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Cover
WHY WE FIGHT. At 9:03 a.m., a hijacked
airliner strikes World Trade Center
Tower Two in New York City, as Tower
One (right), struck eighteen minutes be-
fore, burns. Thirty-seven minutes later, a
third hijacked airliner will strike the Pen-
tagon in Washington, D.C.; at 10 a.m.,
a fourth will crash in Pennsylvania. At
8:30 that evening, President George W.
Bush will speak to and for the nation:
“Today, our fellow citizens, our way of
life, our very freedom came under attack
in a series of deliberate and deadly terror-
ist acts. . . . Thousands of lives were sud-
denly ended by evil, despicable acts of
terror. The pictures . . . have filled us with
disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet,
unyielding anger. These acts of mass
murder were intended to frighten our na-
tion into chaos and retreat. But they have
failed. . . . A great people has been moved
to defend a great nation.”
On 20 September the president informed
the world how it would do so: “Our re-
sponse involves far more than instant re-
taliation and isolated strikes. Americans
should not expect one battle, but a
lengthy campaign. . . . It may include
dramatic strikes . . . and covert opera-
tions. . . . We will starve terrorists of
funding, turn them one against another,
drive them . . . until there is no refuge. . . .
And we will pursue nations that provide
aid or safe haven to terrorism.”
The Naval War College’s new President,
Rear Admiral Rodney P. Rempt (whose
President’s Forum begins on page 7), has
mobilized the institution to support the
nation’s new war, with special studies,
faculty task forces, symposia, and scholar-
ship. An example of the latter is our lead
article, by Professor Ahmed Hashim.
Also, Robert Harkavy’s geostrategic study,
though written before the events, speaks
directly to issues that must now be
squarely faced.
Chao Soi Cheong, AP Wide World Photos
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Rear Admiral Rempt was raised in the Los Angeles sub-
urb of Van Nuys and graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy with the class of 1966. He holds master’s de-
grees in systems analysis from Stanford University and
in national security and strategic studies from the Naval
War College. Initial assignments at sea included de-
ployments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9)
and USS Somers (DDG 34). His first sea command was
USS Antelope (PG 86), one of four missile-armed pa-
trol gunboats homeported in Naples, Italy.
Rear Admiral Rempt commanded USS Callaghan (DDG
994) during two western Pacific/Indian Ocean deploy-
ments, and USS Bunker Hill (CG 52), homeported in
Yokosuka, Japan. While aboard Bunker Hill, he served
for eighteen months as the Anti-Air Warfare Commander
for Seventh Fleet.
Duties ashore included three years in the weapon
prototyping office of the Naval Sea Systems Command
as the initial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical
Launch System; on the staff of the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations (CNO) as program coordinator for the Aegis
Weapon System; as the director of the prospective com-
manding officer/executive officer department at the
Surface Warfare Officers Schools Command, in New-
port; and as the Director, Anti-Air Warfare Require-
ments Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Orga-
nization, where he initiated the development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those ef-
forts as Director, Theater Air Defense (N865) on the
CNO’s staff.
In July 1996 Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as
Program Executive Officer, Theater Air Defense, addi-
tionally serving as the U.S. Steering Committee member
for the Nato Seasparrow and Rolling Airframe Missile
multinational programs. In May 1998 he was assigned
as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Theater Combat Systems; in that capacity he was the
principal advisor on the introduction of naval theater
ballistic missile defense and the development of ad-
vanced shipboard combat systems. In June 2000, Rear
Admiral Rempt was assigned as the first Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations for Missile Defense. In September
of that year, he additionally became Director, Surface
Warfare (N76), responsible for all surface warfare per-
sonnel initiatives, ship programs, and combat systems.
Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the forty-eighth
President of the Naval War College on 22 August 2001.
His personal awards include the Legion of Merit (three
awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (three awards),
and the Navy Commendation Medal (three awards, the
second with combat V device).
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
We know that this war is different in nature from any we have
fought in the past. It is not a war for territory, resources, or
hegemony.
THESE ARE MOMENTOUS TIMES. While I write this in late October, the
nation is at war. As President George W. Bush stated to a joint session of Con-
gress on 20 September 2001: “We are a country awakened to danger and called to
defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether
we bring our enemies to justice, or justice to our enemies, justice will be done.”
It is both a great honor and a great responsibility to take command of the Na-
val War College at this point in history. To the faculty and staff of the Naval War
College and the Navy Warfare Development Command; to present and past stu-
dents; and to our entire Navy and Marine Corps, as well as those of our allies and
friends, I promise I will do my utmost to provide sound guidance and strong en-
couragement in the months and years ahead. My assignment is a dream come
true—a chance to educate tomorrow’s leaders and to develop a vision of the fu-
ture Navy they will command.
OUR MISSION
In Newport we have two clear, mutually supporting missions. One is to educate
the future leaders of our navy and our nation. Led by the Provost, Rear Admiral
Barbara McGann, our distinguished faculty and staff provide a world-class edu-
cation—focusing on the principles of war. The credentials and accomplish-
ments of our faculty are phenomenal, and the awards and accolades they have
received are too numerous to mention. I know they would be the first to insist,
however, that their greatest satisfaction lies in seeing their students who have
risen to high rank using their Naval War College education on behalf of our
great nation.
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Our other mission is to define the future of the Navy through the develop-
ment of new operational concepts, experimentation at the fleet level, and refine-
ment of tactical doctrine. The staff of the Navy Warfare Development Command,
led by Rear Admiral Bob Sprigg, is propelling the Navy into the twenty-first cen-
tury. Together with the Strategic Studies Group, led by Admiral Jim Hogg, they
are working to define the next Navy and the Navy after next. Whether testing
new hull forms, conceiving unmanned air vehicles, or exploring the potential of
networks to allow real-time targeting, they are in the process of transforming
our service. This is exciting work!
These two missions—education of leaders and definition of the Navy—are
the key ingredients of keeping our Navy strong. They are especially pertinent as
the students of past classes wrestle with the great issues that face our nation in
the Terror War.
THE TERROR WAR
History has taught us—and our recent experiences in Vietnam, Iraq, Kosovo,
and elsewhere have confirmed—that we must clearly understand the funda-
mentals of war:
• Goals: our own, and those of our enemy;
• Strategies: alternate paths for achieving our goals and thwarting those of
our enemy;
• Assessment: how we know whether we are winning or losing;
• End-state: the situation we desire at the end of the war.
The table on the next page lists ten questions our strategic and political lead-
ers must consider as we embark on a war. Armed conflict is a two-sided or
multisided endeavor, and outcomes cannot be guaranteed. Few go to war to lose,
but in a struggle between opposing sides, one is bound to lose. Considerable ef-
fort must be undertaken to ensure we have explored all the dimensions of na-
tional-level strategy and policy issues so that we clearly understand the context
in which we are fighting. In order to win, we need to know what we seek to ac-
complish and then ensure that the means are sufficient and appropriate to
achieve that end.
Identifying Our Enemies. President Bush has helped us in defining who our ene-
mies are—not only terrorists and their support networks but, more importantly,
“nations that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism. . . . [A]ny nation that con-
tinues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a
hostile regime.” Some would believe that the notion of nation-states does not
apply in the Terror War. However, history reminds us that pirates, bandits, or
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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others who live outside the law cannot
long survive if the state they live in pur-
sues them with diligence. It is the safe ha-
ven and support of sympathetic nations
that enable terrorists to go on. So it really
does come down to nation-state versus
nation-state—those that harbor terror-
ists versus those that abhor them. States
that support the rule of law cannot ratio-
nally support terrorism at the same time.
Our president has called for waging
war against any nation that continues to
harbor or support terrorists; such sup-
port is the terrorists’ center of gravity. If
we can dismantle their support structure,
hound them mercilessly in every nation
of the earth, and go after any group or na-
tion that supports them, our war will be
successful. We will reach the point where
terrorists cannot take refuge or have the
wherewithal to plan another sick event.
The world will have ousted this cancer
from our midst.
Of course, today only a few nations openly sponsor, support, or allow terror-
ists within their borders. The world rightfully has spoken out in indignation
against this menace to freedom and the rule of law. But rhetoric is not enough to
stop terrorists. States defiant in their support of terrorism must be compelled by
force to accept the rule of law embraced by the world.
Using Military Force. The president’s ultimatum was the proper first step to warn
complicit governments of our intention to use military force. The terrorists, their
support organizations, and the governments harboring them are subject to at-
tack. How we use military force is, of course, critical. We must demonstrate that
our enemy is terrorists—not Afghans, Arabs, or Muslims—and we must do so in
word and deed, especially in our use of military force. We want to avoid encourag-
ing more terrorist attacks through injuring innocent civilians, causing extensive
collateral damage, or committing human rights abuses. In this war, civilian casu-
alties and general suffering among the Afghan population would probably em-
bolden support for the terrorists. In this case “a little stick,” judiciously applied,
may be much more effective than the “big stick” of large-scale attacks.
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 9
1. What are U.S. goals and objectives?
• What must we do to win?
2. What are our enemies’ objectives?
• What must they do to win?
3. What kind of a war are we involved in?
• Resources? Influence? Ideology?
4. Who or what are our enemies?
• How do they assess us as adversaries?
5. What are our enemies’ strategies?
• What is their center of gravity?
6. What should U.S. strategy be?
• What are the alternative approaches?
7. What are our coalition objectives and strategy?
• How important is coalition support?
8. For what purposes is military power applicable?
• How should we apply it?
9. What end-state are we looking for?
• What constitutes victory?
10. How can we assess how well we are doing?
• What are the metrics?
QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY: THE TERROR WAR
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Once our overall war aims and resulting strategies are in place, defining suit-
able and achievable objectives for military action will become critical. In this we
will have to curb our expectations of what military force might actually accom-
plish; not all our goals are achievable with bullets and bombs. Designing a suc-
cessful military campaign against
the shadowy and elusive world-
wide terrorist network is a tall
challenge. In the end, the overall
effort will have to be political,
diplomatic, and even economic if
we are to achieve the president’s
goal of finding, stopping, and de-
feating “every terrorist group of
global reach.”
We know that this war is differ-
ent in nature from any we have
fought in the past. It is not a war for
territory, resources, or hegemony. It
is a war of freedom against tyranny,
justice against mass murder, open
markets and capitalism against malnutrition and unrelieved poverty. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld helped define how we will know we have won: “The
ultimate victory in this war is when everyone who wants to can . . . get up, let your
children go to school, go out of the house and not in fear, stand here on a sidewalk
and not worry about a truck bomb driving into us.”
What we are fighting for are our basic beliefs and freedoms as Americans, the
freedoms guaranteed us by our Constitution, Bill of Rights, and the democratic
rule of law. These freedoms were violently taken away from those who died in
lower Manhattan and the Pentagon. That is why we must act.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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The terrorists who attacked the United States
on September 11 aimed at one nation but
wounded an entire world. Rarely, if ever, has
the world been as united as it was on that ter-
rible day. It was a unity born of horror, of fear,
of outrage, and of profound sympathy with the
American people. This unity also reflected the
fact that the World Trade Center, in this
uniquely international city, was home to men
and women of every faith from some 60 nations.
This was an attack on all humanity, and all
humanity has a stake in defeating the forces
behind it.
KOFI A. ANNAN, 21 September 2001
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THE WORLD ACCORDING TO USAMA BIN LADEN
Ahmed S. Hashim
Since 11 September 2001, a day etched in the memories of all Americans,Usama Bin Laden has replaced Saddam Hussein as Public Enemy Number
One. This is hardly surprising, given the growing consensus that the Saudi fugitive
and his shadowy Al-Qaeda network were responsible for the deadliest terrorist at-
tack on American soil, the single deadliest act of terrorism anywhere to date.
For over a decade Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had been perceived as a “new Hit-
ler,” a totalitarian thug with nasty weapons and an age-old quest for personal
and national aggrandizement. Americans felt they understood his agenda of
territorial irredentism and greed. Moreover, while he “talked the talk,” he could
not “walk the walk.” His threat to unleash the “mother of all battles” with his
vaunted army turned into the “mother of all embarrassments,” the humiliating
defeat of that army in February 1991.
Bin Laden, on the other hand, is terrifyingly different for most Americans.
Perhaps many were vaguely familiar with him as a result of the bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998, and the
attack on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden Harbor in 2000, all of which he is sus-
pected of masterminding. Now, as a result of terror attacks by which he “reached
out and touched” the homeland, Bin Laden is known,
at least by name, to every American.
The attacks were carried out against the symbols of
American economic and military power, the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. There are indications
that the White House, the symbol of American politi-
cal power, was also a target. The attacks of 11 Septem-
ber 2001 constituted not only a political, economic,
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and psychological blow but also a cultural shock to Americans. Bin Laden’s ideas
and visions are unfamiliar to most Americans, who find the idea of a holy war in
this day and age bizarre. Questions abound: “Why do they hate us?” “What does
he want?” Indeed, Bin Laden’s goals remain the least understood aspect of this
crisis.
His methods were unfamiliar to most Americans, who have indeed suffered from
acts of terror committed against them and their country’s interests, but overseas.
Large-scale terror attacks at home have been rare. The conspiracy to bring down
the World Trade Center towers in 1993 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
building in Oklahoma City in 1995 were significant acts of terror, but they pale
by comparison with the events of 11 September 2001. The latter attacks were di-
abolically brilliant in conception and execution. The perpetrators did not use
“normal” weapons of war—they attacked the United States not with interconti-
nental ballistic missiles but with commercial aircraft used as guided mis-
siles—and the result was the deaths of thousands of innocent people. If this was
not terrorism, what is?
We can eschew a long and ultimately futile discussion of the definition of
terrorism. Much ink has been spilled on this topic.1 The definition used by the
U.S. government (and analyzed in detail by Paul Pillar) is sufficient for the pur-
poses of this paper: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usu-
ally intended to influence an audience.”2
The 11 September perpetrators were not ten-foot-tall “supermen” but “ordi-
nary,” in some cases well educated, men who planned their mission well but who
also made many mistakes prior to the commission of their act.3 Moreover, the
hijackers were not armed with the latest in sophisticated gadgetry but with box
cutters and knives. Nonetheless, and most important, they were willing to lay
down their lives. They were of a breed of men that one Israeli terrorism expert
has called “Islamikaze.”4 But they are not a new phenomenon, their kind having
appeared in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Suicide attacks have plagued Israel since
the mid-1990s and have caused a considerable number of casualties during the
cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians that erupted in October 2000.
However, apart from events like the assault on the U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut in 1983 (a bombing that killed 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers) and the
suicide attack on the USS Cole by two men in a speedboat, the last time Ameri-
cans had come face to face with this culturally different form of warfare was in
the Pacific War against the Japanese. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001
spawned a vast “instant” literature seeking to answer a large number of disparate
questions. What do these terror attacks on the continental United States mean
for homeland defense and national missile defense? Who is Usama Bin Laden?
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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How were the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon planned?
How does the shadowy Al-Qaeda network function?
There has been very little writing, however, that deals with Bin Laden’s
thought and the rationale for the Al-Qaeda. Raymond Tanter describes Bin
Laden as a freelancer who is completely independent of states yet operates
within a state and may collaborate with rogue regimes. However, Tanter offers
little about the man and his ideas.5 Yossef Bodansky has produced a vast com-
pendium of myths, facts, and half-truths, all lacking documentation.6 Mary
Anne Weaver presents a biographical summary of Bin Laden’s life but no de-
tailed analysis of his philosophy.7
Major studies of Bin Laden are reported to be on the way, but in the mean-
time, a short piece by Michael Dobbs in the Washington Post and a presentation
by Dr. Bard O’Neill on Bin Laden’s view of the world warrant mention.8 By far
the most detailed and complex analysis of the religious background of Bin
Laden’s thought is a study by Rosalind Gwynne.9
What, then, is Bin Laden’s philosophy, with its origins, message, and goals—in
other words, his worldview? In times of crisis, tragedy, or war, human beings
tend to view things in Manichean terms—as a struggle between the good and the
bad, viewed as equally powerful—and to portray an antagonist as unmitigatedly
evil. However, the best way ultimately to defeat one’s enemies is to understand
them.
Our quest for understanding relies on a three-level methodological frame-
work. First, in order to understand Bin Laden’s conception of world order, two
interrelated analytical steps are necessary. We need to understand the political,
cultural, and social milieu, or context, within which Bin Laden arose—some of
the political ideas of the Islamists who influenced him.
The context of the Arab world in particular, and the Islamic world in general,
is one of turmoil as a result of the declining political legitimacy of rulers and of
massive socioeconomic and identity crises. Relatedly, we need to understand
that Bin Laden is not among the foremost Islamists; nor are his
ideas particularly original. Over the past two decades, Islamists
have sought to explain the causes of the political, socioeco-
nomic, and identity-related crises of their own societies and of
the Islamic world and to provide solutions to them. Bin Laden
drew many of his ideas from such Islamists, in particular the
Egyptian Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag, who was executed
in 1982 for his role in the assassination of President Anwar
Al-Sadat. Farag himself was not an original thinker; indeed,
more famous scholars offer a deeper understanding of the
philosophical wellsprings of Islamic fundamentalism. Farag
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is important because he wrote a manifesto of action for the Islamic
fundamentalists.
Second, we need to address Bin Laden’s own ideas, by tracing his evolution
from the unremarkable scion of a wealthy family into an Islamist in 1979 and
then proceeding to a careful textual analysis of some interviews over the last
several years. It will be necessary to keep in mind, however, that Bin Laden is a
man more of action than of words.
Third, what does it all mean? What is Bin Laden trying to achieve in the larger
scheme of things? Does his war against the United States, and by extension the
rest of the West, portend a “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Is-
lamic world?10 He may see it in such terms, but does this mean that the West
should? If in fact the West succumbs to the siren song of those who would wel-
come such a clash, the implications will be far-reaching and ominous.
POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
The context from which Usama Bin Laden emerged was that of the Arab world.
Bin Laden, after all, is an Arab from Saudi Arabia, even though he later based
himself in non-Arab Afghanistan. In this context, it is instructive to begin with
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 following its defeat in World War I.
The Arabic-speaking peoples who had been a part of this Turkish-ruled multi-
ethnic empire sought to found an independent Arab state, or states. In a remark-
able study, the noted Arab-American scholar Fouad Ajami borrowed from T. E.
Lawrence the phrase “dream palace” to describe the intellectual edifice of secular
nationalism and modernity that the Arabs constructed and thought would con-
stitute the theoretical underpinnings of their entry into the modern world.11
The “Catastrophe”
The imposition following World War I of European colonialism, particularly in
its British and French variants, did not dim Arab optimism concerning the
future. Indeed, the adherence of many Arab thinkers to imported European no-
tions of secular nationalism and modernity led them to object to colonialism
specifically because of the resulting underdevelopment and the lack of legiti-
macy of puppet regimes. Some Arab thinkers and politicians in the interwar
years turned their backs on secular, liberal nationalism, because of its associa-
tion with Britain and France, and espoused radical nationalist tendencies and
far-right ideologies that looked on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy with sympa-
thy. Ultimately, though, Arabs saw their salvation in ideas brought from the
West. Very few subscribed to the view that a return to the precepts of Islam con-
stituted a solution to the subjugation of the Arab world to colonialism and to
its lack of development.
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Even in the 1950s and 1960s, when independence came and the elites of the
colonial regimes were overthrown by supposedly forward-looking modernizers,
many Arab thinkers and some rulers continued to believe that the moderniza-
tion of their societies lay in the
implementation of a nationalist
and socialist agenda. Modern so-
cieties, dynamic economies, and
powerful armies were the visible
outcomes desired by the post–World War II “enlightened” dictators who
emerged in many Arab countries. They did not achieve those outcomes. The hu-
miliating Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967 became, in the view of Fouad
Ajami, the Waterloo of Arab secular nationalism. This defeat was known in
Arabic as al nakba, the catastrophe, a term denoting something deeper than a
mere battlefield reverse. Indeed, the defeat was a sad commentary on the entire
Arab world, but particularly on the modernizing regimes, which had been
shown to be corrupt, tin-pot dictatorships. Their economies were a mess; they
had not created a new “socialist man,” with progressive ideas; certainly, they had
not built powerful armies.
Not surprisingly, no sooner had the Arab militaries been defeated than a
whole generation of intellectuals and politicians sought to analyze the causes.
The secularists argued that the Arab states had been defeated by a modern and
advanced power, that the Arabs had lost because they had failed to modernize ef-
fectively and thoroughly. Their solution was to deepen the quest for modernity.
Others were more conservative, arguing that the solution was a blending of Arab
and Islamic culture with the best that the Western world had to offer in the way
of technology.12
The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism
However, it was the views of a group of thinkers who came to be known as “Is-
lamic fundamentalists” that became most prominent. Islamic fundamentalism
is not a new phenomenon, but it has gained strength whenever great stress has
been placed on Arab or other Muslim societies.13 The 1967 defeat constituted
such a period in Arab history. Some Islamic fundamentalists argued that Israel
had won the 1967 war because its people had remained true to their faith,
whereas the Arab world had lost because its rulers and people had turned away
from their own faith, Islam. Others took the point farther, arguing forcefully
that the Arab world needed to turn its back on imported and alien ideologies
and return to Islam. They dismissed Western approaches, such as the idea and
practice of the secular nation-state, as hulul mustawrada, “imported solutions.”14
The continued failures of all Arab regimes following the defeat of 1967 provided
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more ammunition to the Islamic fundamentalists.15 Indeed, The Economist put
it concisely and accurately not long after the 11 September 2001 attack:
The past three decades have provided fertile ground for these ideas [Islamic funda-
mentalism]. Nearly every Muslim country has experienced the kind of social stress
that generates severe doubt, discontent and despair. Populations have exploded.
Cities, once the abode of the privileged, have been overrun by impoverished, dis-
contented provincials. The authoritarian nature of many postcolonial governments,
the frequent failure of their great plans, and their continued dependence on western
money, arms and science have discredited their brand of secularism. The intrusion of
increasingly liberal western ways, brought by radio, films, television, the Internet and
tourism, has engendered schism by seducing some and alienating others.16
To sum up, the nation-states of the Arab world, and of the Islamic world in
general, have failed to meet the triple challenge of modernity, economic devel-
opment, and political legitimacy. Islamic fundamentalists point to this failure as
grounds for opposition to imported solutions and for acceptance of their own
concept—the nizam Islami, the Islamic order. Before discussing what some
Islamists mean by “Islamic order” and their various strategies for bringing it
about, a few words about Islam itself are necessary.
The Islamic Divine Order. Unlike Christianity, Islam is both a religion and a
sociopolitical system. There is no separation between church and state, between
God and Caesar. The Prophet Muhammad was both a religious figure, who re-
ceived the Koran as a revelation from God, and a political ruler, who conducted
affairs of state, engaged in diplomatic interactions with his neighbors, and
fought wars against his enemies. There was in Islam no Reformation like that
which Christianity underwent in the sixteenth century; in fact, the very notion is
theoretically alien to the Islamic community, or Umma—“theoretically,” be-
cause for most of the history of Islam, Muslims have not really lived under an Is-
lamic order. The Ottoman Empire, which ruled the vast majority of Arabs and
Muslim peoples for close to five hundred years, could be conceived of as an Is-
lamic order only by stretching the notion; the sultans in Istanbul were often cor-
rupt and dissolute men who came to power by illegitimate means and were
ultimately incapable of protecting the Islamic community from the depreda-
tions of foreign powers.
Modern rulers in the Arab and Muslim worlds have fared no better; their lit-
any of failures and defeats has been long and sorrowful. The Islamic fundamen-
talists’ own vision of rule calls for the implementation of hakimiyat Allah, God’s
rule, under which the divine law, the Sharia, would hold sway. An Islamic divine
order is one that is characterized by the sovereignty of God alone. The head of
such an Islamic state exercises power legitimately only insofar as he carries out
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the will of God—that is to say, the injunctions of the Sharia. This Islamic divine
order stands in stark contrast to constructs created by Western man and im-
ported into the Islamic societies.
Man-made political orders, such
as secular-liberal or Marxist poli-
ties, assert that sovereignty belongs
to man. This, in the Islamic divine
order, is blasphemy—God alone
is sovereign. Muslims who live under man-made political orders exist in a mod-
ern jahiliyyah, originally a Koranic term describing the state of ignorance and
barbarism that prevailed in Arabia before the revelations to the Prophet Mu-
hammad.17 In the modern context, jahiliyyah refers to societies that are antithet-
ical to Islamic order.
If Islamic order is the solution, how is it brought about? As Lenin asked, chto
delat’? What is to be done?18 Taken to their logical conclusion, the political views
of many Islamic fundamentalists inevitably imply violent confrontation with
the state. But the reality of power relationships, to paraphrase Samuel Johnson,
concentrates the mind wonderfully. Fighting the Arab state poses major prob-
lems. Notwithstanding its decay and corruption, the Arab nation-state has a
formidable apparatus, in the shape of large security services and paramilitary
forces. In fact, one could argue convincingly that one of the few successes of the
modern Arab state—its ability to survive in spite of its multitude of problems—has
been due simply to its efficient, multilayered, and well funded security appara-
tus. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s Islamic fundamentalists launched bloody
armed struggles against the secular states of Algeria and Egypt.19 Neither has yet
collapsed. They have been weakened and their legitimacy further battered, but
the Arab state, as represented by those two countries as well as by Syria and
Iraq—both of which have faced their own Islamic radicals—has been as ruthless
as its opponents.
Not surprisingly, given this disparity in power, some Islamic fundamentalists
have focused their attention on the individual within society, or on the society
itself; this approach, a form of Basil Liddell Hart’s strategy of the “indirect ap-
proach,” avoids head-on confrontation with the state and seeks to re-Islamize
individuals in their daily lives, in the hope that they will break radically with the
manners and customs of “impious” society. Others have adopted a broader and
more peaceful approach that seeks to re-Islamize society as a whole by propagat-
ing Islamic cultural values throughout such institutions as the media, the judi-
ciary, entertainment, etc. The commanding heights of the state, so to speak, are left
alone, because any assault on the political leadership, public institutions, or armed
forces elicits a vigorous and vicious response. Of course, both indirect strategies
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ultimately undermine secular foundations of the nation-state; neither is easy to
combat, as the secular Turkish state has discovered over the last decade.20
The Neglected Duty. Some extremist Islamic fundamentalists continue to preach the
necessity and virtue of direct action, of armed struggle. To legitimize and promote
such a proactive approach in the face of the pitfalls and dangers, one needs a jus-
tification. That justification has appeared in a little-known manifesto, Al-Faridah
Al-Gha’ibah (the neglected duty), by Muhammad Abdel Salam Al-Farag. The work
of this Egyptian Islamic radical, who was a member of Al-Jihad, is critical to un-
derstanding Usama Bin Laden’s conception of world order and his choice of direct
confrontation.21
Farag begins his manifesto by asking, “Do we live in an Islamic state?” A Mus-
lim lives in an Islamic polity if its rulers follow the Islamic law. If not, Muslims
are said to be in the dar al Kufr, abode of infidels. Rebellion against such a system
is permissible. Farag quotes the Prophet Muhammad: “If you have proof of infi-
delity [you] must fight it.”22 He dismisses all the possible peaceful ways that have
been put forward for the establishment of an Islamic polity.23 The only way, says
Farag, is jihad, which is imperative against oppressive and iniquitous rulers.
The meaning of jihad has been a cause of considerable controversy among
Western scholars of Islam and its popular interpreters. It has erroneously been
taken to mean “holy war.”24 The phrase meaning “holy war” is harb mukaddasah;25
jihad conveys striving or exertion (that is, fighting) in the way of God—against
the evil in oneself, against Satan, against apostates (murtadd) within one’s soci-
ety, or against infidels. For Farag, the most important jihad is the third one. It is
so important that jihad, says Farag, should be the sixth pillar of the Islamic
faith (see the table). This is a striking innovation, since Islam’s five pillars of
faith—individual and social obligations—were prescribed by the Prophet Mu-
hammad in a hadith, or saying.
Farag argues that the Islamists must focus first on the enemy at home: “We
must begin . . . by establishing the rule of God in our nation. . . . [T]he first battle-
field for jihad is the uprooting of these infidel leaders and replacing them with
an Islamic system from which we can build.”26 Only afterward can the enemy
“who is afar” (in Farag’s words) be combatted. Usama Bin Laden seems to have
reversed the order somewhat, in that he has con-
centrated primarily on the enemy who is techni-
cally afar, the United States, rather than on the
impious rulers of Islamic states. But the situa-
tion by the 1990s was far different from when
Farag was executed in 1982. In the 1990s the
United States established a visible and looming
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presence in the Arabian Peninsula—the “land of the two holy mosques,” in Bin
Laden’s language. In this context, Bin Laden, who focuses his ire on the United
States as the support of its “puppets,” the Al-Sauds, sees the enemy at home and
the enemy who is afar as intricately linked in a symbiotic relationship.
Finally, jihad, says Farag, allows all kinds of operational tactics. Deceiving and
lying to the enemy is permissible, as it allows “victory with the fewest losses and
by the easiest means possible.”27 Similarly, infiltrating the infidels’ ranks and ap-
pearing to be one of them is also permissible.28 Farag also mentions the impor-
tance of detailed planning before the battle is joined.
Farag’s exposition of jihad influenced many within the present circles of
Islamic revolutionary action; one of these was Usama Bin Laden. Bin Laden may
have read Farag on his own; it is more likely that Farag’s ideas were passed on
to him by his second in charge, the fugitive Egyptian surgeon Dr. Ayman
al-Zawahiri.29
THE EVOLUTION OF A TERRORIST
Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden was born in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in
1957. He was the seventeenth of fifty-two children, and the seventh son sired by
Sheikh Muhammad Bin Laden, who had come to Saudi Arabia in 1930 from the
Hadramaut region of Yemen.30 Muhammad Bin Laden came into Saudi Arabia a
destitute man; he would die in 1968 (in an airplane crash) a billionaire. Over the
decades he established his family as the wealthiest in the construction industry
in Saudi Arabia, with strong financial ties and bonds of friendship to the royal
family. Nothing in his son’s early years indicated that Usama, born into wealth
and privilege, was destined to achieve notoriety on the world stage.
The Transformation of 1979
Bin Laden’s father was dominating and domineering, and he imposed discipline
and a strict social and religious code on all his children. Some accounts say Bin
Laden was quite religious, living in a city, Jeddah, that was exposed to the
thought of many Islamic scholars. Others argue that Bin Laden was not at all
religious and had imbibed liberal ideas from his Syrian mother, a progressive
woman who was his father’s fourth wife. Bin Laden attended King Abdul Aziz
University in Jeddah and in 1979 earned a degree—in economics and manage-
ment, by some accounts, or in civil engineering, by others. It is difficult to get a
clear-cut picture of Bin Laden’s early years. Unlike many other committed fun-
damentalists, Bin Laden never lived or studied in the West. However, he is an
educated man, like many others who succumbed to radical politics through
distaste for, and frustration with, the conditions prevailing in their societies.
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We should judge the year 1979 as transformative in Bin Laden’s life. In that
year three major events shook the Middle East. On 26 March, Egypt and Israel
made peace, a peace that was denounced by Arabs and Muslims the world over as
a sellout. Two months earlier, an Iranian revolution led by an ascetic cleric, the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, toppled the shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi,
the most powerful ruler in the
Middle East and the most impor-
tant pillar of U.S. security and
economic interests in the Persian
Gulf. Finally, in December, the So-
viets invaded Afghanistan, a Mus-
lim country with an unstable Marxist puppet government aligned with the
Soviet Union. We do not know whether the first two events, momentous as they
were, had much impact on Bin Laden; the last event definitely did. In one of his
earliest interviews Bin Laden recalled, “When the invasion of Afghanistan started,
I was enraged and went there at once. I arrived within days, before the end of
1979.”31
Bin Laden may have been exaggerating the alacrity with which he traveled to
Afghanistan, but the Soviet invasion was certainly important for him, in two
major ways. First, it was an act by an external enemy, an infidel and godless
enemy, against an Islamic country. This led Bin Laden to focus his wrath on the
enemy outside of Islam rather than on the internal oppressive ruler. Second, the
jihad in Afghanistan brought Bin Laden face to face with the military and
technological strength of a superpower. He was impressed in some ways, yet dis-
dainful in others. He and the contingent of Muslim volunteers from Arab coun-
tries—on which more below—fought the Soviets to a standstill in a couple of
battles.32 Bin Laden thought that the Soviets were admirably ruthless but also
paper tigers: “The myth of the super power was destroyed not only in my mind
but also in the minds of all Muslims. Slumber and fatigue vanished.”33
Bin Laden’s Political Philosophy and Strategy of Direct Action
The evolution of Bin Laden’s political philosophy will be examined from the
early 1990s to the present, through a textual analysis of his interviews, his fatwas
(rulings), and his “epistles,” or edicts. All of these point to his tactics and concep-
tions of world order, from the struggle in Afghanistan to his current struggle
against the United States.
The Afghanistan War and Exile. Upon his arrival in Afghanistan, Bin Laden be-
gan to develop his conception of who the outside enemy was, a view that he ar-
ticulated to a French journalist in 1995—it was the communists and the West. “I
did not fight against the communist threat while forgetting the peril from the
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West. . . . I discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan, but that we
had to fight on all fronts against communist or Western oppression. The urgent
thing was communism but the next target was America. . . . This is an open war
up to the end, until victory.”34
In Bin Laden’s eyes, he and the Afghan guerrillas were aligned at the time with
the Americans solely because they were fighting a common enemy. It is not clear
what relationship he had, if any, with the Central Intelligence Agency, which was
pouring money and arms into Af-
ghanistan. Whatever the case, Bin
Laden regarded America as an en-
emy; if he did accept funds and
weapons, it simply indicated his
willingness to collaborate opera-
tionally with one ideological enemy in order to go after another. (In this connec-
tion, it would be useful to know whether he has since accepted support from
regional states with which he and his network have little ideological affinity.)
Second, the war in Afghanistan showed Bin Laden’s modus operandi, politi-
cal and organizational skills, flexibility, and opportunism. Contrary to popular
belief, he did not rush into Afghanistan, AK-47 in hand, to battle the Soviets
personally. The jihad was not only a matter of fighting, dying, and killing in the
name of God. It required extensive preparation, a logistical infrastructure, polit-
ical support for the Afghan fighters, funds, and the recruitment of Muslim vol-
unteers from other parts of the Islamic world. Bin Laden did not participate in
major battles at this stage. Between 1979 and 1982, in fact, he was in Afghanistan
for only short periods. He made several trips out to collect money and matériel
for the guerrillas. In late 1982 he took back construction and earth-moving ma-
chinery; an Iraqi engineer friend used it to dig massive tunnels and caves into the
mountains in Bakhhar Province for hospitals and weapons depots.
In 1984 he formalized his role in the Afghan conflict, establishing a guesthouse
in Peshawar for Muslim volunteers on their way to the war, and cofounding
(with the well-known Palestinian Islamist ’Abdullah Azzam) the Maktab al
Khidamat, or Jihad Service Bureau. The bureau was a propaganda and charity
organization whose publications ultimately attracted thousands of Arabs and
other Muslims to fight in the war.
By 1984 these volunteers were arriving in significant numbers. At the height
of the conflict the “Afghan Arabs” included fifteen thousand from Saudi Arabia,
five thousand from Yemen, three to five thousand from Egypt, two thousand
from Algeria, a thousand from the Arab states of the Gulf, a thousand more
from Libya, and several hundred from Iraq. Apparently Bin Laden played a cru-
cial role in facilitating the entry into Afghanistan of these willing recruits.35 He
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commanded some of the Afghan Arabs, and in 1986 he decided to enter the bat-
tle actively against the Soviet forces. Among the fighters under his command
were former senior military officers from Egypt and Syria, with combat experi-
ence and with training in the Soviet Union.36
Bin Laden continued to pay attention to preparations and infrastructure. He
cultivated people in high places to fill the coffers for the war effort against the
Soviets. One of Bin Laden’s most
productive years was 1988, when
he realized that he needed better
documentation of the activities of
the Afghan Arabs. A formalized
structure was essential to keep track of the comings and goings of the foreign
fighters and to list their wounded and dead. For this he set up Al-Qaeda, mean-
ing simply “the base.”37 In due course Al-Qaeda developed into a large clearing-
house for a host of loosely aligned radical Islamic organizations.38
Thus, in a nutshell, if Bin Laden entered Afghanistan as a dilettante, he left as
a committed believer. Apart from articulation of his views of the enemy and his
recognition that the enemy was not invulnerable, he set down little in the way of
political philosophy or worldview. In 1989 the Soviets acknowledged defeat and
withdrew from Afghanistan. It was clear to most people by then that the Soviet
Union was a superpower in terminal decline. Bin Laden believed that the Afghan
Arabs had contributed in no small measure to its collapse.
Interestingly, when Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989 he began to
focus his attention on an enemy that was close at hand—not the Saudi regime
but Saddam Hussein of Iraq. In 1989 Bin Laden began to warn of impending
Iraqi aggression against the kingdom. He saw Saddam Hussein as a greedy and
aggressive secular Arab nationalist, an anti-Islamic ruler who could threaten two
holy places, Mecca and Medina. In August of 1990—perhaps another milestone
year for Bin Laden—Iraq invaded Kuwait. In Bin Laden’s eyes, one of the key du-
ties of an Islamic ruler is to defend his territory from aggression. He suggested
that Saudi Arabia augment its defenses, on which the rulers had spent so lavishly,
with thousands of former Afghan Arabs.
To the consternation of Bin Laden, the royal family decided instead to invite
the Americans, infidels, to defend the holy places. In 1998, in his declaration of
the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders” (discussed
below), there was clear evidence of Bin Laden’s dismay, expressed in masterful
Arabic imagery:
Since God laid down the Arabian peninsula, created its desert, and surrounded it
with its seas, no calamity has ever befallen it like these Crusader hosts that have
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spread in it like locusts, crowding its soil, eating its fruits, and destroying its verdure;
and this at a time when the nations contend against the Muslims like diners jostling
around a bowl of food.39
What he saw as an American invasion led Bin Laden in 1995 to articulate his
first major critique of the Saudi regime, in an “Open Letter to King Fahd.” In it
Bin Laden took the royal family to task for lack of commitment to Islam, squan-
dering of public funds and oil money, inability to implement a viable defense
policy, and dependence on non-Muslims for protection. This came very close to
denying the political legitimacy of the Al-Sauds. In his communiqué Bin Laden
advocated a campaign of small-scale attacks on U.S. forces in the kingdom. The
royal family stripped him of his nationality and sent him into exile, first to
Sudan and ultimately back to Afghanistan. Not long after his falling-out with the
Saudi royal family, attacks were conducted against U.S. facilities in Dhahran
(1995) and at Khobar (1996). Bin Laden did not claim “credit” for these attacks
but, in what was to become a trademark following attacks in which he was im-
plicated, applauded the perpetrators: “What happened . . . when 24 Americans
were killed in two bombings is clear evidence of the huge anger of Saudi people
against America. The Saudis now know their real enemy is America.”40
“Declaration of War against the Americans.” The philosophical underpinnings
of Bin Laden’s opposition to America are to be found in two key epistles. The
first is the “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the
Two Holy Places,” issued on 23 August 1996.41 We must understand the regional
and global context in which what is being called the “Ladenese Epistle” first cir-
culated. Muslims, says Bin Laden, from Palestine to Iraq, from Chechnya to
Bosnia, have been slaughtered in large numbers, their lands expropriated, and
their wealth looted, by non-Muslims:
The people of Islam [have] suffered from aggression, iniquity, and injustice imposed
on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators, to the extent that
the Muslims’ blood became the cheapest and their wealth was loot in the hands of
enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the
massacre of Qana, in Lebanon, are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in
[Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina] took place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake
the conscience.42
What, one may ask, has all this to do with America? These events were unfor-
tunate, but America cannot be blamed for them. Not so, Bin Laden—and many
others in the region, even some who do not share his vision—would respond.
America, they would say, provided some of the arms used in massacres of Mus-
lims; for example, the killing of hundreds of Lebanese civilians in Qana in 1996
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in the wake of the Israeli Operation GRAPES OF WRATH involved American
weapons. In the Yugoslav civil war, America stood passively by, mouthing plati-
tudes about human rights, as Muslim civilians were massacred. America does
nothing while Russians slaughter Chechens yearning to be free of Moscow’s
yoke. Further, they would reply, America says nothing about the depredations of
the Arab and Muslim rulers against their own peoples.
However, the focus of Bin Laden’s anger in the 1996 epistle was the continued
American “occupation” of the land of the holy places, a presence that the corrupt
Al-Sauds had permitted at a time when their country suffered from economic
distress and demoralization. Several attempts by well-meaning citizens to draw
the attention of the Al-Sauds to the terrible state of the country had been to no
avail. Why?
Everyone [has] agreed that the situation cannot be rectified . . . unless the root of the
problem is tackled. Hence it is essential to hit the main enemy who divided the
Umma into small and little countries and pushed it, for the last few decades, into a
state of confusion. The Zionist-Crusader alliance moves quickly to contain and abort
any “corrective movement” appearing in the Islamic countries.43
In this regard, one of the most important duties of Muslims is “pushing the
Americans out of the holy land.” To lend weight to his argument Bin Laden
quotes a noted Islamic jurist of medieval times, Ibn Taymiyyah, who argued that
when Muslims face a serious threat, they must ignore minor differences and col-
laborate to get the enemy out of the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam). As Bin Laden
put it, “If there [is] more than one duty to be carried out, then the most impor-
tant one should receive priority. Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more
important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. . . . The
ill effect of ignoring these [minor] differences, at a given period of time, is much
less than the ill effect of the occupation of the Muslims’ land by the great Kufr
[unbelief].”44 If the Muslims fight one another instead of the great Kufr, they will
incur casualties, exhaust their own economic and financial resources, destroy
their infrastructures and oil industries, and expose themselves to even greater
control by the Zionist-Crusader alliance.
Also in this epistle Bin Laden articulates his disdain for the United States. Af-
ter the attacks on American installations in Saudi Arabia, William Perry, the sec-
retary of defense at the time, declared (Bin Laden says) that the explosions had
“taught him one lesson: that is, not to withdraw when attacked by coward terror-
ists.” Bin Laden’s response in his 1996 epistle is an interesting look into his
mind-set:
We say to the Defense Secretary that his talk can induce a grieving mother to
laughter! . . . Where was this false courage of yours when the explosion in Beirut took
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place in 1983? . . . You [were] turned into scattered pits and pieces at that time; 241
mainly marine soldiers were killed. And where was this courage of yours when two
explosions made you leave Aden in less than twenty-four hours! But your most dis-
graceful case was in Somalia; where—after vigorous propaganda about the power of
the USA and its post–Cold War leadership of the new world order—you moved tens
of thousands of an international force, including twenty-eight thousand American
soldiers, into Somalia. However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor bat-
tles and one American pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area
carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. . . . You have
been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew. The extent of your impotence and weak-
nesses became very clear.45
Bin Laden, then, views the United States as a paper tiger, like the Soviet
Union—which, however, he considers a more worthy opponent, because it
fought hard and ruthlessly in Afghanistan. However, Bin Laden may be mak-
ing a mistake here. Americans are often blinded by what the British strategic an-
alyst Ken Booth once called “strategic ethnocentrism,” inability to perceive other
cultures or societies in an empathetic manner, or to understand them. Bin Laden
may suffer from the same disease vis-à-vis the United States. He may have un-
derestimated the nation’s resilience and ingenuity; he may believe that after the
Somalia experience it would always respond in a lumbering, technological man-
ner and do no more than launch a few cruise missiles. These assumptions may be
among the first cracks that can be exploited in the edifice of his conception of
the world.
Nonetheless, Bin Laden does not underestimate the difficulty of fighting the
United States. Islamic fundamentalists elsewhere—such as Sheikh Hussain Fadlallah
of the Lebanese organization Hizballah—have had to deal with an imbalance of
power between their groups and their enemy, Israel. For his part, Bin Laden is
quite aware of the technological superiority of the United States:
Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between
our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be
adopted—that is, using fast-moving light forces that work under complete secrecy.
In other words to initiate a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the
military forces, take part in it. And as you know, it is wise, in the present circum-
stances, for the armed military forces not to be engaged in a conventional fight with
the forces of the crusader enemy.46
Nowhere in the 1996 epistle did Bin Laden refer to the type of operation that
was to occur on 11 September 2001 (though, of course, that does not preclude
its possibility). He focused on the creation of the kinds of assets needed to attack
forward-positioned U.S. forces, such as those in Saudi Arabia. How does one re-
dress an imbalance of power? Bin Laden mentions a number of ideas in his
H A S H I M 2 5
29
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
“Declaration of War,” such as boycotting American goods. More interesting is
his belief, expressed elsewhere in 1998, that it would be permissible for him to
acquire weapons of mass destruction: “Acquiring weapons for the defense of
Muslims is a religious duty. If I
have indeed acquired these weap-
ons, then I thank God for enabling
me to do so. And if I seek to ac-
quire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not
to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting
harm on Muslims.”47
It seems also that the strategy of using “fast-moving light forces” includes the
salutary application of terror.48 In another part of the epistle Bin Laden says that
terrorism against American forces is legitimate: “Terrorizing you, while you are
carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. . . . [Y]our
example and our example is like a snake which entered into a house of a man and
got killed by him. The coward is the one who lets you walk, while carrying arms,
freely on his land and provides you with peace and security.”49
The italicized passage is important, as it highlights an essential difference be-
tween Bin Laden’s conception of terrorism and that of Americans: he considers
the killing of unarmed U.S. personnel in their offices or barracks legitimate;
the American view is that the indiscriminate killing of unarmed personnel is
clear-cut terrorism and illegitimate.
The 1996 epistle ended on this intriguing note. However, later that year, in the
October–November 1996 issue of an Islamic magazine, Nida’ ul Islam, Bin
Laden dismissed the notion that his declaration of war against the United States
presence in the holy land was terrorism. Instead, he argued, it was what America
and its ally Israel were doing to the Muslim peoples that constituted terrorism:
The evidence overwhelmingly shows America and Israel killing the weaker men,
women and children in the Muslim world and elsewhere. A few examples of this are
seen in the recent Qana massacre in Lebanon, and the death of more than 600,000
Iraqi children because of the shortage of food and medicine which resulted from the
boycotts and sanctions against the Muslim Iraqi people. . . . Not to forget the drop-
ping of the atom bombs on cities with their entire populations of children, elderly
and women, on purpose and in a premeditated manner, as was the case with Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.50
In his “Declaration of War against the United States” Bin Laden did not target
American civilians, only U.S. military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia.
However, that was to change dramatically.
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“Declaration of the World Islamic Front.” On 22 February 1998, an edict over
Bin Laden’s signature was published in the Arabic-language paper Al-Quds
al-Arabi; it was entitled the “Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad
against the Jews and the Crusaders.” It was a more significant document than the
“Ladenese Epistle.” It articulated more fully why Bin Laden views the United
States as an enemy and how he proposed to deal with that enemy.51
In the 1998 epistle he offered three major reasons why America is to be con-
sidered an enemy of the Islamic peoples:
First—For more than seven years the United States [has been] occupying the lands of
Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its
rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the
peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples. . . .
Second—Despite the immense destruction inflicted on the Iraqi people at the hands
of the Crusader-Jewish alliance and in spite of the appalling number of dead, exceed-
ing a million, the Americans nevertheless, in spite of all this, are trying once more to
repeat this dreadful slaughter. . . . They come again today to destroy what remains of
this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.
Third—While the purposes of the Americans in these wars are religious and eco-
nomic, they also serve the petty state of the Jews, to direct attention from their occu-
pation of Jerusalem and the killing of Muslims in it.
There is no better proof of all this than their eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest
of the neighboring Arab states, and their attempt to dismember all the states of the
region, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Sudan, into petty states, whose
division and weakness would ensure the survival of Israel and the continuation of the
calamitous Crusader occupation of the lands of Arabia.52
These three crimes constituted “a clear declaration of war by the Americans
against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims.” When the Muslim world goes on the
offensive, war is conducted by professional soldiers and even volunteers; how-
ever, when it is under attack, the defense of the community becomes the duty of
every individual Muslim. The Islamic umma, the declaration held, was now
fighting a defensive war against the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance;
therefore, as the ulema (the authorities on theology and Islamic law) had uni-
formly ruled for many centuries, jihad was the duty of every Muslim. This is an
interesting and subtle distinction; because of it, Bin Laden can claim that he is
not responsible when outraged individual Muslims vent their anger on the
United States but that he can understand their actions and justify them.
The declaration’s most important part is a fatwa, or ruling:
To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of ev-
ery Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque
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[in Jerusalem] and the Haram Mosque [in Mecca] are freed from their grip and until
their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, inca-
pable of threatening any Muslim.53
This document is remarkable not because it constitutes a declaration of war
against America or because it makes no distinction between innocent civilians
and military personnel but because it transcends the bounds of fundamentalist
rhetoric and discourse. It reaches out to those in the Arab and Islamic worlds
who do not share the agenda or language of the Islamic fundamentalists.
The 28 September 2001 Interview and 8 October Speech. Indeed, even secular
Arabs and most nonfundamentalist Muslims view with mounting outrage
and despair what America has done to Iraq and its policies with respect to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is crucial for understanding why many people
in the Arab and Islamic worlds viewed the destruction of the World Trade
Center and the damage to the Pentagon with barely concealed glee, studied in-
difference, or awe.
In an interview on 28 September 2001, Bin Laden expressed his reactions to
the terror attacks and the fact that he was viewed as the chief culprit: “I have al-
ready said that I am not involved in the 11 September attacks, nor do I consider
the killing of innocent women, children, and other humans as an appreciable
act. Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other
people.”54
This is very interesting. Bin Laden here seemed to have retreated from his
earlier claim that war against all Americans is permissible and that there is no
distinction between innocents and legitimate military targets. However, his re-
treat back into the mainstream of Islamic thought on just war—which calls for
such a distinction between innocent noncombatants and combatants—must be
considered a tactical ploy. Ultimately it clashes with his view, derived from
Farag, that jihad is more important than anything except belief in God. If that is
so, “collateral damage” sustained by innocents and noncombatants can hardly
be allowed to stand in the way. If jihad is a central pillar of Bin Laden’s thought,
his retreat on the issue of the killing of noncombatants was a pragmatic step de-
signed to suit the realities of the situation at the time—that is, the need to avoid
American retaliation.
But American retaliation did come. On 8 October, U.S. forces launched a con-
certed air assault on what passes for infrastructure in Afghanistan. Following the
start of the American offensive against him, Bin Laden launched a verbal onslaught
against the United States and its allies in the Muslim world, whom Bin Laden
castigated as “hypocrites,” in an appearance that day on the controversial but
popular Arab satellite television station Al-Jazeera. His comments were significant
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in other ways as well. Bin Laden spoke apocalyptically of the possibility of a war
between Muslim and non-Muslim, of the suffering of the Iraqi people under sanc-
tions and of the Palestinians in their conflict with Israel. Contrary to the observa-
tions of some that Bin Laden has not been concerned with what happens in the
Fertile Crescent, this was not the first time he had spoken about these issues; how-
ever, it was the first time that they had attained such prominence in his strategy.
This indicates a decision to widen his base of support beyond those ideologi-
cally sympathetic to him. Indeed, Bin Laden’s speech of 8 October resonated
with a number of people in the region, many of whom expressed satisfaction
with that part of his message, if not with his methods or his apocalyptic vision of
a clash between Muslims and non-Muslims.55 Certainly, Bin Laden’s decision to
appear on TV after the American attack indicates a sophisticated understanding
of the power of the media.56
WHERE IT IS, WHAT IT IS, AND WHAT IT DOES
What does this all mean? Are we witnessing the start of the clash of civilizations,
as predicted by Samuel Huntington, or is the struggle against Bin Laden primar-
ily a military and law-enforcement campaign writ large—one that will eventu-
ally address other terrorist entities and state sponsors by the same means? Both
are losing strategies, and the United States cannot afford either of them.
The Western and Islamic worlds have many common attributes, but their
mutual history has been one of conflict and discord since medieval times. The
facts that they had more in common with each other than either had with, say,
the Sinic or Hindu civilizations and that they were adjacent to one another con-
tributed enormously to the centuries of struggle. The evolution of Western
thought and ideas, and the emergence of Western military superiority from the
sixteenth century onward, opened a new chasm between the two worlds. Islamic
fundamentalists perceive two competing world orders, one man-made and ma-
terialistic, the other divine and spiritual. Each has claims to universalism: the ad-
herents of each believe that its conceptions are universal and exportable—which
cannot be said about the Hindu, Buddhist, or Chinese civilizations.
It is not, however, in the interest of the West to view this as a clash of Western
and Muslim civilizations, for a number of reasons. First, it would play into Bin
Laden’s hands. He wants the United States and its Western allies to continue as-
saulting Muslim lands and peoples. This, he believes, would draw to him Mus-
lims now sitting on the sidelines, and it might lead to the collapse of secularist
traditions and pro-Western tendencies within the Arab and Muslim worlds. It
would also galvanize his adherents and supporters to greater heights of zeal.
Second, adoption of the idea of a clash of civilizations would have major
implications for the domestic politics of Western societies. Europe has a large
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Muslim population, which is struggling within itself over identity, whether it
should exist as a quasi-separate community within a secular European society or
integrate itself into that society and do away with some of its older traditions. Is-
lam is the second-largest religion in France; there are four million Arabs and
Muslims in that country. The United States has six million Muslims and three
million Arabs.57 A declared clash of civilizations would widen the gap between
these communities and the societies in which they live, with potentially dire
consequences for their political liberties and rights.
Third, the conception of world order promoted by Bin Laden and other Is-
lamic fundamentalists suffers from a fatal flaw that no thinker has been able to
overcome. Islamic fundamentalists
have been very good at highlight-
ing and analyzing the weakness,
backwardness, and problems af-
flicting current Islamic societies.
They have also been good at pro-
posing their own solutions—but
very bad at the details. They have no Islamic model to hold up as appropriate for
this day and age.58 The Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be a model, because it is
a Shia state, whose trajectory has been very different from those of its Arab
neighbors. Moreover, the Ayatollah Khomeini’s central political idea, the rule of
the religious jurisprudent, constituted an innovation even in Shia thought, and
it has been under constant challenge since his death in 1989. Sudan is not a
model either. It is a poor country, whose Islamic political system has not been
able to withstand the tensions between the army, under President Omar al
Bashir, and the Islamists, under the suave, Sorbonne-educated Hasan al-Turabi.
Usama Bin Laden and his followers, and many other Islamic fundamentalists as
well, can cause disorder and conflict with and among the West and its allies in
the Islamic world; indeed, they can widen the chasm between the two sides. But
it is not likely that they will be able to implement an alternative order that can
constitute a successful challenge.
On the other hand, a strategy that simply takes a military and law-and-order
approach, as advocated by some members of the Bush administration, is neither
feasible nor realpolitik. This is not a war that the United States can fight alone;
it needs a coalition, and its present coalition is wobbly. It would be adding fuel
to the fire to attack other terror networks—in Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and
Iraq—particularly in the absence of direct evidence that other groups or states
were involved in the attacks of 11 September. Not even the European members
of the coalition who have been America’s staunchest supporters would be
willing to give the hawks within the Bush administration carte blanche. As for
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the countries of the region, they will see an enlargement of this struggle against
terrorism as an attack on Muslims and as an attempt by the United States, and its
ally Israel, to settle scores with all their enemies.
Usama Bin Laden is a dangerous opponent, and so are those who might suc-
ceed him should he be killed over the course of the American onslaught. They
have been able to attack America effectively. The United States is a global power
with diplomatic, cultural, military, and economic interests worldwide. It is easy
to attack America by acts of terror against those global interests; Bin Laden has
done so in the past. But this time he brought the battle to the heart of the nation.
He and his supporters have crossed a threshold.
They have attacked the United States because of where it is, what it is, and
what it does. Of course, America is not attacked primarily for where it is—that is,
nearly everywhere, and conspicuously in the Middle East; its global presence
simply makes it easier to attack for the other two reasons. It is clear that America
is detested by many people the world over for what it is—a successful and dy-
namic modern society. It has created envy among the dispossessed and revulsion
among ideologically alienated groups who see it as totally antithetical to their
own values or aspirations. There may be very little that can be done to assuage
the anger of those who hate America for its very nature.
Some American analysts claim that terrorists hate America only for what it
is.59 This is undoubtedly true with respect to the terrorists themselves, but there
is a large number of people in the Middle East whose primary, if not sole, issue
with America is its allegedly unfair and “hypocritical” policies.60 Ignoring the
bubbling dissatisfaction with what the United States does, or allegedly does,
would relieve Americans of some painful policy adjustments that may in fact be
necessary. Many people in the Middle East see Bin Laden as sending the United
States a multifaceted message, elements of which they can identify with. Indeed,
Bin Laden has brilliantly established a nexus between those who hate the United
States for what it is—the great seductress, spreading a culture and religion of
material plenty around the globe—and those who despise it for what it does in
the Middle East, as they see it—extending support to Israel, turning its back on
the Palestinian quest for justice, continuing to punish Iraq for transgressions of
a decade ago.61
While this article is not intended to make policy recommendations, it must
conclude by supporting, however superficially in a brief space, an alternative ap-
proach—a long-range and sustained strategy with a “basket” of many options,
some of which can be implemented in tandem, and others that would have to be
implemented sequentially.
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Instrumentally, the war against terror involves the use of intelligence assets
and military, legal, and financial means all at the same time, in a broad-based,
synergistic campaign. Despite recognition by the United States that terror con-
stitutes one of its greatest security threats, the American war against terror has
not been an effective or integrated one. Psychological warfare and humanitarian
approaches are also required; to pursue them it is necessary to look carefully at
socioeconomic and structural conditions that contribute to the rise of radical
politics.
A number of failed states have become breeding grounds for terrorist orga-
nizations; Afghanistan and Somalia come to mind. Other states can be classified
as potential hotbeds—Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, and Algeria. Instead of focusing
on potential state sponsors of terrorism, it might be efficacious to look as well at
key states where conditions may ultimately promote the proliferation of terror-
ist infrastructures.62 A well-structured international economic-aid policy to
these countries could be formulated and implemented over a period of years.
Such a policy should address even such micro-issues as the so-called Islamic
schools (madrassahs) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where very young children
are indoctrinated into the belief that terrorism is just, that death in the service of
their version of religion should be their highest aspiration.
Policywise, the United States may have to make some painful adjustments
throughout the Mideast region. Although none should be implemented under
pressure of terrorism, some truly far-reaching changes should be examined. For
instance, must the United States permanently station ground forces on the Ara-
bian Peninsula? If not, what does this mean for power projection and force
structure? Even trickier, how might America help resolve the debilitating
Arab-Israeli issue in a manner that both sides can view as fair, while making clear
to the Arabs that it will not abandon Israel as an ally? What can and should be
done about Iraq, which has become a point of contention for all Arabs, whether
fundamentalists, secularists, members of the working class, or intellectuals? It is
an issue that will not go away.
Last, but by no means least, the American tendency to ignore or brush over
the questionable stability of Arab allies and the deep-seated political and
socioeconomic problems besetting them works strongly against its own in-
terests. How to persuade these countries that they must undertake reforms in
order to survive, however, is a nettlesome problem. Plainly, the strategy sug-
gested here to combat the Bin Laden phenomenon needs to be explored in
greater analytical detail. In the final analysis, a comprehensive national—even
international—strategy, sustained over a long period of time, is needed to win
the war against terrorism. Any other way leads to the abyss.
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STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY
AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
Robert Harkavy
Occupying a pivotal position at the juncture of Europe, Africa, and Asia, the“Greater Middle East”—here defined as the sum of the core Middle East,
North Africa, the African Horn, South Asia, and ex-Soviet Central Asia—like-
wise occupies a crucial position with respect to some of the major issue areas of
the contemporary era.1 Those issue areas are energy sources and availability; the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery sys-
tems; and the dangerous pairings involving Israel and the Arabs, Iran and Iraq,
and India and Pakistan. Surely, this region in its aggregate has come to be viewed
by the contending and aspiring world powers—the United States, Russia, a
united Europe, China—as a strategic prize, maybe the strategic prize.
The geographic aspects of these issues can be analyzed by moving from
macro to micro, from grand strategy to operations and tactics (climate and ter-
rain). The new missile programs involving WMD do not easily fit within this
framework but apply across issues.
TRADITIONAL AND EMERGING IMAGES
A sketch of traditional geopolitical theory would go somewhat as follows.2 Al-
fred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder advanced what appeared to be con-
trary views on the relative importance of sea and land power for global dominance.
Both focused on a global struggle for power between a Eurasian-based land
power and a “rimland”-based sea power in the context of global maritime domi-
nance. Mackinder thought that land power was destined to prevail, because of
such emerging technological developments as motorized transport, and road
and rail networks, which would simplify logistics between the Eurasian core and
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the periphery; indeed, he argued, these might also allow the “heartland” power to
achieve maritime superiority as well. Mahan read the opposite into emerging
technological trends, seeing in them possibilities for dominance by a maritime
power, able to project power more easily than before all around the rimland.3
What has been the legacy of geopolitics? Geopolitics must be understood as
“a conceptual and terminological tradition in the study of the political and stra-
tegic relevance of geography.”4 Accordingly, even in the nineteenth century, geo-
politics was
concerned with the implications for power politics of the geographical attributes of
states, and of their spatial locations. . . . In the abstract, geopolitics traditionally indi-
cates the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space;
in concrete terms it is often seen as a body of thought assaying specific strategic pre-
scriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in world
history. . . . The geopolitical tradition had some consistent concerns, like the
geopolitical correlates of power in world politics, the identification of international
core areas, and the relationships between naval and terrestrial capabilities.5
Nicholas Spykman developed the “rimland” thesis in contrast to Mackinder’s
“heartland” doctrine. Both believed that at given times, certain regions become
pivotal.6 Mackinder saw the Russia–Eastern Europe area as pivotal. Spykman
contended that considerations like population, size, resources, and economic
development combined to make the rimland—peninsular Europe and the coastal
Far East—the most significant geopolitical zone, domination of which meant
global hegemony. American interests thus dictated that the European or the Far
Eastern coastland not be dominated by any hostile coalition.
Saul Cohen has used the term “shatterbelts” as roughly equivalent to the
concept of the rimland—“a large, strategically located region that is occupied by
a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of
adjoining Great Powers.”7 Cohen sees the Middle East and Southeast Asia as the
primary shatterbelt regions, and, contrary to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civ-
ilizations” thesis (about which more below), he holds that “the Shatterbelt
appears to be incapable of attaining political or economic unity of action. . . . [I]t
is because internal differences are so marked, and because they are found in a re-
gion that is crushed between outside interests [Cohen was writing during the
Cold War], that we have defined the Middle East as a shatterbelt.”8
In brief, the core of geopolitical theory boils down to two fundamental ques-
tions, questions relevant both before and after the events of 1989–91. The first
concerns the role of strategic geography—factors of size and location; the second
pertains to militarily important terrain, maritime choke points, and areas con-
taining critical resources.
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/1
In recent years still another strand of international relations thinking has
come to the fore. “Long-cycle theory,” associated with George Modelski and
William Thompson, holds that the centuries since 1500 have seen a progression
of global hegemonies, lasting about a century apiece, based on maritime and
commercial preeminence.9 This model of successive periods of maritime domi-
nance punctuated by major wars is closely related to Mahan’s thesis of undivided
naval dominance, but it adds a role for technological breakthroughs in inaugu-
rating periods of hegemony. It is noteworthy that the successive long-cycle hege-
monies have had important bases in some of the same places around the Indian
Ocean littoral—in the Horn of Africa, around the Straits of Hormuz and Tiran
(Aden, Oman), the coasts of India, Sri Lanka, and around the Indonesian
Straits.10
NEW GEOPOLITICAL IMAGES
That much is familiar to most students of international relations. With the Cold
War gone, what new geopolitical images have been projected? Six come to
mind—ideal (and not altogether discrete) tendencies from which hybrid or
transitional models might be generated, in addition to the familiar North-South
model: the three-bloc geo-economic thesis, balance of power, the “clash of civili-
zations,” “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil,” the United States as unipolar
hegemon, and a revived bipolar competition. Several of these merit brief review.
Economic competition between three blocs has become central to current
geo-economic thinking. It assumes that the emerging foci of international rela-
tions are: a Japan-led Pacific Rim region including China, Korea, Indonesia,
Thailand, and other East Asian powers; a United States–led Western Hemisphere
bloc centered on the North American Free Trade Agreement group but poten-
tially encompassing most of Latin America; and a Germany-centered European
bloc, assumed to include Russia and other former Soviet states and perhaps also
North Africa. The status of Africa and South Asia in this view is ambiguous, if
not marginal; the Middle East becomes a wild card, a geo-economic prize.11 The
three-bloc model also incorporates the now widely discussed “end of history”
thesis, which proceeds from the end of big-power ideological conflict that domi-
nated the global stage after the 1930s to the prediction that such conflicts will
not recur but be superseded by older economic rivalries. Related to this is the
popular “democratic peace” theme, which asserts that modern democratic states
with high levels of per capita income do not even contemplate fighting each
other and never have.12 Rather, in this view, they exist in Karl Deutsch’s rather
hoary concept of the “security community.”13
This is indeed a primitive vision. Some would question, for instance, whether
in an era of extensive economic interdependence, multinational industry, and
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globalized production of so many
goods, a three-bloc model of this
sort captures the realities of inter-
national trade and investment. Fur-
ther, the three-bloc model may be
too state-centric, too prone to view-
ing trade as merely between nations
rather than throughout a complex
web of global corporate patterns of
development, production, and mar-
keting. The three-bloc thesis as-
sumes that the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans form natural dividing lines
between the Americas bloc and the
other two. As such, it ignores the
possibility that still newer regional
economic blocs might span the
great oceans. Competing analyses have begun to focus on “regionalism,” or “re-
gion states,” within Europe, Asia, and North America—for example, that region
running from Bavaria to northern Italy, the zone comprising Hong Kong and
southern China, the “growth triangle” of Singapore and nearby Indonesian is-
lands, or the Seattle/Vancouver area.14
The prospect of renewed multipolarity, or a balance of power, reminiscent of
the Europe of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been propounded by
Henry Kissinger, The Economist, and others.15 In its various manifestations, it
portends an international system having five or six poles of roughly equal
weights: the United States, a united Europe, Japan, China, Russia, and perhaps
India. It further portends the eventual demise of communism in China and
thereafter the absence of competition based on ideological factors in alliances
or rivalries, implying the prospect of ever-shifting alliances. It might be the
United States and Europe versus the rest in one phase, the United States and
China versus Russia plus Europe and India in another. It is not clear whether the
United States could or would maintain such naval dominance and bases as were
seen in earlier centuries in the face of asymmetries not present then (large Rus-
sian and Chinese land armies).
Hence, in this conception, the Islamic Greater Middle East becomes in effect
one pole in a rather complex system, with fault lines running between it and
Europe, Russia, and India. That would appear to mean a fundamental imbalance
of power, in military terms at least, against Islam, perhaps somewhat counter-
balanced by oil and gas reserves and their associated political leverage. Because
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China, India, Japan and the rest of East Asia, Europe, and the United States are all
projected to remain heavily dependent on gas and oil from the Greater Middle
East “energy ellipse,” the energy producers are assured of being intensely wooed
by the other poles.16
The “clash of civilizations” model formulated by Samuel Huntington has
captured the attention of students of international affairs, particularly in con-
nection with the Greater Middle East.17
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not
be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among human-
kind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain
the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics
will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civiliza-
tions will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the
battle lines of the future.18
Declaring that “fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political
and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and
bloodshed,” Huntington focuses particularly on the cultural lines of demarca-
tion between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity in Europe, and
between the latter and Islam.19 The most significant dividing line in Europe,
he says, may be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity as of the year 1500.
Huntington’s thesis is underscored by the several continuing conflicts along this
old fault line—in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier, between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Chechnya, and in Central Asia (Kazakhstan,
Tadzhikistan). Huntington addresses the long interaction between Western
Christianity and Islam, noting that the West’s military superiority as recently as
the Gulf War humiliated some Arabs, reinforcing Islamic movements that reject
Western political and cultural values. This can be seen even in Indonesia. Hence,
it is with some of these conflicts in mind that Huntington predicts that “the next
world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.”20
A further image, the “zones of peace/zones of turmoil” model, was pro-
pounded in Max Singer’s and Aaron Wildavsky’s The Real World Order, which
holds that “the key to understanding the real world is to separate the world into
two parts,” one of which is “zones of peace, wealth and democracy,” and the
other “zones of turmoil, war and development.”21 In this view, the combination
of geo-economics and democratic-peace theory supports the prospects of the
zones of peace—Western Europe, the United States and Canada, Japan and the
Antipodes, comprising about 15 percent of the world’s population. The rest of
the world, including eastern and southeastern Europe, the territory of the former
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Soviet Union, and most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, is composed of what
are, for now, zones of turmoil and development.
The Singer-Wildavsky thesis abuts at least two other topics of current specula-
tion. First, it is in basic agreement with the idea that there has been a fundamental
shift in world affairs among the traditional powers whereby warfare becomes an
anachronism, as did slavery. In the view of Singer and Wildavsky, however, this
applies only to that fraction of the world that is democratic and, relatively speak-
ing, well off.22
Still another future geopolitical image involves American unipolar domi-
nance, primarily in military strength—far less of economic power, which the
United States will have increasingly to share with competitors. American military
strength—conventional power projection, space, strategic nuclear—could re-
main indefinitely preeminent, if the U.S. defense budget is not allowed to slide
farther. What was long a deterrent to American interventions, a military peer, is
now absent, and no new one can be foreseen.
Finally, the academic literature and think-tank realm have circulated various
scenarios envisioning a new hegemonic rival to the United States, a new round
of Cold War, and a resumption of global bipolarity. China, of course, figures
most prominently.23 Some scenarios see a united and increasingly hostile Europe
as America’s coming rival.24 Fewer scenarios dwell on a revived, nationalist Rus-
sia (an extrapolation of certain goals and policies of the Putin regime) or a mili-
tarily and economically energized Japan.
A contemporary of Mackinder’s, James Fairgrieve, suggested the possibility
of a heartland farther east than its classical locus between the Vistula River and
the Urals, implying that China and its hinterland could become a new heartland,
or pivot.25 But caveats are necessary regarding a U.S.-Chinese rivalry in a heart-
land/rimland framework. China, of course, has a long Pacific coastline; it does
not need “warm water ports” (though it may think it needs ports, for loosely
equivalent reasons, on the far side of the Indonesian Straits). However, and un-
like tsarist Russia as perceived by Mackinder, it is also vulnerable from the sea;
there is no glacis of mountains like the Hindu Kush, Elburz, and the Caucasus to
protect it from invasion by the United States. China, indeed, is itself located on
the traditional rimland.
A CONVERGENCE OF GEOPOLITICS AND GEO-ECONOMICS
How might these conflicting definitional and political arguments apply to the Greater
Middle East? Does one have to choose between geopolitics and geo-economics?
Are they necessarily mutually exclusive?
First, it must be recognized that the geo-economics thesis really applies to
relationships between contending major powers and blocs, and in that sense it is
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similar to geopolitics, which saw a long-term tendency toward conflict between
dominant land and sea powers. The Middle East does not constitute a power
center of that sort; the region has been and is an object of major power rivalries.
Hence, neither a traditional geopolitical nor a mercantile and essentially peaceful
geo-economics model is very useful. There is the potential for a great deal of
trouble, perhaps even arms races and war, even between the major democra-
cies—the United States, Japan, and the European Union—now thought perma-
nently immune from security competition.
Nevertheless—and despite oil wealth, which has given some regional nations
per capita incomes on a par with the Western democracies—the bulk of the
Greater Middle East remains squarely within Singer and Wildavsky’s “zone of
turmoil.” It is broadly characterized by an absence of democracy, internal insta-
bility, endemic violence, etc. Daily events in Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, Kurdistan,
Kashmir, southern Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and so on, offer little encourage-
ment that this region is at the “end of history”—the end of major warfare and se-
curity rivalries. In that obvious sense at least, geopolitics is alive and well in the
Greater Middle East. It is a powder keg—over which loom weapons of mass de-
struction and long-range delivery systems.
There is, then, in the Greater Middle East a convergence of geopolitics and
geo-economics, if not in their traditional senses. As a further illustration, parts
of the region are developing rapidly in terms of infrastructure (roads, ports,
pipelines, etc.) and industry (petrochemicals, crucially), and in terms of mod-
ern communications, electricity grids, and the like.26 But this development has
left many nations highly vulnerable to modern precision weaponry, as demon-
strated by the U.S. “takedown” of Iraq’s infrastructure during the air assault
phase of DESERT STORM. Seawater desalinization plants in the Persian Gulf area,
for instance, might be critical targets in future wars. All this makes it a matter of
urgency not only whether the Middle East will be a “zone of turmoil,” somewhat
left out of globalization, but also whether part of it will continue to identify with
the “southern” half of a North-South divide.
Of course, Huntington’s clash of civilization directly applies here. He points
out that conflict has been going on along the fault line between Western and Is-
lamic civilizations for 1,300 years. Huntington, like many other contemporary
analysts both Western and Islamic, sees these two civilizations as potentially pit-
ted against each other in a conflict that would define the evolving world order.
Not everyone, of course, agrees with Huntington’s now widely discussed thesis.27
Nonetheless, to the extent that the clash of civilizations turns out to be predic-
tive, it will be a defining feature of a new strategic map. Perhaps it already is, as
concerns the Greater Middle East; the long frontier of the Islamic world—Marrakesh
to Bangladesh and beyond—is at the “fault line’s” northern end.
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While the United States may still be able—norms concerning multilateralism
or collective security notwithstanding—to intervene in the Greater Middle East
in a repeat of the Gulf War, there are restraints on the exercise of U.S. power in
this region. One would be possibly heavy diplomatic pressure from Europe,
Russia, and China (maybe combined) against unilateral American action. Also,
the U.S. military is now commonly thought (even by its own spokesmen) less ca-
pable of large-scale operations than it was a decade ago, technological develop-
ments notwithstanding. Third, there are serious questions (or were before the
events of 11 September 2001, which occurred as this article was being prepared
for press) about whether, in the event of another crisis, the United States would
be offered access for its aircraft and ships in the region.
Finally, factors of location and geography now render the heartland/rimland
model irrelevant to any China–United States hegemonic competition in the
Greater Middle East. Nonetheless, China’s proposed pipeline linking it with
Central Asia’s energy reserves, its acquisition of bases on Burma’s offshore is-
lands, and its moves in the South China Sea may well augur a geographically new
type of hegemonic competition centered on that part of the old rimland.28 Also,
if current hints of a new Russo-Chinese alliance prove substantial, the West
could be presented with a threat from a very large heartland abetted by maritime
access to the western Pacific. Such an alliance would inevitably put pressure on
the Western position in the Middle East and its oil reserves; India would become
a wild card.
GEOGRAPHY AND POWER PROJECTION
INTO THE MIDDLE EAST
The geographic aspects of power projection into the Greater Middle East per-
tain now mostly to the United States, but in the future they could apply to the
European Union (which is developing an independent reaction force capable of
out-of-area operations), a revived Russia again a force in the Middle East, or
even China, should its naval reach establish itself in Burma’s Coco Islands and
extend westward from there. The subject needs separate treatment, but several
points can be made here. They pertain to the geography of power projection
broadly construed as dealing with military interventions (unilateral or multi-
lateral), arms resupply to client states involved in wars, and coercive diplo-
macy—and more specifically with bases, access, overflight, and the physical
geography of nations, straits, and islands as it affects power projection.29
The experience baseline is the 1990–91 Gulf War, during which the American-led
coalition had access to air and naval bases around the periphery of the war zone
(Egypt, Turkey, Kenya, and such Gulf states as Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia)
and en route from the United States (a variety of countries in Europe, North Africa,
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and East and Southeast Asia). Importantly, in what turned out to be the last
months of the Cold War, the coalition also had heavy forces and substantial materiel
in Europe, as well as materiel and other support at the British-owned island of Diego
Garcia, which is located strategically in relation to the Greater Middle East. Staging
rights for transport aircraft were granted by India and Thailand, and overflights
were allowed even by ex–Warsaw Pact countries.
Planners can no longer count on anything close to such access. A large por-
tion of the troops and aircraft once in Europe has since returned to the conti-
nental United States. Access to, and
transit rights over, such states as Mo-
rocco, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi
Arabia are problematic, depending
much more than before on the na-
ture of the crisis, despite a much larger
“permanent” presence in several of
the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
Even Europe could be in question if
the political divide between the
United States and the European
Union over Middle Eastern policies
should widen. Hence, worst-case
scenar ios have envisioned the
United States in a tough situation,
attempting to intervene in the Gulf area mostly from bases in the continental
United States and from carrier battle groups and amphibious formations.
A number of salient geographic problems emerge in such an analysis. Over-
flight rights in Europe (notably Spain and France) and in the Middle East itself
(Egypt, Saudi Arabia) are prominent among them. So too is basing access in
Egypt, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, all in the
vicinity of the crucial Gulf. (Israel could be added, however politically undesir-
able that might be.) Transit rights through Suez and the feasibility of passage
through the crucial Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Tiran also stand out. Diego
Garcia is potentially vital, especially if access is denied elsewhere.
A final point here is the geography of a still hypothetical U.S. regional
missile-defense system, perhaps entirely sea based. Issues would include the ef-
fectiveness of such a system in the Persian Gulf or Arabian Sea, and whether
there would be access ashore for replenishment, crew rest, etc. The political
geography of that problem looms particularly large in the face of projections of
future Iraqi and Iranian nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.
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The Geography of Weapons of Mass Destruction
It is fairly clear that nuclear proliferation in the Greater Middle East will produce
arsenals on both sides of each of its three conflict pairings—the Arab world–Israel,
Iran-Iraq, and India-Pakistan. Events are also moving toward biological and
chemical warfare capability in Iran and several Arab states, including Egypt and
Syria; and toward long-range missile capabilities that will allow all of these
WMD-armed states to strike not only contiguous rivals but nations far afield.
With the exception of North Korea (and of course China, a longtime nuclear
state), the concerns that have fueled American interest in homeland ballistic
missile defense arise in this region.
Essentially, in its geographical aspects, this subject breaks down into four
parts: the contiguous nature of the conflict pairings; the burgeoning threat of
WMD-armed ballistic missiles to Europe and the United States; the possibilities
for “indirect” or “triangular” deterrence and compellence; and the geography of
the movement or smuggling of WMD technology, materials, and skills.
The first point is in clear contrast to the nuclear standoff during the Cold
War. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had seriously to concern
itself with being overrun (though their allies might have been) by the other’s
conventional forces. For that matter, even at the height of the Cold War there was
little actual hatred between the Russian and American peoples—one almost had
the feeling, going back to their combined victory in 1945, that they actually liked
each other.30 In the Greater Middle East we have terrific, long-standing, primor-
dial hatreds between peoples; fears that conventional battlefield defeat would be
followed by genocide; and very short flight times for missiles and aircraft bear-
ing weapons of mass destruction, producing hair-trigger preemptive situations.
Some would argue further that not only are “fail-safe” capabilities of command
and control systems more limited than those of the United States and USSR but
that irrational, culturally based decisions are more likely.
Secondly, several regional nations are likely eventually to acquire long-range
ballistic missiles that could reach not only across the Middle East but well out-
side it. Pakistan and Israel will be able to target each other. Iran and Iraq will be
able to target all of Europe and Russia, maybe later the United States. Israel will
be able to target all of Europe and Russia (perhaps to deter any tilt toward, or
willingness to resupply with arms, the Arabs). India will be able to target all of
China, as well as Russia and Europe, maybe also the United States. Israel and In-
dia, at least, could also launch WMD attacks against nations outside the region
by aircraft. All of these projections, of course, beg the question of whether the
United States, alone or with allies, will be able to install defensive systems effec-
tive against at least some kinds of missile attacks.
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The Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during DESERT STORM
introduced what may be a new “asymmetric” strategic problem. In the future, a
Middle Eastern “rogue state” threatened by the United States may respond
against a regional U.S. ally, or even against a nation not at all friendly with
the United States, trading on traditional American sensitivity to innocent casu-
alties.31 As missile ranges in the Greater Middle East expand, so do the options
for such “triangular” strikes.32
Geography is also largely accountable for the ease of illegal transfers of WMD
material from the former Soviet Union to such Middle Eastern states as Iran and
Iraq. Much of the old USSR’s nuclear infrastructure was near the borders of
neighboring Middle Eastern states; truck routes via Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey
are hard to monitor.33 Where there is a will (and money to grease palms), there is
likely to be a way.
Operational and Tactical Geography
The military geography of the Greater Middle East affects the operational and
tactical levels of warfare in a number ways:34 the conduct of a two-front conven-
tional war; strategic depth; climate; the size of the theater and the length of bor-
ders, or of the “forward line of troops”; the ethnography of battle areas or
frontiers; patterns of settlements and road networks; and mountains and rivers,
as barriers.
The geographical aspects of two-front conventional warfare could be critical
in another round of Arab-Israeli fighting should Egypt become involved. How-
ever, let us focus on two other points: strategic depth (which relates to nuclear
proliferation and possibly warfare) and climate (weather and the seasons), with
respect to military technology.
Strategic Depth. “Strategic depth” is a staple of the military literature; it refers,
broadly speaking, to the distances between the front lines or battle sectors and
the combatants’ industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key
centers of population or military production. How vulnerable are these assets to
a quick, preemptive attack or to a methodical offensive? Conversely, can a coun-
try withdraw into its own territory, absorb an initial thrust, and allow the subse-
quent offensive to culminate short of its goal and far from its source of power?
The issue is the trade-off between space and time; a classic historical case is
Germany’s failure to knock out the Soviet Union in 1941–42.
How have these traditional considerations applied to recent wars in the
Greater Middle East? How have they influenced preemptive attempts to produce
dramatic, conclusive victories? How important have been the asymmetries be-
tween specific adversaries? In the early stages of the war between Iraq and Iran,
Iraq—then considered the weaker power—launched an offensive to seize the
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Khuzestan oil region, hoping
that the eventual truce would
make the conquest permanent.
Initially the strategy met with
some success, but there was lit-
tle chance of a quick, decisive
Iraqi victory (a more substan-
tial campaign would have re-
quired better combined-arms
tactics and logistics than Iraq
possessed). Iran enjoys vast
strategic depth, buttressed by
the formidable barriers of a lava
plain and the Zagros Moun-
tains, behind its western fron-
tier. Teheran is some 260 miles
from the border, Isfahan approximately 240 miles. The smaller cities of
Kermanshah and Ahwaz (just west of the oil fields, which are on the western
slopes of the Zagros range) are closer but not easy to overrun in a rapid offen-
sive; only the area around Khorramshahr was vulnerable to a quick “seize and
hold” operation.
On the other hand, Iraq has little strategic depth, almost none in the south;
throughout the war it was highly vulnerable to Iranian offensives across the
Shatt-al-Arab toward Basra, a major city only about ten miles from the frontier.
Baghdad, farther north, is only some seventy miles from the border. The major
cities in the oil-rich Kurdish area, Kirkuk and Mosul, are less than a hundred
miles from the frontier. Additionally, the main roads connecting these cities run
parallel to and close to the frontier. In theory, Iraq is subject to knockout by a
quick offensive, and Iran made enormous and costly efforts to achieve that end,
shelling Basra heavily in the process, though it never succeeded in exploiting
Iraq’s vulnerability in strategic depth.
The current India-Pakistan military balance also illustrates the impact of
asymmetries in strategic depth. Pakistan is potentially subject to a quick, preemp-
tive attack.35 Its main cities lie even closer to the border than do Iraq’s, and like Iraq
its critical road and rail communications run along the frontier. Karachi is a hun-
dred miles from the border, Hyderabad eighty, Islamabad and Rawalpindi fifty,
and Lahore only twenty. (Yet in 1965 and 1971 Pakistani forces did manage to de-
fend the border areas against superior forces in short wars.) By contrast, on the In-
dian side, while Amritsar is vulnerable, only twenty miles from the frontier,
Ahmadabad is 120 miles away, New Delhi more than two hundred miles, and
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Bombay over four hundred.
These distances are striking
(though the terrain is generally
favorable for mechanized forces)
in view of well publicized earlier
Pakistani ambitions to conduct
a lightning preemptive strike to-
ward New Dehli.
The Arab-Israel conflict has
also illustrated the importance
of strategic depth, although in
some surprising ways. Before
1967 it was common to speak of
Israel’s extreme lack of depth
along its borders with Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria; from the West
Bank, a Jordanian advance of
only nine miles west could lit-
erally have cut Israel in half.
Syria was close to the Galilee
settlements, and Egypt was
poised to strike quickly at Eilat,
Beersheva, and Ashdod, indeed
at all of Israel. But Israel’s preemptive assault in 1967 took advantage of interior
lines that allowed the small state to act like a “coiled spring.”
The denouement gave Israel an additional 120 miles of strategic depth across
the northern Sinai, then widely thought to be a margin of badly needed safety.
But Israel’s setbacks in the early phases of the 1973 war along the Suez Canal
proved again that the advantages of strategic depth are at least partially offset by
vulnerability resulting from extended lines of communication.36 On the other
hand, the 1967 Israeli capture of the Golan Heights proved critical in 1973.
Then, and again in 1982, it was of enormous concern to Syria that Israeli for-
ward positions in the Golan were only some thirty miles from Damascus. But
paradoxically, Israel was also more vulnerable on the Golan in 1973; the very
proximity to core areas shortened Syria’s lines of communications and length-
ened Israel’s.
Since then both Israel and Syria have been in a precarious situation of shallow
defensive depth vis-à-vis one another, which is why the Golan has remained
such a contentious issue. As for Jordan, Amman is only twenty miles from the
Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem is almost as close to the Jordanian frontier on the
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Jordan River, albeit behind steeper, more imposing defensive terrain. Eilat and
Aqaba, the two key ports for Israel and Jordan, on the Gulf of Aqaba, are contig-
uous mutual hostages. To the north in Lebanon, the fact that Beirut is only sixty
miles from Israel’s frontier rendered it highly vulnerable in 1982 to a quick ar-
mored strike, supported by leapfrogging amphibious operations along the coast.
Generally speaking, then, in the core Middle Eastern zone of conflict, dis-
tances are very short and produce fast-moving wars with quick outcomes (the
Iran-Iraq War is a partial exception). The implication for weapons of mass de-
struction is stark and potentially ominous. Israel and Pakistan, and perhaps also
Iraq to a lesser degree, labor under the threat that sudden and decisive conven-
tional battlefield defeats could quickly raise the specter of mass destruction, par-
ticularly by nuclear weapons.
If a Palestinian state is ever created in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel’s secu-
rity belt in the Jordan Valley is removed, and the Golan Heights are returned to
Syria (with or without demilitarized zones), Israel will be returned to the vul-
nerable strategic situation of pre–June 1967. Its features will include the
nine-mile corridor north of Tel Aviv between a new Palestine and the sea, and a
danger in the Galilee area of a Syrian attack that quickly menaces Israeli towns.
Then too, a vast buildup of Egyptian forces with U.S. weapons, like the M1A1
tank, would open the possibility of an Egyptian attack out of Sinai. Such an as-
sault, threatening Israel as it would with massive and unacceptable casualties,
might bring on early use of Israeli tactical nuclear weapons—likewise in the
Golan and in the West Bank, if Jordanian or Iraqi forces should mount an attack
out of the Jordan Valley area.
Likewise, Pakistan, its population and industrial cores menaced by a quick In-
dian offensive, might be tempted to almost immediate, at least tactical, nuclear
use. Here, by contrast with the Israeli case, such threats might be tempered by
Indian escalation dominance up and down the “ladder.” Another scenario might
be an Indian attempt to take out Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure (also, un-
avoidably, located near the border), a risky venture that would, escalation domi-
nance notwithstanding, bank precariously on “rational” decision making on the
part of the Pakistanis.
Despite Iraq’s quasi-victory over Iran in 1988, the facts of demography and
gross national product would weigh heavily in Iran’s favor in the case of a future
conflict (at present, tensions between the two countries are rather low, but bad
blood long antedates the 1980–88 war). As noted, Baghdad is not far from the
border. Unlike India, Iran may still have only limited capabilities for relatively
long-range combined-arms offensives. But Iraq’s previous use of chemical war-
fare could augur a WMD response to a conventional battlefield defeat, Iran’s
own possession of such weapons notwithstanding.
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Climate. The weather and seasons in the Greater Middle East, and related mat-
ters of terrain and topography, present a very mixed and varied picture. Fighting
has occurred on the Sinai and Rajasthan Deserts; in the mountainous terrain of
central Lebanon and the Golan Heights, the Zagros Mountains northeast of
Baghdad, the Himalayan foothills in the southern Kashmir region, and the
Punjab along the India-Pakistan frontier; in the Rann of Kutch and Haweizeh
Marshes; and in the riverine and semijungle areas of Bangladesh. Rugged moun-
tainous terrain has also been the scene of conflict in western Sinai, Yemen,
Chechnya, Afghanistan, Georgia, Tadzhikistan, Algeria, Kurdish eastern Turkey,
and Kurdish northern Iran, among other places. Neither terrain nor extreme en-
vironmental conditions preclude military operations.
A major problem regarding the weather itself involves the unique conditions
the Greater Middle East presents for high-technology weapons used by the
United States and its allies. The climatic conditions in and around Kuwait and
southern Iraq were remarkably suitable for the 1991 air campaign (the unusu-
ally inclement weather during part of that operation notwithstanding).37 Clear
skies favor a side able to achieve virtually uncontested control of the air, like
Israel in 1967 and (after a ten-day delay) 1973. Climate also facilitated Israel’s
destruction of the Osirak reactor in Baghdad in 1981. In the 1980–88 war, the
fecklessness of the Iranian and Iraqi air forces rendered such factors largely
moot. On the other hand, human beings exposed to the summer desert, winter
in Kashmir, or the spring haboobs over Iran quickly reach their limits.
What then for the future? Will geography, terrain, and climate offer advantages to
modern air forces in future Greater Middle East conflicts? Will “asymmetric strate-
gies” of a passive sort (underground fiber-optic communications, improved cam-
ouflage and deception techniques, and traditional methods of clandestine warfare
such as the mujahedin employed against Soviet forces) prove insurmountable?
Implied here is a technology race involving potential developments on both
the high and low sides, advances that can alter asymmetries, as indeed did the in-
troduction of newer surface-to-air missiles and radars into the Suez Canal area
in 1973. How well will new reconnaissance satellites penetrate cloud cover and
tree cover, and thereby allow effective interdiction in less than optimal condi-
tions? There were hints in the Bosnian and Kosovo operations that such matters
had come some distance; if so, air superiority in the Greater Middle East will
become more vital than ever. In any event, geography itself will remain the most
important strategic factor in military operations in this region.
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36. See, among others, Chaim Herzog, The War
of Atonement, October 1973 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1975), esp. chaps. 1 and 18.
37. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Conduct of the Persian
Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, pursuant
to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Sup-
plemental Authorization and Personnel Ben-
efits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25),
Washington, D.C., April 1992.
H A R K A V Y 5 3
57
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Piers M. Wood (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve
[Ret.]), a Vietnam combat veteran, was an artillery officer.
He is a graduate of, and a former history instructor at, the
U.S. Military Academy and has been a Washington-based
defense analyst for the last thirteen years. Dr. Charles D.
Ferguson, a physicist, former submarine officer, and a
graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, collaborated on this
article as a defense analyst with the Federation of American
Scientists in Washington, D.C., before his current employ-
ment at the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed
here are the authors’ own.
© 2001 by Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 4
58
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/1
HOW CHINA MIGHT INVADE TAIWAN
Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson
While defense analysts agree that the Taiwan Strait remains a flashpointfor armed conflict because of China’s near obsession with reunification
with Taiwan, these analysts generally fall into two camps regarding China’s abil-
ity to carry out a successful invasion against Taiwan, either today or in the fore-
seeable future.
One camp enumerates disproportionate numerical advantages in combat air-
craft, soldiers, submarines, etc., that the People’s Republic of China enjoys over
Taiwan and also cites China’s acquisition of advanced Russian Sovremenny-class
destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship cruise missiles, and Sukhoi-27 combat
aircraft. While stopping short of predicting an easy victory over Taiwan, these
analysts typically conclude that the United States must increase its military ties
with Taiwan.1 Other analysts envision a marked decrease in Taiwan’s military ca-
pabilities in mid-decade that could give China an edge by the end of the decade.
Some point out, however, that even massive U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan
would do little in the short term to enhance the island’s defenses, because of the
time it would take Taiwan’s military to absorb the new equipment.2
The other camp, in contrast, recognizes Taiwan’s qualitative advantage in
combat aircraft and warships. Moreover, this group perceives the difficulties
inherent in an invasion of Taiwan and grasps the natural advantages possessed
by defending forces.3 Although these analysts acknowledge that Chinese mod-
ernization could someday prove decisive in a future invasion attempt, they usu-
ally place this development ten or twenty years hence.
The first school of thought is flawed by its reliance on more or less sophisti-
cated “bean counts” that stop short of a full operational analysis. The second
camp, for its part, is playing by Western rules and perhaps forgets that twice in
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the last fifty years the United States has underestimated the determination of
Asian militaries, with severe consequences. Further, both groups generally
presume that an invasion would be an all-or-nothing proposition, positing that
an invasion must occur in one fell swoop (the “nothing” possibility including an
“escalating ladder” of threats meant to intimidate Taiwan into capitulation
without an invasion). By and large, they neglect, or do not probe in detail, a third
contingency—a phased military operation. Faced with operational realities,
military professionals most often think in terms of extended campaigns. How-
ever, in this case the staging aspect has been so seldom addressed recently that
few modern readers are even aware that the Peng Hu Islands (formerly the
Pescadores) sit astride the invasion routes across the Taiwan Strait—as hard to
ignore, tactically, as an ox in the living room.
As a contribution to the debate over whether or not China possesses the capa-
bility to invade Taiwan in the near term, this article assesses this missing factor
from a doctrinal perspective and finds that a phased invasion, one that ratchets
up the level of offensive operations, has a better prospect of success than an
all-out attack against the main island of Taiwan. While we make no predictions
about the success or failure of a Chinese invasion against Taiwan in the foresee-
able future, we caution that a determined China could launch an invasion
sooner than the five, ten, or twenty years that some have projected, though it
would be unlikely to succeed if it made the attempt today.
PHASED INVASION
The People’s Liberation Army could realize a number of important advantages,
should it invade Taiwan, by conducting the operation in three phases: seizing
Quemoy (Kinmen) and other islands close to the mainland, capturing the Peng
Hu Islands, and assaulting Taiwan’s west coast. By attacking these objectives in
succession, the Chinese could amass great numerical superiority against each
one in turn and render the next object less defensible. This stepping-stone strat-
egy would place the defenders in the predicament of deciding whether to absorb
casualties fighting for key terrain currently under attack or to conserve resources
for a final stand on the main island.
Phasing could work to the Chinese advantage for other reasons as well.
Beijing could exploit the initial phase domestically, creating a state of war fever
that would generate support for military construction projects that would in
turn be essential for succeeding phases but would seem unjustifiable in peace-
time. Moreover, a break after the first two phases would allow an opportunity for
major upgrades in military training, taking advantage of experience gained in
what would amount to combat “rehearsals” for an assault against the main is-
land. Long halts would keep the door open for a general surrender or a favorable
5 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
60
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/1
negotiated settlement with Taiwan. Notably, the preliminary phases might also
be viewed as less than a full attack on the island, and thus as not justifying U.S.
military intervention.
For the People’s Liberation Army, an attack on Quemoy represents more an
opportunity than a risk. Although Quemoy is heavily fortified with tunnel and
bunker complexes, the Chinese would have little difficulty amassing five-to-one
odds against Quemoy’s fifty-five thousand defenders. Also, because of its prox-
imity to the mainland and the shallow depth of the water between, an attack on
Quemoy would resemble less an amphibious invasion than a river crossing. Ac-
cordingly, the Chinese could safely presuppose one of the cardinal precepts of
amphibious doctrine, air superiority. That is, they could conduct the attack
under the umbrella of air defense forces—both on the mainland (long-range
surface-to-air missiles belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force) and
missile and antiaircraft-artillery forces integral to the army assault units them-
selves. Keeping the Chinese air force largely out of this battle would preserve its
aircraft, while air defense forces could shoot down some of the Taiwanese air
force’s best aircraft—unless the Taiwanese held them back. Chinese antiair artil-
lery would have two factors in its favor: huge numbers and concentration of fire-
power. The Chinese could employ about sixteen thousand air-defense artillery
tubes, compared to the four thousand guns that Iraq had in the Persian Gulf
War. Also, and again in contrast to DESERT STORM, this battle would take place in
a confined space—fifty miles of coastline and inland perhaps thirty-five miles.
The Peng Hu Islands, the second-
phase objective, comprise a dozen or so
rocky islets in the Taiwan Strait, thirty
miles from Taiwan. Because the Tai-
wanese forces (currently numbering
sixty thousand) on the Peng Hus could
threaten the flank of an assault against
the main island, the Chinese must take
these islands first in any case. By the
same token, however, once seized these
islands could prove useful in preparing
for the final invasion.
The actual amphibious landings in the
Peng Hus would be on a much smaller
scale than the mammoth invasion of
the main island, but it would serve as a
test of China’s capability. Unlike the
first phase, without air superiority and
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at least some measure of sea control, any hope of victory in this phase, and ac-
cordingly in the overall campaign, would be lost. Absent those prerequisites, the
offensive forces might be obliged to abort the operation, making an assault on
Taiwan one of history’s nonevents—like Hitler’s invasion of England.
This is not to say that success requires a multistaged campaign. The point here
is that the time factor dramatically changes the operational parameters of a
cross-strait invasion—Taiwanese defenders are in much greater peril from a me-
thodical campaign than from an abrupt, full-scale assault. So also, Beijing politi-
cians may see strategic safety in such incrementalism.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A clear understanding of the essential requirements of any amphibious opera-
tion—whether or not conducted in phases—is necessary in determining
whether China could invade Taiwan. U.S. joint amphibious doctrine—which,
based upon historical experience, is the most authoritative source for any am-
phibious warfare—sets out four fundamental precepts for amphibious opera-
tions.4 The first is that air superiority must be achieved before embarkation of
troops and maintained throughout the assault and landing. Second, sea con-
trol—ideally, outright sea denial—is necessary to ensure freedom of movement
at sea and thereby protect troop transports and prevent naval counterattacks.
Third, carefully choreographed sea lift from embarkation to landing is vital for
the coherence of tactical units on the beach, and sea-lift capacity must be suffi-
cient to give the ground assault a numerical advantage. Finally, the landing force
must achieve fire superiority on the beach before launching the assault. Fire sup-
port—naval gunfire, close air support, and field artillery—must be reliably and
quickly available.
Before examining these requirements in detail, we need to specify a set of rea-
sonable assumptions to bound the analysis. The first is that China would not re-
sort to nuclear war.5 Further, we posit that China would not launch a “people’s
war” of insurgency. The third assumption is that the United States would not
militarily intervene before China actually attempted to establish an amphibious
beachhead on the island.
Air Superiority
Air superiority represents the most critical precept, because the other factors de-
pend upon it. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, we assume that China
would not proceed with an invasion unless it could achieve air superiority.
Virtually all practitioners of amphibious warfare have considered sea control and air
superiority to be prerequisites to landing. . . . The amphibious attacker has the initia-
tive. If control of the sea and air is not gained at least in the immediate area of a
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landing, the attacker can postpone or cancel the landing. The defender has no such
option. The corollary, of course, is that a defender can usually deter a landing by
maintaining air and sea control.6
Table 1 displays the quantitative advantage of China in fighter and attack air-
craft versus Taiwan.7 However, the Chinese air force and naval aviation are quali-
tatively outmatched. Only the Russian-made Su-27 long-range air-superiority
fighter and the Su-30 (a two-seat, multirole, long-range interceptor version of
the Su-27) come close to matching the most advanced Taiwanese aircraft.
Nonetheless, before discounting the impact of the Chinese quantitative ad-
vantage, one should consider two crucial factors not properly emphasized in the
literature.8 First, China’s principal objective in the air war would be to attack air-
fields in order to reduce the sortie rate of defending aircraft, not to maximize
air-to-air kills. Second, China can build fields close enough to Taiwan to allow
even older aircraft to reach the island in large numbers. Presently, it can support
in revetments about 1,100 combat aircraft in the twenty-two airbases within 370
miles—that is, within striking distance—of Taiwan.9 In addition, there are per-
haps two dozen more air facilities between 370 and five hundred miles from Tai-
wan. Their aircraft could defend the bases closer to the coast and replace aircraft
shot down.




Low Est. High Est. Taiwan Inventory
J-11 (Su-27) 48 65* F-16 150





J-7 (MiG-21) 600 780* F-5 200





Total 2,830† 5,635 540
*IISS figures (giving a total of 3,300).
**Su-30 MKK, “delivered but not in service,” hence no PRC designation.
†Defense Dept. unclassified total is 4,300 “tactical fighters.”
TABLE 1
CHINESE/TAIWANESE EQUIVALENT FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT
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However, it would do the People’s Liberation Army Air Force little good to re-
duce the defenders’ sortie rate if China could not quickly “turn around” air-
craft—that is, keep large numbers of its own aircraft over enemy airfields. The
Chinese sortie rate, in turn, would depend upon the capacity of close-in air-
fields. Clearly, China cannot achieve air superiority, and therefore cannot invade
Taiwan, until it builds new airfields near Taiwan or greatly expands existing
ones. By the same token, it might be imprudent to presume that China cannot
rapidly do so; airfield construction does not require advanced technologies. A
nationwide reallocation of resources would get the job done in a matter of
months, not years.
As for China’s ballistic missiles, certain crucial factors deserve emphasis. The
current inaccuracy of these missiles means that, at the current rate of buildup,
China will require several more years to produce missiles in sufficient numbers
to damage Taiwanese airfields significantly enough to retard their sortie rates.10
However, the most important effect of preemptive missile strikes would be the
suppression of air defenses. Missiles would be especially effective for that pur-
pose were the Chinese to incorporate cluster munitions, which would spread
thousands of bomblets over wide areas.11
Sea Control
Air cover would not completely protect the movement and landing phases of the
invasion from the defending fleet. The Taiwanese navy has thirty-five principal
surface combatants, compared to fifty-three for China. Nonetheless, and despite
plans to acquire advanced destroyers from Russia, the Chinese navy is qualita-
tively outmatched in most categories of warships. Its surface combatants alone
could not protect the landing force in transit and secure the supply lines there-
after. China’s submarine force would be the key factor in offsetting the Taiwanese
navy’s impressive capabilities.
China’s seventy submarines—against Taiwan’s four submarines (two of the
World War II–vintage “Guppy” type)—could establish a corridor just before the
assault, in a form of sea denial uniquely suited to the confined Taiwan Strait.
Even Taiwan’s advanced antisubmarine warfare resources—including seven
frigates of the Cheng Kung (Oliver Hazard Perry) class, with antisubmarine heli-
copters—could not effectively oppose so many boats.12 Submarines guarding
both sides of the swept zone could deny passage to Taiwanese surface combat-
ants with reasonable effectiveness; depending on the assault route, each subma-
rine would be responsible for as small a sector as two to five miles.
On the other hand, because most of the strait is fairly shallow, Chinese sub-
marines would have limited ability to hide. Some might operate on or near the
surface, losing much of their advantage. However, the southeasterly approach
6 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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from China to Taiwan offers deeper waters and perhaps therefore a logical attack
corridor. Although using submarines to establish an attack corridor is a bit un-
orthodox, it could be a major mistake for Taiwan’s navy to ignore the possibility.
Sea Lift and Taiwan Strait Transit
Of the lengthy lists of combat tasks that would face the invaders, two critical
ones stand out: moving the requisite multitudes to the battlefield and, once on
the beach, achieving superiority at some point. Many analysts claim that both
are presently beyond China’s capabilities.
China has a large merchant fleet, with an enormous capacity for personnel and
cargo. Its fifty naval amphibious ships and between two hundred and 350 land-
ing craft, however, would be utterly unable to carry the entire combined-arms
force.13 It would be logical to devote military amphibious vessels exclusively to
heavy weapons like tanks and artillery rather than personnel; in any case, bow
ramps are just about the only way to get this bulky hardware ashore in an assault.
If the amphibious ships were devoted entirely to tanks and the landing craft to
artillery, more than 250 tanks and almost seven hundred pieces could be put
ashore in one wave.14 This is not impressive for a landing force that could num-
ber over a hundred divisions—a single U.S. armored division has more tanks,
and the artillery would outfit only about ten U.S. divisions; still, specialized am-
phibious craft could rapidly shuttle tanks and artillery ashore. In any case, it has
always been difficult, for any nation, to get tanks and artillery ashore. That is
why heavy reliance upon infantry, naval gunfire, and close air support is a hall-
mark of amphibious operations everywhere.
Meanwhile, the Chinese merchant fleet could be transporting upward of two
million troops, in regular passenger ships and on cargo vessels temporarily
adapted for troops—but without excruciating effort to get them all on board.15
With the present port capacity of China’s southeastern coast, embarkation of
troops would be time-consuming. A choice would have to be made between
shuttling relatively small waves of troops to the beach and forcing early-loading
ships to hover offshore, vulnerable to attack, while the remaining vessels queue
up for pier space. Despite frenzied port construction over the last decade or so,
the ports from Shanghai to Hong Kong could accommodate sufficient shipping
to load only about two hundred thousand troops at any one time. This is only
10–13 percent of the possible force.16 Still, upgrading port capacity—like build-
ing airfields—would not exceed China’s competence, if it were willing to reallo-
cate resources and postpone civilian-sector endeavors.
The difficult part of transporting troops, once successfully embarked, to their
objectives would be transferring them from large ships to small vessels able to
run aground close enough to the shore to disembark personnel in shallow water.
W O O D & F E R G U S O N 6 1
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Most “China hands” agree that
China has in excess of a hundred
thousand small seagoing fishing
vessels. If each one carried thirty
troops—a conservative assump-
tion—the last few tens of miles,
only half of them would be re-
quired to land 1.5 million troops.17
U.S. amphibious doctrine puts
a great deal of emphasis on the or-
ganization of the ship-to-shore
movement of the assault landing
force. The Chinese would experi-
ence great difficulty in this re-
spect, using civilian craft, and so
many of them. Amphibious doc-
trine calls for meticulous “reverse
embarkation,” or “combat load-
ing,” of transports—loading last
everything that will be needed
first, so that it will be readily ac-
cessible in the holds; keeping all
boats carrying particular ground
units near each other; and form-
ing painstakingly sequenced
“boat groups” within “boat
waves,” making up still larger “flo-
tillas.” The principal concern is to
preserve the tactical organization
of army units. Without this co-
herence, landed in isolated, inter-
mixed groups, the troops would
become a mob, ripe for slaughter.
A modern innovation in nav-
igation might help the Chinese
orchestrate the tens of thousands
of small boats: Global Positioning
System receivers could help each
craft find its exact destination.18
Soldiers could, therefore, be
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reasonably certain of joining their
larger units in a short time. Em-
ploying this technology could
make the Chinese doctrinal inno-
vators in amphibious warfare.19
Whatever new technology the
Chinese may adopt, however, the
operational key is the enormous
“lift” potential of their commer-
cial fleets. This capacity has too
frequently been written off, and
its omission unrealistically di-
minishes China’s ability to realize
its numerical advantage on Tai-
wan’s doorstep.
Beach Landing and Assault
Normally, in frontal attacks the
defenders have the upper hand.
However, in the amphibious situ-
ation, certain advantages accrue
to the offensive. It has the initia-
tive; the landing force commander
chooses the time of attack and,
with the inherent flexibility of
movement upon the open sea, the
exact location. In this case, Tai-
wan would surely know that the
Chinese were coming, but not
precisely when or where; the at-
tacker would have, almost auto-
matically, the advantage of tactical
surprise.
The Taiwanese have nearly two
million people in their armed
forces, including reserves, which at
first glance makes the two sides
seem equal. However, uncertainty
would compel Taiwan to spread its
force over the 250-mile coastline
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opposite China. Its surveillance and warning system would likely be degraded, if
not saturated, by the vast number of contacts in a strait clogged with vessels. The
Chinese presumably would deliberately overload Taiwan’s surveillance sensors
rather than try to evade them.
Furthermore, even if somehow Taiwan managed to evacuate and bring home
all five divisions presently stationed on offshore islands, its twenty-one divisions
(including marines and seven divisions of reserves, but excluding two divisions
of armor and mechanized forces) would have to defend frontages of almost
thirteen miles each. That would be a considerable challenge: in June 1944 the
German forces holding the Normandy beaches, with frontages of less than ten
miles per division, lost the beachhead to a hundred thousand Allied troops in
under forty-eight hours.
With the at least theoretical capability of moving almost two million soldiers
in one “lift,” the Chinese would probably be able to mass sufficient infantry
somewhere to overwhelm the defenders. Once ashore, the sheer size of China’s
total force, given air and sea superiority, would make it difficult for the Taiwan-
ese to counterattack effectively. It is unlikely they could entirely eliminate a
beachhead—even with their qualitatively superior armored forces. To recall
Normandy again, the German army’s inability to move armor against the beaches
because of Allied air superiority teaches an important lesson.
Nonetheless, the Chinese would find the number of tasks in a final assault,
and the complexity of integrating them, daunting. In particular, they would
have to sustain air superiority over an extended period. Moreover, the com-
mander ashore would have to organize an airmobile theater reserve, a force
combining parachute and heliborne units. Just to get ashore, the landing force
commanders would have to improvise extensively to deal with the inhospitable
Taiwanese west coast, which is mostly mud flats, with significant tidal ranges.
The Chinese would also have to contend with two monsoon seasons, from Au-
gust to September and from November to April; it would be restricted to two
“windows” of attack, from May to July and the month of October. Still, such im-
pediments did not thwart U.S. amphibious forces at Inchon during the Korean
War; nor did coral reefs and an extremely low tide prevent the seizure of Tarawa
in World War II.
LIKELIHOOD OF AN INVASION
No prudent military planner can dismiss the possibility of a successful invasion
of Taiwan. The numerical advantages of the Chinese in almost every relevant
military category are unambiguous and overwhelming. Although it might be
years before any Chinese soldier sets foot on Taiwan itself, the early stages of a
phased offensive could begin earlier than expected—that is, long before the year
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2005, widely described as the soonest that China could project force beyond
its borders.
There are, of course, a number of big “ifs.” If the Chinese air force failed to
gain air superiority, or if the navy could not get millions of troops afloat, an at-
tack would halt even before embarkation. Well before any attempt, if China did
not expand its airfield capacity near the coast facing Taiwan, it could not even
contemplate air superiority; similarly, if China had not significantly expanded
its port capacity in the same region, it could not use effectively the sea lift to be
requisitioned from the merchant marine. Sea control would be contingent on
the submarine force’s ability to sweep and hold a security corridor from shore to
shore; if that corridor were breached, the assault forces would most likely be de-
stroyed en route. If, having crossed, the assault waves could not maintain coher-
ence among the great mass of men and materiel, the defenders would prevail.
However, a determined government in Beijing may be able to overcome these
obstacles; it would need neither technological magic, super-weapons, spectacu-
lar leaps in weapons production, nor even a foreign benefactor. It would need a
wrenching reallocation of resources. A nation’s willingness to make great sacri-
fices cannot be assumed, but a sound military analysis cannot ignore the possi-
bility. Underestimating the determination of seemingly overmatched Asian
powers has been a common American failing since 1950.
Another if is the delicate cross-strait military balance. Any dramatic tilt to-
ward Taiwan’s favor in the rough military equivalence—all factors consid-
ered—that currently exists could limit Chinese offensives to Quemoy and other
small islands near the mainland. The new arms sales requisite for such a shift
would hardly dismay the Pentagon. However, Sino-American relations would
surely suffer, and as some analysts have pointed out, such an increase in arms
shipments could backfire, precipitating a preemptive strike before Taiwan had
time to assimilate the new equipment. The authorities in Taipei, in any case,
might choose to produce indigenously, or procure from other nations, whatever
arms could protect them from a cross-strait invasion.
The negative “ifs,” however, are balanced by a number of important “coulds.”
The People’s Liberation Army could commandeer an enormous range of civilian
assets that would contribute directly to its capabilities. China could transport
millions of personnel across the strait, choked with fifteen hundred ships and
tens of thousands of small vessels. Its air force could deliver ordnance with over
three thousand jet aircraft (though not in a single wave). A landing force could
overwhelm or outlast the Taiwanese army once it was firmly ashore.
Most significantly, the Chinese could phase an invasion over time to gain op-
erational advantages, maneuvering successively against Taiwan’s untenable off-
shore islands. Such a multistaged campaign would maximize China’s inherent
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capacity to sustain a war of attrition, and it might well produce in effect a defeat
in detail, should Taiwan defend each position. Even if Taiwan chose not to fight
for every foot of ground, the advantages of an extended time frame would seem
to accrue to China.
The world will not know which camp of contending analysts will win this
debate unless China actually attacks Taiwan. We are confident that those who
continue to ignore the significance of airfields, submarines, commercial sea lift,
and sequential campaigning will not have prepared the nation for the worst-case
contingency.
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Higgins is clearly superior to the standard
keeled fishing craft, there is little evidence to
indicate that commercial vessels would not
suffice. In fact, were it not for Higgins’s per-
sistence, the U.S. Navy might well have en-
tered World War II with what was called the
“venerable fishing craft,” which remained un-
der consideration until 1936.
18. “China’s military-backed industries also have
entered into joint ventures with foreign firms
to produce GPS receivers, which may find
their way to military weapons.” U.S. Defense
Dept., Annual Report, 22 June 2000, p. 13.
19. Other innovations that might improve the ef-
fectiveness of Chinese landing forces are off-
shore oil drilling platforms and unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Oil platforms could
be towed into the shallows around the Peng
Hus and off the main island and then sunk
upright, out of range of artillery. They might
prove invaluable in transshipping operations;
some closer in could provide firing platforms
in the assault phase. UAVs returning
real-time images could improve notoriously
unreliable battlefield intelligence.
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DEFENDING TAIWAN, AND WHY IT MATTERS
Chris Rahman
The unresolved political status of Taiwan has over the past decade assumed arenewed urgency, to the extent that conflict across the Taiwan Strait has
overtaken that on the Korean Peninsula as the most likely war scenario in East
Asia. The Taiwanese democratization process combined with regime weakness
and a process of domestic change within China itself to create the conditions for
the deterioration of cross-strait relations that led to Beijing’s 1995–96 series of
military exercises, culminating in the temporary, de facto blockade of Taiwan’s
two major ports as a result of China’s ballistic missile tests in March 1996. Since
that time cross-strait tensions have hardly abated, with the election in 2000 of
the (at one time) openly pro-independence presidential candidate of the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party, Chen Shui-bian. Underlying the pedantry over defini-
tions of “one China” and other impediments to meaningful dialogue between
Beijing and Taipei, however, is a more serious problem. The problem, simply
stated, is that the future political status of Taiwan itself is growing in significance
as a vital national interest for other states in the context of the expansion of
China’s power and influence throughout maritime East Asia.
The status of Taiwan has also been the primary irritant affecting Sino-U.S.
relations, a point placed in stark relief by the 1996
missile crisis, when the United States deployed two
carrier battle groups near the island, and by incessant
warnings from Beijing over foreign interference in
China’s “domestic affairs” ever since. More recently,
the 1 April 2001 EP-3 surveillance plane incident
prompted repeated Chinese demands for the cessa-
tion of U.S. surveillance flights near Chinese territory.1
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The United States has had to balance its relations with China both to avoid ac-
tual hostilities on one hand, and to satisfy popular domestic opinion and uphold
its obligation to assist Taiwan to defend itself from Chinese aggression, as set out
in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, on the other.2 In addition to these immedi-
ate concerns are a range of factors that further complicate American policy on
Taiwan. These include the positions and security interests of America’s key
regional allies; the responsibility necessarily shouldered by the world’s sole su-
perpower to uphold liberal values in the international system; and the uncom-
fortable possibility that Taiwan’s continued geopolitical separation from the
Chinese mainland now represents a vital strategic value for U.S. (and allied) in-
terests in the western Pacific.
Taiwanese democratization and the missile crisis have been well documented.3
This article will assess instead the potential geopolitical significance of the is-
land of Taiwan in the new East Asian security environment. Initially, this article
will address briefly the question of how Taiwan is important, and might become
more so, in wider political, economic, and ethical perspectives, before providing
a detailed examination of the island’s potential strategic significance in the
context of the interests of the three major players in East Asian security—China,
Japan, and the United States. Finding that there are genuinely irreconcilable in-
terests at play in maritime East Asia, the article will suggest that Taiwan is be-
coming an increasingly urgent problem for regional security, not due simply to
the potential for near-term armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait but also, and
perhaps more fundamentally, to the rather more perplexing (for diplomats and
strategists alike) consideration that over the longer term Taiwan will hold ever
greater geostrategic value in the unfolding competition over political, eco-
nomic, strategic, and even moral leadership in East Asia between China and a
loose American maritime coalition. This article will also address some of the op-
erational considerations involved in deterring China and defending Taiwan, in-
cluding potential shortcomings of U.S. strategy and military posture in the
region.
WHY TAIWAN MAY MATTER
Taiwan’s democratization process has produced the world’s only Chinese
democracy. The legitimacy of Taiwan’s bid for international recognition as a
sovereign entity was considerably boosted in the eyes of Western popular opin-
ion by its rapid democratization under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, and de-
mocratization has increased the domestic political incentives in many
democratic countries (especially in the United States) to protect Taiwan should
another crisis erupt across the Taiwan Strait. Although Taiwanese public opin-
ion remains divided over the details of the island’s relationship with China—a
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fact well understood by President Chen—it is unlikely that the Taiwanese would
ever accept unification on China’s terms.4 Thus, Taiwan’s successful democrati-
zation arguably creates an ethical responsibility for the United States (and to a
lesser extent other liberal states) to protect that democracy and its vibrant
market economy, a responsibility based less on idealistic grounds than on “en-
lightened self-interest” in maintaining the U.S.-dominated liberal international
political order.5 The ethical consideration becomes yet more pronounced if one
considers the tenuousness of China’s sovereignty claim. Taiwan’s history is a
complex one, in which inhabitants of the island were often ruled by outside
powers, yet Taiwan has never been successfully integrated, politically, with
mainland China.6
Taiwan is also significant for economic and social reasons. Whilst the impor-
tance of the China trade for many states has been often overstated—mostly in
everlasting anticipation of future profits and markets—China’s major trading
partners in fact typically do almost as much business, or even more, by value,
with Taiwan.7 Moreover, the Taiwanese port of Kaohsiung is one of a small num-
ber of regional hub ports that
increasingly dominate sea-
borne trade in Asia.8 Finally,
the Taiwanese people are well
educated, with very strong
social as well as commercial
links to the outside world.
A third reason why Taiwan
might be considered impor-
tant is the political symbol-
ism involved in the Taiwan
question. Aside from ethical
concerns, a failure by the
United States to support Tai-
wan in a crisis situation with
China would symbolize will-
ingness to defer to China in
regional matters, amounting
to a reordering of great-
power influence in East Asia.
More importantly in the im-
mediate term, such a failure
would demonstrate to Japan,
South Korea, and Australia
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that Washington is an unreliable ally, and to the Southeast Asians that it is an
unreliable protector-stabilizer in the western Pacific. The problem would be
most acute for Japan, but even the Koreans, who follow a generally pro-Beijing
line over Taiwan, would most likely view American reluctance in a Taiwan Strait
conflict as demonstrating U.S. unreliability as a protector. Moreover, the reputa-
tion of the United States would suffer the world over, which in turn would ad-
versely affect the working of so-called general deterrence in other conflict-prone
regions.9
Finally, and most importantly, Taiwan matters strategically. A war over
Taiwan would affect all states in the region and many beyond. Even in the ab-
sence of conflict, however, Taiwan is taking on increased relevance to the shape
of the emerging post–Cold War era. All states that rely upon either Asian
sea-lanes or continued U.S. presence in support of strategic order (thus avoiding
Chinese regional hegemony) have important interests at stake in the future of
Taiwan, even if some do not admit it. This is not an argument that Taiwan
represents some magic strategic key to control East Asia. But a change in its
geopolitical status, even a peaceful one, in favour of the mainland may be
enough to alter the region’s correlation of forces, thereby damaging the regional
stability underwritten by the United States.
THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT: CHINA’S MARITIME EXPANSION
China’s push into regional seas provides the strategic context for the increased
profile of Taiwan in East Asia. This maritime expansion is taking economic,
territorial, and strategic forms. Economically, the coastal cities and provinces
dominate the new Chinese economy, providing windows to international mar-
kets. There has been a heavy emphasis upon the role of marine industries for
continued economic growth; these industries already employ over four million
people. According to its marine policy white paper of May 1998, China must
“take exploitation and protection of the ocean as a long-term strategic task be-
fore it can achieve the sustainable development of its national economy.”10
Amongst the most important of those industries are shipping, shipbuilding,
fishing, and offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation.
Offshore oil production alone was forecast by Western sources to account for
7 percent of the national total in 2000, up from only 0.9 percent in 1990.11 The
value of marine industry production has increased 20 percent per annum since
1990, according to a Chinese report, accounting for 4 percent of gross domestic
product in both 1996 and 1997, with a targeted increase to 5 percent of GDP
sought for 2000 (for which results are not yet available). Beijing aims to double
that figure over the next decade, so that marine industry production will ac-
count for 10 percent of GDP by 2010, an ambitious goal that will require the
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annual growth rate of China’s marine economy to continue to exceed the ex-
pected high growth rate of GDP.12
To fulfil such ambitious production goals, China has placed considerable
importance on utilizing the resources of the South China Sea, especially poten-
tial oil and gas reserves, thus linking those resources to national economic devel-
opment.13 Oil is a strategic resource of which China has been a net importer
since 1993, increasing both the salience of China’s territorial claims in the South
and East China Seas and the importance of the sea lines of communication that
connect the Chinese economy to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf. Disputes over
territorial features in the South China Sea, including Chinese occupation of the
Paracel Islands and some features (some mere rocky outcrops, not always visible
above water) of the Spratly Islands, fuel concerns over China’s intentions and
ability to project influence throughout Southeast Asia, whilst the Senkaku
(Diaoyu) Islands dispute continues to sour Sino-Japanese relations. Protection
of its economic interests and pursuit of its contested territorial claims have nev-
ertheless provided China with rationales for a concerted expansion of its mari-
time strategic force structure.
Within the overall context of Chinese military modernization, the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has received a relative boost in emphasis com-
pared to the historical norm, although the nuclear deterrent, rocket, and air
forces still take precedence over naval capabilities.14 Nevertheless, the new
interest in the maritime environment is giving rise to potentially profound
changes to Chinese strategic perceptions, with concomitant effects on military
strategy, doctrine, and weapon procurement. Those leading the charge into the
maritime environment have explicitly promoted, both rhetorically and in prac-
tice, the need for imparting “maritime sense” to the Chinese people, thus linking
the restoration of China’s “honor” and place in the world (that is, Chinese na-
tionalism and, implicitly, irredentism) and its strategic ambitions to the growth
of the marine economy and naval expansion.15
The enhanced relevance of maritime factors for China’s national security
led during the 1980s, under the patronage of Admiral Liu Huaqing, to the trans-
formation of the existing strategy of “offshore active defense.” Originally refer-
ring only to the defense of coastal waters, it now envisages an extended
defence-in-depth encompassing the entire ocean space within the “first island
chain”—running from the Kuriles through Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the
Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago (thus including the entire expanse of
the South and East China Seas). Liu has also used “offshore” to indicate all
waters within the “second island chain” (stretching from the Bonins through the
Marianas and Guam to the Palau island group).16 The adoption of an extended
area bias for national defence is linked to the evolution of the defence doctrine of
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“people’s war under modern conditions” during the Deng era—a doctrine that
even in the late 1970s envisaged a major expansion of China’s maritime capabili-
ties, producing by the late 1980s substantial (if not by the standards of oceango-
ing navies) improvements in China’s naval force structure.17 The further
evolution of post-Deng military doctrine to “modern war under high-tech con-
ditions” places even greater emphasis upon defensive depth. Contemporary
doctrine requires the projection of power for offensive operations at ever greater
distances from the mainland in order to defend not only the Chinese coast but
also its maritime territorial claims and interests.18 Further, it recognizes that
external strategic threats to China’s national interests will almost certainly em-
anate from across the sea. These factors have only become more prominent in
Chinese thinking as the Taiwan issue has assumed greater intensity over the
last decade.
If improvements to the Chinese navy have been significant relative to its ca-
pabilities less than a decade ago, they have been limited by resource constraints
and the large technological hurdles presented by the military standards of po-
tential adversaries. New locally designed and built platforms like the Luhai-class
guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and Song-class conventional submarines
(SSKs) are being placed in service at a very slow pace. These vessels will probably
provide the backbone of the future naval force structure, but they are already
outdated compared to Western systems; surface combatants lack such basic ca-
pabilities as modern air defense weaponry, for example.19 To make up the short-
fall in capabilities China has imported limited numbers of Russian units, most
notably four Kilo-class SSKs and two Sovremenny-class DDGs (with another
two secondhand ships likely to follow) armed with lethal SS-N-22 Sunburn
(Moskit) antiship cruise missiles.20 The Chinese air force has also received Su-27
Flanker combat aircraft from Russia and is currently introducing advanced
multirole Su-30MKK (Flanker ground-attack variant) fighters into service, as
well as air-to-air refuelling aircraft and, prospectively, A50E airborne early
warning aircraft.21 Question marks remain, however, over the competence and
training of aircrews; the ability to control and support offensive operations;22
and the ability to integrate naval and air force assets and doctrine in joint mari-
time operations.23
The much-debated and elusive aircraft carrier has yet to appear, although
there is some evidence that construction of the first of a new class of indigenous
carriers may soon begin.24 Even so, it will take many years, if not decades, for
China to master first the technical and technological prerequisites to designing,
constructing, and maintaining such complex and costly platforms, and then the
art of operating them, and finally the technique of employing carriers as in-
struments of military strategy.25 China has purchased several old carriers for
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scrapping, including HMAS Melbourne; three Russian Kiev-class carriers—Kiev,
Minsk, and Novorossiysk (the latter two via South Korea); and the unfinished
Varyag from Ukraine.26 These should provide ample opportunities to study and
copy design elements. Logically enough, Beijing seems to favour the Russian
template for carrier design and employment, which reflects Chinese interest in
the Soviet strategy of sea denial against enemy (U.S.) fleets at considerable dis-
tances from territorial waters.27 According to one analysis, a Chinese carrier
would likely take the form of a type of heavy through-deck guided missile
cruiser in the Russian tradition, incorporating a ski jump and carrying approxi-
mately twenty-four combat aircraft.28
Much of the naval and air force expansion during the late 1980s to the early
1990s can be linked to the growth of China’s maritime interests and to its territo-
rial disputes in the South China Sea.29 However, since the mid-1990s the imme-
diate driving force behind force structure improvements has been without
doubt the Taiwan issue—although, as has often been noted, enhanced capabili-
ties developed initially to bring Taiwan into line will also provide the basis for
projecting power into the South China Sea and for contesting sea control within
at least the first island chain, if and when that ambition is operationalized. How-
ever, perhaps more significant than conventional force improvements has been,
in the words of one Pentagon China expert, the strategically calculated develop-
ment of other, less traditional capabilities and doctrines,
designed to enable targeting of adversarial strategic and operational centers of grav-
ity, and defend its own, in order to pursue limited political objectives with an asym-
metrical economy of force. In other words, the [People’s Liberation Army], as part of
its long-range regional security strategy, is attempting to develop an ability to target
an enemy’s forward-based command, control, communications, computers, and in-
telligence (C4I) nodes, airbases, aircraft carriers and sea-based C2 [command and
control] platforms, as well as critical nodes in space.30
The capabilities being developed include ballistic and cruise missiles (both
antiship and land attack); information warfare (including land, sea, air, and
space-based acquisition capabilities, information attack and countermeasures,
and information protection/denial); and integrated air defence (including of-
fensive operational capabilities) and counterspace systems.31
Quite clearly, those “limited political objectives” are increasingly Taiwan-
centered; the Chinese navy’s development into a “formidable cruise missile
force” is designed for operations against Taiwan;32 China’s deployment of CSS-6
(M-9/DF-15) and CSS-7 (M-11/DF-11) short-range ballistic missiles opposite
Taiwan continues apace, with reportedly over 350 missiles already deployed.33
The Pentagon also estimates that China’s missile deployments by 2005 will constitute
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a significant strategic advantage against which Taiwan may have little defense.34
China has also mounted a concerted diplomatic attack on America’s develop-
ment of missile defence systems, especially regional systems that might involve
either Taiwan or Japan, or a national missile defence system that might negate
China’s small long-range nuclear deterrent force.35
If Taiwan is indeed the immediate strategic focus of the People’s Liberation
Army, an important factor arises that is often neglected—the extent to which the
fate of the island of Taiwan itself may determine China’s future ability to prose-
cute its regional security and sea control ambitions.
BEAUTIFUL ISLAND, UGLY NEIGHBORHOOD
The Portuguese, who became in 1590 the first European visitors to Taiwan,
called it “Ihla Formosa”—the “beautiful island.” The regional strategic issues
relating to the island today are considerably less appealing than when the Portu-
guese made their discovery over four hundred years ago.
Taiwan in China’s Strategic Thinking
There is a real, if exaggerated, fear in Beijing that should a formal Taiwanese dec-
laration of independence go unpunished, restive regions of China may also try
to break away. Separatist tendencies within China cannot, however, easily be
linked to Taiwan; such regions each involve dynamics and circumstances that
are unrelated to the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is qualitatively different. Tibet,
Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia are, after all, constituent parts of the People’s
Republic of China; Taiwan, quite clearly, is not. This is the fundamental reality of
cross-strait relations, even if Chinese propaganda and the dissembling habits of
international diplomatic practice suggest otherwise.
The latent crisis of political legitimacy within China has been alleviated in
part by national economic dynamism and in part by the promotion of Chinese
nationalism. Yet relying upon sustained high rates of growth in an economy
with significant structural problems is fraught with risk, leading to the conclu-
sion that the encouragement of nationalist sentiment will be increasingly im-
portant to the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.36 In this
respect Taiwan’s democratic evolution, whilst posing a challenge to the main-
land regime, paradoxically also provides a focal point for the nationalist propa-
ganda that seeks to prop up the party. Nevertheless, threats issued to deter
formal Taiwanese independence not only legitimize the mainland regime but
may be vital to the political survival of the regime. Having placed such a pre-
mium on unification, to allow Taiwan to break free formally might lead to the
downfall of the current Chinese leadership, possibly even the party itself. At
the very least, Army support for the regime would waver.37 There is a general
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consensus over the Taiwan issue in Beijing, and the domestic political ramifica-
tions of “losing” the island in a limited war across the strait could be severe. The
question remains: would the Chinese Communist Party allow a conflict in which
its survival was at stake to remain limited—or in its terminology, “restricted”?38
The adoption of a nationalist agenda also helps to maintain People’s Libera-
tion Army support for a regime no longer as intimately connected to the armed
forces as was the case in the past.39 The ambitions and strategic worldview of the
Army thence become fundamental to Taiwan’s newfound geopolitical signifi-
cance.40 If preventing a formal split between the mainland and Taiwan is a pri-
mary consideration, there is reason to suggest that China’s military places
substantial strategic emphasis on “recovering” the island of Taiwan also to facili-
tate its own regional (geo)political ambitions, which are expanding as Chinese
power itself grows.
Taiwan’s physical position complicates free access to the Pacific from the
mainland. The island does not block that access entirely, but its possession by a
maritime power inimical to China might threaten both China and China’s
sea-lanes, both eastward to the Pacific and down through the South China Sea.
On the other hand, should Taiwan fall into Beijing’s hands, China would be
better able to prosecute sea-denial operations and sea-lane disruption against
the other Northeast Asian states and their American ally, should the need arise.
Accordingly, the “recovery” of Taiwan represents part of the rationale for the
pursuit of offshore active defense and greater defensive depth; in the longer
term, the island would play a leading role in the execution of that very strategy.
Chinese strategists well understand the relevance of the island to the accom-
plishment of China’s wider maritime goals and the development of a successful
national maritime strategy, as reflected by the thoughts of two PLAN officers:
“China is semiconcealed by the first island chain. If it wants to prosper, it has to
advance into the Pacific, in which China’s future lies. Taiwan, facing the Pacific
in the east, is the only unobstructed exit for China to move into the ocean. If this
gateway is opened for China, then it becomes much easier for China to ma-
noeuvre in the West Pacific.”41
Implicit in this statement is the problematic role of Japan in Chinese strategy;
it is specifically the Japanese home islands, the Ryukyus, and the disputed
Senkakus that, together with Taiwan, partly conceal China. Japanese geography
and sea power, therefore, collectively pose an inherent obstacle to Chinese ex-
pansion into the Pacific as long as Taiwan remains free of mainland control. Fur-
ther, the U.S. Navy, Taiwan’s “defender of last resort,” continues to represent the
greatest medium-term threat to the Chinese navy’s Taiwan-centered ambitions
for greater defensive depth and transformation into a major sea power in the
western Pacific, perhaps beyond.
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Taiwan, therefore, matters a great deal to China, both politically and strategi-
cally. But how significant is it for other actors in strategic terms? Any attempt to
answer that question must take note of two fundamental aspects of regional se-
curity: Taiwan’s physical location astride regional sea lines of communication,
and the (already documented) growth of China’s maritime power. In these con-
texts, Taiwan matters to Japan.
Japan: The “Third Man” in the Taiwan Dispute
Japan is, like Taiwan, an insular trading democracy with heavy dependence upon
imported resources, especially energy, most of which arrive by sea-lanes adja-
cent to Taiwan; accordingly, Japan feels threatened by Chinese expansionary
pressure into East Asian seas. Japan’s China problem is exacerbated by an under-
standable Chinese dismay over the absence of formal contrition by Tokyo for its
past aggression against the Asian mainland. The Senkaku Islands dispute has
also increased Chinese nationalist and anti-Japanese feeling; some anti-Japanese
protests may indeed have been spontaneous, as was reputedly the case during a
flare-up of the Senkaku dispute in 1996.42 However, it must also be noted that
Beijing has attempted to manipulate domestic opinion for its own ends. Also,
despite Japan’s frustrating attitude toward its past misdeeds, Tokyo has never-
theless effectively been compensating Beijing ever since Deng opened China to
the outside world—Japan has provided more than twenty-three billion dollars
to China in financial aid and “soft” loans since 1979.43
Japan has become increasingly concerned about China’s nationalist rhetoric,
military modernization, and related maritime activities. Japan’s sensitivities
were heightened when the two issues were linked in early August 2000 by the
refusal of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to sanction a ¥17.2 bil-
lion ($161 million) low-interest infrastructure loan due to consternation over
Chinese research vessels in Japanese-claimed waters. At least seventeen such “in-
trusions” by Chinese vessels were claimed to have taken place that year, whilst
Chinese naval vessels had been sighted in the Tsugaru and Osumi Straits, leading
one Tokyo politician to label China’s actions as an “apparent provocation.”44 An-
other LDP member was quoted as declaring that “those [Chinese] vessels may be
searching for places to illegally enter Japanese territory. Japan’s sovereignty has
been violated.”45 Such statements reflected both growing concern about China’s
strategic expansion and Japanese frustration that the Chinese government had
kept its public ignorant of Japan’s huge contributions to China’s infrastructure
improvements, castigating Japan in the state-controlled media and taking credit
for Japanese-funded projects. The loan package was subsequently released only
after Chinese “concessions”relating to “naval incursions.”46 In February 2001 China
and Japan agreed to provide advance notification of marine scientific research
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activities, although the ocean areas to be covered have not been defined, due to
fundamental disagreement over maritime delimitation.47
Chinese marine scientific research in what Japan considers its waters, proba-
bly including surveys on marine resources and oceanographic data but also
naval intelligence collection, has in fact been carried out continuously over the
last several years. Most of the activity seems to take place in areas of disputed
jurisdiction—overlapping and unresolved exclusive economic zones, and the
waters surrounding the contested Senkakus—thus allowing China to claim that
the consent of the coastal state (Japan) is not required.48 In the wider strategic
context, however, Japan views such activities as the thin end of the Chinese
wedge. One quasi-official Japanese analysis notes that similar activities preceded
China’s occupation of the Paracels and features in the Spratly group, summing
up: “Supported by the activities of marine scientific research vessels and naval
vessels, combined with its increasingly active fishing industry and marine trans-
portation, China may consolidate its position as a full-fledged sea power in the
future.”49
The statement may seem matter of fact, yet in context it demonstrates Japan’s
concern with China’s burgeoning sea power. More specifically, the same analysis
suggests that increased Chinese naval activity around the Senkakus in 1999
may have been linked not only to China’s marine scientific research program but
also to then–Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s “state to state” description of
China-Taiwan relations, “as moves designed to restrain the passage of bills re-
lated to the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.”50 Perhaps even
more revealing of unfolding difficulties in the Sino-Japanese relationship is the
role that Taiwan has played in Japan’s strategic thinking—most importantly,
Taiwan’s place in the new guidelines.
The revised Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation agreed upon in
September 1997 were designed to enhance the relevance of the alliance by subtly
adapting to the new regional security conditions of the post–Cold War period.
The most significant revision to the 1978 guidelines was the provision—passed
into law, partially amended, in May 1999—for “cooperation in situations in ar-
eas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace
and security.”51 Enhanced cooperation and expanded roles for Japan within the
existing alliance framework envisaged by the term “situations in areas sur-
rounding Japan” include humanitarian relief, noncombatant, and search and
rescue operations; the provision of facilities and rear area support for U.S.
forces; and operational cooperation, to include surveillance and minesweeping
support both “in Japanese territory and on the high seas around Japan,” and sea
and airspace management.52 Although opinion is divided, it seems likely that
the new guidelines represent a significant, if limited, shift in Japanese defence
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policy from an orientation purely of self-defense to one that shows an intent to
play a greater role in assisting the United States to underpin regional security.53
Implementation of the guidelines, however, has been tardy, and American
moves to strengthen the alliance seemed by the close of the Clinton era to have
lost impetus.54 The Bush administration has attempted to reinvigorate the U.S.
relationship with Japan as part of its renewed strategic emphasis on Asia; the
assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Peter Rodman,
has publicly encouraged Japan to exercise its right of collective defence within
the framework of the alliance. Also, the Japan Defense Agency has reportedly
created an “action plan” for cooperation with U.S. forces under the guidelines,
although its contents remain classified.55
The geographically undefined reference to “areas surrounding Japan” is not
only the most important revision but the most controversial. China, which ob-
jects generally to the revised guidelines as one of several “new negative develop-
ments in the security of the Asia-Pacific region,” claims that such a loose
geographical definition might include Taiwan. The new guidelines, in China’s
view, have
failed to explicitly undertake to exclude Taiwan from the scope of “the areas sur-
rounding Japan” referred to in the Japanese security bill that could involve military
intervention. These actions have inflated the arrogance of the separatist forces in
Taiwan, seriously undermined China’s sovereignty and security and imperiled the
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.56
Tensions across the East China Sea were heightened when Japan’s chief cabi-
net secretary publicly stated that the guidelines were relevant for the Taiwan
Strait area.57 That view had been prefigured by other Japanese officials in 1997;
one former Japanese foreign ministry official had declared, for example, that
“no one has denied that the Taiwan Strait is included. Japan has a great interest
in stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait.”58 Japan has since attempted to ex-
plain its way out of this controversy by stating that the term is “not geographic
but situational,” but such diplomatic creativity has failed to mollify China.59 In
any case, the difficulty lies primarily not in vague definitions or (mis)percep-
tions over whether “areas surrounding Japan” include Taiwan but in a funda-
mental clash of interests between Japan and China over Taiwan’s future.
Most interpretations of the political and strategic rationale behind the
guidelines focus on the need, from a U.S. perspective, to rejuvenate the alliance
relationship in the absence of any Russian threat and to bolster regional stability
against North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs. Although
the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which set forth the case for revising
the original defence cooperation guidelines, appeared only a month (in April 1996)
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after the Taiwan Strait missile crisis, analysts maintain that the guidelines
envisioned primarily a Korean scenario;60 the revised plans for operational co-
operation “were almost certainly created with Korean scenarios, not Taiwan, in
mind.”61 However, it is likely that Taiwan played a larger role in the Japanese de-
cision to adopt them than is commonly believed. Backing up the statements
from officials, one senior analyst at Japan’s National Institute of Defense Studies
has suggested that from Tokyo’s perspective, the guidelines were aimed primar-
ily at a Taiwan contingency.62 Japanese defence analysts with a maritime focus
often relegate the Korean Peninsula to a subsidiary status in Japan’s defence pri-
orities and strategic concerns; for them, China is increasingly the primary
threat, and Taiwan a more pressing interest.63
Tokyo’s close, if unofficial, political and economic ties to Taiwan (its colony
from 1895 to 1945) may grow yet stronger as China continues its maritime ex-
pansion; Taiwan’s continued separation from the mainland is, therefore, a strategic
interest for Japan. In a cross-strait conflict Tokyo is unlikely to get involved in a
direct military sense, but it might do so indirectly, by assisting the United States
in accordance with the new guidelines.
U.S. Strategic Interests and Taiwan
The announced Chinese unification formula, which would bar PLA forces from
Taiwan and allow the island to maintain its own armed forces, should be viewed
as a ploy. China’s 2000 white paper on Taiwan, after reiterating that upon “reuni-
fication” Beijing would “not send troops or administrative personnel to be sta-
tioned in Taiwan,” declared that other states should “refrain from providing
arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pre-
text.”64 If Taiwan ceded its sovereignty it would no longer be able to purchase
weapons, spare parts, or related technologies from abroad; the capabilities of the
Taiwanese armed forces would slowly wither. There could be no further prospect
of U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan. Even without People’s Liberation
Army forces on Taiwan, unification would remove a barrier to the Navy’s access
to the Pacific Ocean, and it is barely credible to suggest that China would desist
from utilizing Taiwan as a strategic asset for long, particularly if Japan reacts to
Chinese maritime advances in some tangible manner.
Therefore, in the context of its alliance relationship with Japan, Taiwan
matters strategically to the United States. Although the United States itself would
not be directly endangered in any immediate, military sense by China-Taiwan
unification, it could not ignore the adverse geostrategic consequences for
security in East Asia. China would not only be able to take advantage of Taiwan’s
wealth, advanced technology (including U.S.-transferred military technology),
and (possibly) its highly educated workforce but would also pose a direct challenge
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to Japanese security by dominating its energy lifelines and depriving Tokyo of a
close (if informal) political friend.65 The ability of China’s improving navy to
sever Japan’s maritime lifelines and to prosecute effective sea denial against the
U.S. Navy (potentially even local sea control within the semi-enclosed East
China and South China Seas) would be greatly improved if the Chinese army
controlled Taiwan.
Unless the security of Japan ceases to be a vital national interest of the
United States, the maintenance of the geopolitical status quo in Taiwan is a
balance-of-power and shipping interest for the United States.66 The future of
Taiwan has become linked to Japanese security, therefore, and the future
health of the Washington-Tokyo alliance, the possible alternatives to which
hardly inspire confidence: a strategically assertive Japan left to protect its
own interests might make a regional conflict with China more likely; an in-
trospective Japan preoccupied by domestic concerns could remove an obstacle
to Chinese expansion; and in the worst case, a weakened Japan that tied itself
to China would instantly create a geopolitical rupture with genuinely global
implications. However speculative, these alternatives demonstrate that it is
difficult to imagine a positive regional security architecture in the absence of
the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and a constant American presence.
In any case, the George W. Bush administration has called China a “strategic
competitor of the United States, not a strategic partner”;67 Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld has reportedly identified China as the primary future strategic
threat;68 it is therefore in the American interest to ensure that China is “con-
strained,” by safeguarding Taiwan’s freedom.69 Thus, it seems prudent to suggest
that America’s strategy for East Asia include the strategic denial of the island of
Taiwan to mainland China. The Taiwanese for their part seek to take advantage
of the island’s newfound strategic significance to America’s Asian interests;
President Chen has stated that “the crescent-shaped American defenses against
China in the Pacific, without Taiwan, would be forced back to Saipan and Guam,
even Hawaii.”70 A peaceful Taiwanese capitulation, then, is most unlikely; U.S.
intervention in response to attempted coercion is not.71
DETERRENCE AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
There is no way of knowing with certainty whether Chinese threats to use force
to recover Taiwan are genuine or merely attempts to deter a Taiwanese declara-
tion of independence. Perhaps China’s increased deployments of ballistic
missiles opposite Taiwan and Taiwan-focused military modernization simply
represent a stratagem.72 However, China deliberately disguises real capabilities
as “a fundamental approach to deterrence”;73 the same forces employed to deter
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formal independence may be used in anger. Therefore, the mainland itself needs
to be effectively deterred and, if that fails, denied its objective.
Initial consideration needs to be given to Taiwan’s own ability to defend itself.
The United States acknowledges and has begun an attempt to remedy some of
Taiwan’s deficiencies in such “functional nonhardware” areas of concern as “de-
fense planning, C4I, air defense, maritime capability, anti-submarine warfare,
logistics, joint force integration, and training.”74 It has nevertheless failed to
provide sufficient military means for self-defence. In this regard, there is a par-
ticular requirement for improved antisubmarine weapons (including modern
submarines and maritime patrol aircraft), mine countermeasures, strike capa-
bilities (to counter-deter those of China), and air defences.75 American reluc-
tance to supply (tactically) “offensive” weapons has unnecessarily restricted
Taiwan’s defence capabilities.76 Holding off from selling sea-based theater
missile defence systems, at least while they remain technologically immature, is
politically sound, however.77
A new arms package for Taiwan announced in April 2001 set out to resolve
some of Taiwan’s force structure shortcomings, including, inter alia, twelve
maritime patrol aircraft, four elderly yet still capable Kidd-class guided missile
destroyers, MH-53E minesweeping helicopters, and most significantly, eight
submarines.78 It is unclear, however, whether the submarines can be delivered, as
the United States (as Taiwan’s only reliable source of arms and military technol-
ogy) does not build nonnuclear boats, and other potential suppliers have thus
far deferred to China.79 Time may not be on Taipei’s side; it seems to be whittling
away Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.80
Taiwan suffers from small size, lack of strategic depth, and proximity to the
threat; Japan labors under constitutional and psychological constraints. Accord-
ingly, responsibility for safeguarding Taiwan and the region’s sea-lanes falls in-
evitably upon the shoulders of the United States. The administration seems
increasingly aware of this; President Bush has declared that America “would do
everything it took to help Taiwan defend itself.”81 The forthrightness of Bush’s
statement may well have reduced the diluting effects of strategic ambiguity upon
deterrence. Nevertheless, the ability of the United States to deter or defend
against mainland aggression ought not be taken for granted; it is clear neither
what would deter the Beijing leadership if it felt its own domestic control was
at stake, nor whether U.S. naval forces are prepared to operate against a geo-
graphically advantaged enemy with forces and doctrine increasingly designed to
repulse them.82
Much of the literature on China’s strategic challenge reflects an assumption
that deterrence by the conventional military superiority of U.S. forces is easy.83
More perceptive analyses of both the theory and the (American) “practice” of
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deterrence suggest that Cold War deterrence experience is not necessarily appli-
cable to new “regional” adversaries.84 If it is not, the ability of the United States
to deter threats to far-flung regional friends and allies becomes tenuous; “The
real problem for deterrence arises when the deterrent effect needs to be extended
from a distant protecting power.”85 To be effective, deterrence policy needs to be
tailored to “the given opponent and context.” An urgent need exists, then, for
improved understanding and intelligence about regional rivals.86
Any deterrence policy “tailored” for the Taiwan Strait will need to take ac-
count of the ways in which China might combine “asymmetric” strategies with
more conventional measures.87 Asymmetries—in geography, interests, capabili-
ties, and doctrine—further complicate the operation of deterrence over long
distances. The Pentagon now recognizes that such factors must be accounted for
when assessing correlations of forces between such pairs of “dissimilar actors” as
China-Taiwan and China–United States.88 “The root of effective tactical action,”
advises Wayne Hughes, “is an appreciation that force estimation is a two-sided
business and that not all elements of force are found in the orders of battle.”89
An effective amphibious invasion of Taiwan seems beyond China at present;90
at the same time, the U.S. ability to counter a concerted attempt at military coer-
cion is less than certain.91 From a purely operational perspective there is cause to
question the American predominance at sea. A Taiwan conflict is less likely to be
fought in the open ocean, where the U.S. Navy possesses its greatest operational
advantages, than in the strait itself, China’s coastal zone, and the East China and
northern South China Seas. The problems facing maritime powers in an un-
friendly and confined littoral environment are both severe and well known.92
American and Taiwanese forces would be faced with an unfavourable geo-
graphic position—the defence of a small island only a hundred nautical miles
away from a hostile continental power in possession of a long coastline and sig-
nificant strategic depth, including active defence far out to sea. U.S. naval forces
at sea would have to sustain themselves from a small number of bases in the
Northeast Asian theater, vulnerable to political unreliability among host na-
tions and to ballistic missile attack.93 Furthermore, China’s land-based airpower,
missiles, and surveillance assets would contest any response from the sea. The
problems will be exacerbated if the United States attempts to defend Taiwan un-
der restrictive rules of engagement.
A recent RAND report has identified ways to enhance the American force
posture in Asia and, for a Taiwan contingency specifically, to overcome some of
these concerns: development of Guam as a power-projection hub (from which
to fly B-52s armed with Harpoon antiship cruise missiles for long-range con-
ventional strikes); new concepts for joint operations by carrier aviation and Air
Force combat support elements; new bases in the southern Ryukyus (only
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150–250 nautical miles from Taipei) and, possibly, on northern Luzon and
Batan Island (between Luzon and Taiwan).94 The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Re-
view also reflects such considerations, stating in less specific terms that the
United States will: maintain U.S. bases in Northeast Asia and improve Air Force
“contingency basing”; increase the presence of aircraft carrier battle groups and
numbers of surface warships and submarines based in the western Pacific; and
conduct Marine Corps littoral warfare training in the region.95 A former Ameri-
can defence and naval attaché to China has clearly stated that by these measures
the Bush administration “is attempting to deter any possible Chinese adventure
against Taiwan.”96
Secondly, forces operating in or near the littoral must cope with electronic
clutter, making it harder to identify targets and threats accurately and rapidly.
The presence of commercial shipping, fishing vessels, and other civilian coastal
craft adds to the threat identification problem—all the more if they have been
sent to sea for that very purpose. Civilian vessels may also be surreptitious
weapon or sensor platforms. The many islands along the central Chinese coast-
line add to the physical clutter and provide hiding places for naval units and
screens for aircraft.97
In a third consideration, oceanographic features, particularly water depth,
and such factors as currents, seabed composition, and coastline configuration
may favour diesel-electric submarines, missile-armed fast patrol boats, and
mine warfare.98 The Taiwan Strait, specifically, is difficult for antisubmarine op-
erations, due to its shallow, rough seas and the influx of rivers.99
Finally, the missile problem becomes particularly complicated in confined
waters. “The strictures of littoral warfare threaten to cramp movement and
compress inshore operations into an explosive mixture of air, land, sea, and un-
dersea launched missiles.”100 Combat in semienclosed waters is likely to be com-
pressed in time as well as in space, placing a premium upon reconnaissance and
tactical intelligence.101 Clausewitzian friction, instability, and unpredictability
would reign in any exchange of missiles. “A small change in the hit probabilities,
the distribution of fire, defensive effectiveness, or the thwarted detection and
tracking of all the enemy will create wide swings in the resulting damage.”102 The
rules of engagement under which U.S. forces would be likely to operate would
not permit them to reduce the instability and uncertainty by attacking first.103
U.S. forces will therefore need defensive superiority, particularly integrated
shipboard theater-missile and antiship-cruise-missile defences, and related
doctrine.104
The U.S. Navy is supremely confident of its own ability to secure “battlespace
dominance in the littoral.”105 Area-denial threats, it is sure, might slow a response to
aggression and increase its costs but could not defeat it.106 Such a characterization
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is not only removed from the strategic reality of political contexts and con-
straints but ignores the inherent difficulties of modern warfare in the maritime
backyard of a continental adversary like China.
A variety of analyses have pointed out these difficulties and capability short-
falls, and have made such recommendations as the development of small, more
expendable craft for the littoral and adjacent narrow seas.107 However, platform
preferences aside, the essential point is the need to develop, in an integrated
fashion, strategy, forces, operational and tactical plans, and doctrine specifically
to deter and, if necessary, combat Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait.
General-purpose U.S. capabilities may in time not be enough—perhaps even now.
REFOCUSING U.S. TAIWAN POLICY
Taiwan has increased in strategic importance for China, the United States, and
Japan, and not merely because of its own internal democratic or economic de-
velopment. There is more to Taiwan’s new role than simply the negative effects
of cross-strait tension and conflict upon stability and confidence, and upon U.S.
credibility as regional stabilizer. Underlying these issues is a real and unfolding
battle over Taiwan’s geopolitical future in the new Asian strategic context, inexo-
rably affecting the interplay of great power relations in the new century. That
new context—the political, economic, and strategic advance of China from its
continental haven into the surrounding seas—places Taiwan on the front line of
strategic developments in East Asia.
For China’s regional ambitions, the successful swallowing of Taiwan would be
a genuine “great leap forward” that would remove geographical restrictions to
the growth of Chinese power and influence across Asian seas. Many analysts
reduce the Taiwan issue to the future of Sino-American relations. However the
Taiwanese may have exacerbated matters in the recent past, the underlying
problems are deeper than the progress of Taiwanese democracy and national
identity. The real strategic picture encompasses major-power relations in Asia;
the future of the U.S. presence in, and commitment to, the region; and perhaps
even the future ability of American seapower to influence events there. The is-
land of Taiwan will be, as it has been for much of its post-Portuguese history, a
pawn in the competitive relations of regional great powers.
It is hardly a happy situation; strategic competition already makes a difficult
situation even less tractable. Certainly, it is not foreordained that China will be-
come an enemy of the United States and the democratic states of Asia and the
Pacific, or even a global power. Yet the portents are not positive; China seems
intent on overturning the status quo.
What is required of the United States is not a wholesale change of Asian policy
but a refocusing on long-term strategic interests—protecting regional allies and
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maintaining American maritime preponderance, thus allowing regional sea-based
trade to flourish unhindered. The Chinese threat to Taiwan is the primary
near-term challenge to the regional order. As the Taiwanese are most unlikely to
surrender willingly, and as the United States has a vital national interest in main-
taining order in maritime East Asia and its own position against challengers to
that order, a strong case can be made on strategic grounds for defending Taiwan’s
de facto independent status, should the need arise. If Taiwan were to be aban-
doned, the entire U.S. policy and strategy framework for Asia would become de-
funct and relationships would be redefined in ways as yet unknowable, bringing
into play further unwanted, unpredictable, nonlinear consequences.108 Such a
loss would at the least accelerate regional instability and animosity, and create a
greater likelihood of a genuinely adversarial relationship between China and the
United States, one in which China would enjoy a more advantageous correlation
of forces than at present.
The United States, therefore, needs to recognize that the significance of Taiwan
lies beyond managing its relationship with Beijing. If the Japanese alliance is to
remain the linchpin of U.S. strategy in East Asia, it must be reinvigorated politi-
cally; if at the same time Japan’s strategic development is to be constrained, the
United States must maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. It makes sense
for the United States to develop closer links with its friends throughout mari-
time East Asia in the fields of reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, basing,
and logistics; however, the United States must have the full range of military ca-
pabilities necessary for near-independent operations in littoral Northeast Asia.
These capabilities include both mine warfare and other coastal combat forces,
and sea-based theater missile defence.109
Any strategy should include detailed operational plans and doctrine specifi-
cally designed for a Taiwan contingency. Efforts already under way to improve
operational effectiveness in littoral waters against a continental power armed
with modern missiles and asymmetric capabilities and tactics must be continued.
Indeed, the Bush administration seems to recognize the significance of Taiwan
in the new Asian security environment; however, success in deterrence or actual
conflict should not be taken for granted. Still, an understanding of how such a
strategy, and related operational plans, tactics, capabilities, and doctrine can
combine to support American Asian policy will represent a sound basis for fu-
ture action and the continued stability of the regional order.
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HAS IT WORKED?
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act
James R. Locher III
Organization has traditionally been a weak element of the American systemof national defense. For the nation’s first 150 years, the public actually fa-
vored a fractured military; so inattention to organizational issues has historical
roots. The United States entered World War II with Departments of War and the
Navy that were organizationally backward and “virtually autonomous.”1 Ob-
serving American inexperience and lack of multiservice coordination at the
war’s start, a British general wrote to London, “The whole organization belongs
to the days of George Washington.”2 Army-Navy disputes complicated finding
more appropriate wartime arrangements. The Navy entered the war embracing
its cherished concepts of independent command at sea and decentralized orga-
nizations relying on cooperation and coordination.
The Army’s shortcomings in the Spanish-American
War and its mobilization challenges during World
War I had pushed that service in the direction of cen-
tralized authority and control.
The Army and the Navy were not able to solve their
differences during World War II. Afterward, Congress
settled the dispute in terms broadly favorable to the
Navy’s concepts—ones that preserved Navy and Marine
Corps independence more than they met the require-
ments of modern warfare. Despite repeated opera-
tional setbacks over the next forty years, subsequent
reorganization efforts offered only slight improve-
ments. Such was the setting for the mid-1980s battle
that produced the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
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sity. In 1978 he joined the Senate Committee on Armed
Services as a professional staff member, leading efforts
that resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorga-
nization Act of 1986. In October 1989, President George
H. W. Bush appointed him assistant secretary of defense
for special operations and low-intensity conflict. Since
1993, he has written, lectured, consulted, and served on
commissions related to the organization of the Defense
Department. In 1996, he assisted the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in drafting its defense law and
organizing its ministry of defense. His book Victory on
the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies
the Pentagon is forthcoming. This article is adapted
from an address delivered at the Naval War College on
8 May 2001.
© 2001 by James R. Locher III
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001, Vol. LIV, No. 4
99
Naval War College: Full Autumn 2001 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. That bitter battle lasted for four years and
241 days—a period longer than U.S. involvement in World War II—and it pitted
two former allies, Congress and the services, against each other.
In this article we will examine the changes mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols
Act and assess whether they have worked. We will begin by reviewing briefly the
history of defense organization and then, with that as background, outline the
organization problems of the mid-1980s. Then we will turn our attention to
Goldwater-Nichols itself—first outlining its key objectives and various provi-
sions, and then assessing its effectiveness and results. Finally—as if the first four
headings will not be controversial enough—we will address the unfinished busi-
ness of Goldwater-Nichols and organizational steps for the future.
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
Many of the problems of defense organization the United States experienced in
1986 had their origins early in the nation’s history, at the beginning of the repub-
lic. It would be possible, however, to begin an analysis at the Spanish-American
War, when Americans first realized that they needed centralized authority in
both the War and Navy Departments and also some mechanism for cooperation
between those two departments. But for our purposes, we need go back only to
World War II.
The United States entered the Second World War with an archaic organiza-
tion that was incapable of coordinating land, sea, and air activities across the two
military departments, or even of harmonizing business (procurement, logistics,
construction, transportation, etc.) efforts within the departments themselves.
In February 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created by executive direction
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or JCS), primarily to work with the British, who had a
combined chiefs of staff organization. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed an enormous role.
Next to the president, they were the most pow-
erful Americans in the war effort. They not
only had major military responsibilities but also
collectively played crucial roles in political, in-
telligence, and even economic decisions. The
American public’s outcry over Pearl Harbor
prompted the creation of unified theater com-
manders, like General Dwight D. Eisenhower in
Europe. Service politics and jealousies prevented
unifying the Pacific theater; it was divided into
two commands—one led by General Douglas
MacArthur, the other by Admiral Chester Nimitz.
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This joint centralization was paralleled by the creation of effective central au-
thority within the War and Navy Departments, necessitated by the war effort, es-
pecially the enormous logistical tasks involved.
However, the contributions of the JCS were lessened by its adoption on its
own of the principle of reaching unanimous agreement before speaking ex
cathedra. Accordingly, the wartime Joint Chiefs—General Hap Arnold, the
commanding general of the Army Air Forces; General George Marshall, the
chief of staff of the Army; Admiral William Leahy, the chief of staff to the com-
mander in chief (that is, President Roose-
velt); and Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of
Naval Operations—had essentially to oper-
ate by cooperation.
A vivid example of the limitations on the
ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do their
work arose in connection with matériel allo-
cations. The British had recommended that
steel be diverted from the construction of
battleships and heavy cruisers to convoy es-
corts and landing craft. Admiral Leahy, who
had just joined the JCS, “remarked that it
looked to him as though ‘the vote is three to
one.’ [Admiral] King replied coldly that as far as he was concerned, the Joint
Chiefs was not a voting organization on any matter in which the interests of the
Navy were involved.”3 Essentially, he demanded veto power. For the most part,
the Joint Chiefs operated upon that principle throughout the war (and in fact
until 1986). Things would proceed when the chiefs could come to unanimous
agreement—which often required watering down their collective advice.
Often, however, they could not agree. There was a fair amount of interservice
rivalry during World War II, both in Washington and in the field. A British air
marshal once said, “The violence of interservice rivalry in the United States had
to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort.”4 In
fact, in 1943 the Army attempted to create a single military department, in place
of the War (that is, the Army and Army Air Forces) and Navy Departments,
because it had become convinced that the current arrangement was too ineffi-
cient. However, disputes between the Army and the Navy were so severe that the
idea of unifying the two military departments had to be put off until after the
war, when President Harry Truman supported the War Department proposals
for a single department, with a single chief of staff and assistant secretaries for
land, sea, and air. Truman, who had been an artillery captain during World War I
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Admiral William D. Leahy (seated at head of table) presides at a meeting of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1944. Generals George C. Marshall and Henry H. Arnold
are to Leahy’s right, and Admiral Ernest J. King is to his left.
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and had stayed in the National Guard until 1940, rising to the rank of colonel,
was very sympathetic to the Army’s ideas on organization.
The Navy and the Marine Corps opposed unification, initially on organiza-
tional principles. The way the Army wanted to organize things was completely
alien to the way the Navy was used to operating, rooted in the traditional ideal of
independent command at sea. Eventually, however, the Navy and the Marine
Corps were fundamentally driven by fear of losing aviation and land missions;
the Marine Corps, in fact, saw unification as a threat to its survival. The U.S.
Army Air Forces had emerged from World War II as a giant; the Navy was not
certain that it could compete in a unified department with the powerful Army
Air Forces, with its atomic mission, and its large parent service, the Army.
Congress was also divided on the unification issue; each service’s view had
strong supporters. But Congress ended up opposing Truman’s proposals, for
two main reasons. One was its own constitutional competition with the execu-
tive branch. Members of Congress feared that the executive branch might be
able to organize its military affairs so effectively that Congress would be at a dis-
advantage. The second reason had to do with
constituencies—where ships were to be built,
where battalions would be posted, where jobs
would be created; Congress would have more
bargaining leverage vis-à-vis a military estab-
lishment in which authority was diffused.
Congress came down, then, on the side of the
Navy and the Marine Corps, forcing President
Truman and the War Department to modify
their approach; the National Security Act of
1947 was the ultimate result.
Many people believe that the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 created the Department of De-
fense. It did not. Instead, it created something
that was called, strangely, the “National Military Establishment,” to be placed on
top of the War and Navy Departments. The act prescribed a weak secretary of
defense, with very limited powers and a small staff, and retained the World War
II boards to govern the new organization. It gave legal standing to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff but gave the group no chairman. The act not only continued the
powerful secretaries of the military departments as cabinet members but also
made them members of a new National Security Council. The services soon
used their power to erect a service-dominated system. They emasculated the
unified commands, despite the value they had shown in wartime. When the ser-
vices were finished, the commands were unified in name only.
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As Mrs. Eisenhower looks on, President Harry S. Truman shakes hands with
General Dwight D. Eisenhower during an award ceremony in the White
House Rose Garden on 18 June 1945 (U.S. Army photo).
102
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/1
In 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, assessing the compromises the origi-
nal act reflected between Truman and Congress and between the Army and the
Navy, said: “In that battle the lessons were lost, tradition won. The three services
were but loosely joined. The entire structure . . . was little more than a weak confed-
eration of sovereign military units.”5 It has been charitably said (by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Historical Office) that the National Security Act of 1947 “con-
firmed the principle of unification by cooperation and mutual consent.”6
Truman and Eisenhower spent much of their energies trying to strengthen
the National Security Act. There were revisions in 1949, 1953, and 1958—the
latter two under Eisenhower. The 1949 legislation created the Department of
Defense. All three sought to strengthen the secretary of defense. The 1949 revi-
sion established the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (In the be-
ginning, however, the chairman was not given a vote. Interestingly, some of
Truman’s early correspondence on the subject spoke of creating a chairman as
principal military adviser, specifically to get away from the idea of JCS operation
by consensus.) The military departments were downgraded in the various revi-
sions; the secretaries were removed from the cabinet and from the National Se-
curity Council. The 1958 legislation removed the service secretaries and chiefs
from the operational chain of command, in order to strengthen civilian control,
as Eisenhower wished. It also gave the unified commanders full operational
command of assigned forces. However, those provisions were not effectively
implemented. The military departments retained a de facto role in the opera-
tional chain of command and never complied with the provision strengthening
the unified commanders.
THE EIGHTIES
From 1958 to 1983, there were no major changes to defense organization; the al-
liance between Congress and the services was too powerful. Even Eisenhower, a
war hero, was unable to overcome this alliance, and that was a salient lesson for
subsequent presidents and secretaries of defense. There were continuing calls
for reform—the Symington report for John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon’s Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel, and the Defense Organization Studies for Jimmy Carter
in the late 1970s.
During this period, the military suffered several operational setbacks: the
Vietnam War, the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the seizure of the Mayaguez, the
failed Iranian rescue mission, the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, and the
Grenada incursion. These failures had a number of common denomina-
tors—poor military advice to political leaders, lack of unity of command, and
inability to operate jointly. The failed Iranian rescue mission exemplified these
shortcomings.
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Desert One
In April 1980, the United States conducted a raid to rescue fifty-three Americans
held hostage in Tehran. The military had six months to organize, plan, and train,
as well as fairly recent experience in
conducting such a mission—the Son
Tay raid about ten years before.
Nonetheless, only six of the eight
helicopters involved arrived at the
rendezvous point, known as “Desert
One,” in the middle of Iran; one of the
six that got that far suffered mechani-
cal problems and could not proceed.
That did not leave enough helicopter
capacity to carry out the mission, and
it was aborted. As the rescue force was
departing, a helicopter collided with
one of the C-130s that were carrying
commandos and helicopter fuel; eight servicemen died. The helicopters, with
valuable secret documents, weapons, and communications gear on board, were
hastily abandoned.
What were the underlying problems? No existing joint organization was
capable of conducting such a raid. There was no useful contingency plan, no
planning staff with the required expertise, no joint doctrine or procedures, and
no relevant cross-service experience. The joint task force commander, Major
General James Vaught, an Army Ranger, was a distinguished combat veteran,
but he had no experience in operations with other services. The participating
service units trained separately; they met for the first time in the desert in Iran,
at Desert One. Even there, they did not establish command and control proce-
dures or clear lines of authority. Colonel James Kyle, U.S. Air Force, who was the
senior commander at Desert One, would recall that there were “four command-
ers at the scene without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no
agreed-upon plan, not even a designated location for the commander.”7 How
could this state of affairs have possibly arisen? It happened because the services
were so separate and so determined to remain separate.
The Department of Defense—which in this period made no effort to reorga-
nize itself fundamentally—was also suffering all manner of administrative
problems. The nation was formulating security strategy unconstrained by real-
istic estimates of available fiscal resources, because the services could never
agree on a fiscally constrained strategy and the allocation of resources to sup-
port it. Communications, refueling, and other vital systems and devices were
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not interoperable across the services. There were modernization/readiness
imbalances, because the all-powerful services were pushing for more modern-
ization, while the readiness needs of the weak unified commanders were
underrepresented.
There were numerous procurement and spare-parts horror stories during this
period. A memorable one involved the coffeepots the Air Force bought for its
C-5A Galaxy aircraft at a price of seven thousand dollars each. The pots were so
advanced that they could keep brewing in conditions that would kill the crews.
“The System Is Broken”
The process that led to Goldwater-Nichols began when General David Jones, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went before the House Armed Services
Committee in a closed session on 3 February 1982, about five months before he
was to retire, and said, essentially, “The system is broken. I have tried to reform it
from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary
reforms.” General Jones was the catalyst, the most important factor in ultimately
bringing about the Goldwater-Nichols Act; the four-year, 241-day battle had
begun.
Shortly after General Jones’s call for reform, General Edward “Shy”Meyer, the
Army chief of staff, urged fundamental reorganization of the Joint Chiefs. Dur-
ing congressional testimony, a third sitting JCS member, General Lew Allen, the
Air Force chief of staff, also voiced support for reorganization. The naval ser-
vice’s JCS members—Admiral Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations,
and General Robert Barrow, Commandant of the Marine Corps—vigorously
opposed reform efforts. The 1982 debate—bitterly pitting the Army and Air
Force against the Navy and Marine Corps—reenacted the postwar disputes over
unification.
In the summer of 1982, three Joint Chiefs—Generals Jones and Allen and Ad-
miral Hayward—reached the end of their tenures. General John Vessey, of the
Army, became the new chairman and adopted an antireform stance. The new Air
Force chief of staff, General Charles Gabriel, also showed no interest in JCS
reform. Admiral James Watkins, the new Chief of Naval Operations, shared Ad-
miral Hayward’s strong antireform sentiments. Suddenly, General Meyer was
the only Joint Chief in favor of reorganization. In late 1982, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, responding to a study request by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,
recommended against major JCS reorganization. Secretary Weinberger and
President Ronald Reagan supported this recommendation, and the administra-
tion took for the first time an official position in opposition to JCS reform. This
stance set the stage for a fierce fight between Congress and the Pentagon.
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In the meantime, the House Armed Services Committee—spurred to action
by General Jones’s reform plea—held extensive hearings and formulated a bill
on JCS reorganization, which the House of Representatives passed on 16 August
1982. Congressman Richard White (D-Texas), chairman of the Investigations
Subcommittee, led the 1982 effort. In 1983, Congressman William Nichols
(D-Alabama) assumed the chair of the Investigations Subcommittee and re-
sponsibility for pushing the reform legislation.
The Senate did not enter the fray until June 1983, when Senator John Tower
(R-Texas), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, launched a ma-
jor inquiry on organization of the entire Department of Defense. At the same
time, the last JCS reform supporter—General Meyer—retired. His replacement,
General John Wickham, joined the antireform ranks. A new Marine comman-
dant, General P. X. Kelley, was also appointed that summer. Like his predecessor,
General Kelley was a determined opponent of reorganization. All five Joint Chiefs
were now united in opposition to reorganization. When Senator Tower maneu-
vered to keep his committee in the antireform camp, the 1983–84 battle lines
had the Pentagon and Senate squaring off against the House of Representatives.
This division also reflected party politics. A Republican administration and
Republican-controlled Senate were united in battling a Democratic-controlled
House.
In 1985, four events began to shift the balance in favor of reform. Senator
Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) became chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee and made defense reorganization his top priority. He formed a part-
nership with the committee’s top Democrat,
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia). The bipartisan
partnership of these two defense giants became
the second most important factor leading to
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The sec-
ond event in 1985 was the elevation of Con-
gressman Les Aspin (D-Wisconsin) to the
chairmanship of the House Armed Services
Committee. He was strongly proreform and
provided important political and intellectual
support to Congressman Nichols’s efforts.
The other two events occurred in the admin-
istration. Robert McFarlane, the national secu-
rity advisor, convinced President Reagan to
establish a commission—the Packard Commis-
sion—to examine defense reorganization. The
commission eventually endorsed reforms being
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Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, chairman and ranking minority
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (U.S. Senate photo)
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considered by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. On 1 October
1985, Admiral William Crowe, a supporter of defense reorganization, became
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Pentagon’s official position in opposition
constrained his public efforts, but behind the scenes Admiral Crowe pushed for
reorganization. In 1986, these factors led the Senate and House to enact sweep-
ing reforms despite the continued opposition of the Pentagon.
PURPOSES AND PROVISIONS
The organizational problems addressed by Goldwater-Nichols had existed for
more than four decades. When Congress went to work on the bill, there were
studies on hand by the Joint Staff and by various commissions for presidents
and secretaries of defense dating back to the 1940s; there was a tremendous
amount of evidence to make use of. We should note, however, that by 1996, the
tenth anniversary of the act, the JCS chairman, General John Shalikashvili, could
say: “The effects of Goldwater-Nichols have been so imbedded in the military
that many members of the Armed Forces no longer remember the organiza-
tional problems that brought about this law.”8 That is certainly even truer today.
In fact, there were really ten fundamental problems in the Defense Department
to which the Congress turned its attention. Their seriousness is evidenced by the
fact that Congress—which, as we have seen, had reason to like things the way
they were—now collectively acknowledged that it would have to give up prerog-
atives in the defense area. Many in uniform also recognized problems, although
the Department of Defense and the four services, as institutions, were dead set
against addressing them.
The Congressional Perspective
The number-one problem plaguing the Department of Defense was an imbal-
ance between service and joint interests. The services absolutely dominated:
they had de facto vetoes in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they had weakened the
unified commanders. On issues of major interest to them, the services aligned in
opposition to the secretary of defense. General Jones had assembled a group of
retired officers, the Chairman’s Special Study Group, to study reform of the joint
system; it agreed, “The problem is one of balance. A certain amount of service
independence is healthy and desirable, but the balance now favors the parochial
interests of the services too much, and the larger needs of the nation’s defense
too little.”9
Second, military advice to the political leadership was inadequate. As before,
it was being watered down to the lowest common denominator, so that all of the
services could agree. General Jones said, “The corporate advice provided by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff is not crisp, timely, very useful, or very influential.”10 James
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Schlesinger, secretary of defense from 1973 to 1975, was even harsher: “The prof-
fered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disre-
garded.”11
Third, military officers serving in joint-duty assignments were insufficiently
qualified, by either education or experience. As Congress found, officers did not
want to serve in joint assignments; they knew that in such billets they would be
monitored for loyalty by their parent services. In the Navy in the mid-1980s,
joint duty was considered the “kiss of death”; it meant that one’s career was over.
General George Crist of the Marine Corps, as com-
mander in chief of Central Command, testified to
Congress that there had not been a single volunteer
for any of the thousand billets on his headquarters
staff—all of them joint billets. Everyone on his staff
had been forced to serve there. Officers unlucky
enough to be assigned to joint duty got orders out
of it as soon as they could; their tours of duty be-
came dysfunctionally short.
A fourth point, already mentioned, was the im-
balance between the responsibility and authority of
each unified commander: his responsibilities were
vast, his authority weak. A fifth, related problem
was that operational chains of command were con-
fused and cumbersome. The services challenged
the operational role of the secretary of defense. The
Joint Chiefs collectively and the service chiefs in-
dividually were not in the operational chain of command; nonetheless, the JCS
often acted as if it were part of the chain, and individual chiefs played opera-
tional roles when the unified commanders involved were from their respective
services. Chains of command within a unified command were obstructed by
what came to be called “the wall of the component.”12 Unified four-star com-
manders had difficulty penetrating the “walls” of their service component com-
mands; three-star or four-star commanders whom the service chiefs tended to
protect led these components. Accordingly, joint commanders were unable re-
ally to pull their commands together to carry out their missions. In 1970, the
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel had declared: “‘Unification’ of either command or of
the forces is more cosmetic than substantive.”13 Samuel Huntington in 1984 ob-
served, “Each service continues to exercise great autonomy. . . . Unified com-
mands are not really commands, and they certainly aren’t unified.”14
Sixth, strategic planning was ineffective. The entire Pentagon was devoting
its attention to programming and budgeting, and neglecting the formulation of
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General David C. Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S. Air
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long-range plans. Seventh, large agencies had been created—the Defense Logis-
tics Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency—to provide common supply and
service functions for all components, but mechanisms for supervising or con-
trolling them were ineffective. An eighth issue was confusion as to the roles of
the service secretaries; the National Security Act of 1947 had not defined them.
The secretary of defense had been placed on top, but his relationships with the
service secretaries had been left unspecified, because addressing them would
have been too controversial. Ninth, unnecessary duplication existed in the mili-
tary department headquarters. Each military department had (as they still do)
two headquarters staffs—that of the secretary, and that of the service chief. The
Department of the Navy—comprising two service chiefs—actually has three
headquarters staffs.
Tenth and last was the major problem of congressional micromanage-
ment—even as seen from Capitol Hill. Congress was finding itself too often “in
the weeds,” immersed in details, not doing its job as the “board of directors,”
providing clear, but broad, strategic direction. Senator Nunn spoke of Congress’s
preoccupation with trivia: “Last year [1984], Congress changed the number of
smoke grenade launchers and muzzle boresights the Army requested. We di-
rected the Navy to pare back its request for parachute flares, practice bombs, and
passenger vehicles. Congress specified that the Air Force should cut its request
for garbage trucks, street cleaners, and scoop loaders. This is a bit ridiculous.”15
Striking the Balance
The overarching objective of Goldwater-Nichols as it was ultimately formulated
was to balance joint and service interests. It was not to thwart service preroga-
tives; the services were and would remain the most important elements of the
Department of Defense. They were, and are, the foundations on which every-
thing else had to be constructed. To strike that balance, the drafters of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act adopted nine objectives:
• Strengthen civilian authority
• Improve military advice to the president (in his constitutionally specified
capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces), secretary of defense,
and National Security Council
• Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission
accomplishment
• Ensure that a unified commander’s authority is commensurate with his
responsibilities
• Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
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• Provide for the more efficient use of resources
• Improve joint officer management
• Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
• Improve Defense Department management and administration.
In the past, Congress had tried to limit the authority of the secretary of de-
fense, because, as has been noted, its direct links with the services, and to the in-
dustries that served them, worked to the benefit of members of Congress in local
politics. But in the report accompanying the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress
finally declared: “The secretary of defense has sole and ultimate power within
the Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to
act.”16 That is, no one in the Defense Department, civilian or military, possessed
authority that was independent of the secretary. Eisenhower had decreed effec-
tively the same thing in 1953, through an executive directive; only in 1986 was
Congress prepared to legislate the point.
To strengthen further civilian authority, Goldwater-Nichols gave the secre-
tary a powerful military ally in the JCS chairman. The chairman was freed from
the necessity of negotiating with the service chiefs, and his institutional perspec-
tive was to be similar to that of the secretary. The 1986 legislation also specified
the responsibilities of each service secretary to the defense secretary. Addressing
civilian authority at the military department level, it clarified and strengthened
the roles of each service secretary.
To improve military advice, the act transferred all corporate functions of the
JCS to the chairman (in which he was to be assisted by a newly created vice chair-
man). Specifically, it designated the chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff as the
principal military adviser, with a mandate to provide that advice on the basis of
the broadest military perspective. Further, it made the Joint Staff (which sup-
ports the Joint Chiefs) responsible exclusively to the chairman, and it made elab-
orate provisions to improve the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff, as
well as to the staffs of the unified commanders in chief.
It did so by ordering fundamental improvements in joint officer management
generally—an arena that became the last battleground in the drafting, passage,
and ultimate enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The services saw
that if they retained absolute control of promotions and assignments, Congress
could pass all the laws it wanted—not much was going to change in the Depart-
ment of Defense. Congress was equally determined to reward officers who ac-
cepted and performed well in billets that were outside of their services; to that
end it created through Goldwater-Nichols a joint officer management system.
Specifically, a joint career specialty was established, and joint education was
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much more closely regulated—the services, for example, had been sending offi-
cers to joint schools but had assigned only a few graduates to joint billets.
As for the unified commanders in chief, the act made them clearly responsible to
the president and the secretary of defense—constituted collectively as the “national
command authority”—for the performance of missions and the preparedness of
their commands. Goldwater-Nichols required the assignment of all combat forces
to the unified commanders and removed the JCS from the operational chain of
command. No longer could the services move forces in and out of regional com-
mands without the approval, or even the
knowledge, of the commanders in chief.
(An investigation after the 1983 bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut found that
thirty-one units in Beirut had been sent
there unbeknownst to Commander in
Chief, U.S. European Command.)
To ensure sufficient authority for the
unified commanders, the law essentially
gave them all the authority that is tradi-
tionally given to a military commander.
Unified commanders were empowered to
issue authoritative direction on all aspects
of operations, joint training, and logistics,
to prescribe internal chains of command,
to organize commands and forces, and to employ forces. A unified commander
in chief could now assign command functions to subordinate commanders and
approve certain aspects of administration and support. In addition, unified
commanders could now exercise personnel authority: they could select their
headquarters staffs and subordinate commanders (matters in which they had
had almost no say in the past); they could suspend subordinates; and they could
convene courts-martial. As might be imagined, all of this caused heartburn
among the services. But Congress had decided that unified commanders had to
have these kinds of authority if they were to be effective.
Goldwater-Nichols addressed the lack of emphasis on high-level planning by
requiring the president to submit annually a national security strategy, on the
basis of which the chairman was to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans.
(The Pentagon at first had major objections here, but a year’s experience with
the new process put them to rest.) The secretary of defense was to provide—with
the assistance of the under secretary of defense for policy—guidance to the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified commanders for the prepara-
tion and review of contingency plans. Goldwater-Nichols also prescribed a role
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for the under secretary in assisting the secretary’s review of the plans. (These
were major advances. Lacking policy and political guidance, the military draft-
ers of contingency plans had been forced to formulate their own assumptions.
Also, until then the JCS had jealously guarded contingency plans, permitting
only the secretary—and no other civilian—to see them in completed form.)
In the resource area, the act called upon the secretary to provide policy guid-
ance for the effective use of resources. He was to address objectives and policies,
mission priorities, and resource constraints. Interestingly, Goldwater-Nichols
told the military departments, in effect, that their collective role, their entire
raison d’être, was now to fulfill as far as practicable the current and future re-
quirements of unified commanders in chief. To the same end, the act strength-
ened the supervision, budget review, and combat readiness of the growing
defense agencies. Congress also assigned ten new resource-related duties to the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the search for the independent joint
budget perspective that had been missing.
Many of the above initiatives, taken together, constituted Congress’s effort to
improve the effectiveness of military operations. That left a final goal, improved
management and administration—and here Congress’s concerns included ex-
cessive spans of control. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the service
headquarters staffs had grown very large, and organizationally “excessively flat”
—forty-two people reported directly to the secretary of defense, and some ser-
vice chiefs directly supervised more than fifty. The Goldwater-Nichols drafters
moved to reduce these spans of control. Believing that Pentagon headquarters
were too large, they mandated personnel reductions in them. Addressing unnec-
essary duplication between service secretariats and military headquarters staffs,
Goldwater-Nichols consolidated seven functions in the secretariats. Last, the act
sought to promote a mission orientation in the Pentagon and overcome the ex-
cessive focus on functional activities—manpower, research and development,
health affairs, and so on.
RESULTS
How well have the objectives that Goldwater-Nichols set been achieved? Have
those objectives been met in terms of the Defense Department’s performance?
Some commentators believe they have. Congressman (later secretary of de-
fense) Les Aspin immediately called Goldwater-Nichols “one of the landmark
laws of American history . . . probably the greatest sea change in the history of the
American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army
in 1775.”17 Admiral William Owens believes it was “the watershed event for the
military since the Second World War.”18 William J. Perry, secretary of defense from
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1994 to 1997, considers Goldwater-Nichols “perhaps
the most important defense legislation since World
War II.”19
A few have been more critical. John Lehman,
Secretary of the Navy in the Ronald Reagan years,
charged in 1995 that the new Joint Staff reflected a
gradual edging toward the old German general-staff
system.20 Richard Kohn has expressed concern
about erosion of civilian control of the military.21
The drafters of Goldwater-Nichols hoped for a Joint
Staff that was as capable as the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense. Now, unfortunately, the Joint Staff
is much more capable than the staff of the secretary
of defense, and only partly due to improved quality
of the work of the former—the performance of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense has been weaker.
Others have had similar unease regarding the cur-
rent viability of civilian control. Professor Mackubin Owens of the Naval War
College has argued, “The contributions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act . . . are
marginal at best, and . . . the unintended consequences of the act may well create
problems in the future that outweigh any current benefits.”22 Let us review the
objectives again, this time in light of the experience of a decade and a half.
There is no dispute about the stature of the secretary of defense. He clearly is
the ultimate authority in the Department of Defense, and his role in the chain of
command is clear. He enjoys the independent military advice of the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to such an extent that policy disputes are now generally
between the secretary and chairman on one side, and the services on the other;
such debates are no longer civil/military in nature, and that is fortunate. The
secretary of defense now has well-understood relationships with the service sec-
retaries, and their internal authority, in turn, has been clarified. There does ap-
pear to have been a reluctance on the part of secretaries of defense to exercise
fully their newly won authority. The weaker performance of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense—leading to an imbalance between the influence of that of-
fice and the Joint Staff—has diminished the civilian voice in decision making.
The Goldwater-Nichols objective of strengthening civilian authority has pro-
duced results of a “B-minus,” middling quality; there are problems here. Still,
they are manageable ones; the problems that once crippled the secretary’s au-
thority have been overcome.
As for the quality of military advice to the national command authority,
recent advisers and advisees have described it as greatly improved. Richard
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Cheney, as the secretary of defense under President George H. W. Bush, thought
it represented “a significant improvement” over the “lowest common denomi-
nator.”23 General Shalikashvili said, “We have been able to provide far better,
more focused advice.”24 Previously, initiatives in the Joint Staff went through five
levels of review, in which each service had, effectively, a veto. Papers tended to be
reduced to the lowest common denominator, inoffensive to any service, even be-
fore they reached the chiefs themselves, where the necessity for unanimous
agreement caused them to be denatured even further. In the end, the secretary of
defense would turn to his own civilian staff for the substantial advice that he
could not get from military officers. Goldwater-Nichols freed the JCS from these
staffing procedures. The Joint Staff now works for the chairman, and the chair-
man—though he may consult the service chiefs and unified commanders—need
“coordinate” his advice with no one. Not all observers are impressed; Secretary
Lehman believes that making the chairman principal military adviser has “lim-
ited not only the scope of military advice available to the political leadership, but
also the policy- and priority-setting roles of the service chiefs and civilian
service secretaries.”25 Nonetheless, the overwhelming opinion believes that
progress in this part of Goldwater-Nichols merits a grade of A, for tremendous
improvement.
It is universally agreed that the same is true regarding clarifying the mission
responsibility of the unified commanders in chief. Military officers and defense
officials have repeatedly cited the benefits of a clear, short operational chain of
command. General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of Central Com-
mand during DESERT STORM, found that the clarification of his responsibilities
made a tremendous difference: “Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear
lines of command authority and responsibilities for subordinate commanders, and
that meant a much more effective fighting force.”26 I would give this an A as well.
Goldwater-Nichols has also effectively made the authority of the unified
commanders commensurate with their responsibilities. Overwhelming suc-
cesses in military operations and peacetime activities have provided visible evi-
dence of the positive results. The act’s provisions have worked out very well
because the Goldwater-Nichols drafters had a great model—the authority that
the military has traditionally given to a unit commander—to use in assigning
command authority to unified commanders. General Shalikashvili has charac-
terized the improvement here in very positive terms: “This act, by providing
both the responsibility and the authority needed by the CINCs [commanders in
chief], had made the combatant commanders vastly more capable of fulfilling
their warfighting role.”27 Observers are divided as to whether the unified com-
manders have too much, or too little, influence in resource issues. Nonetheless,
the current state of affairs is probably about right—another grade of A.
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World events and regional trends have thrust the unified commanders
with geographic responsibilities into broader roles, in which they are seen as
representing the U.S. government. Of all government agencies, only the De-
partment of Defense has officials in the field with regionwide responsibili-
ties. The unified commanders have performed well in this role, but to have
U.S. security interests represented so powerfully around the world by mili-
tary officers may in the long term become unacceptable, because the military
dimension of national-security interests overseas is decreasing.
Of course, the most conspicuous success for Goldwater-Nichols has been in
the realm of military effectiveness; there have been overwhelming operational
successes since the law was passed. General Colin Powell observed, “Perfor-
mance of the Armed Forces in joint operations has improved significantly and
Goldwater-Nichols deserves a great deal of the
credit.”28 Of U.S. joint warfighting capabilities, Gen-
eral Shalikashvili said, “No other nation can match
our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and
fight jointly.”29 Areas of concern might be slow prog-
ress on joint doctrine and resistance to the missions
of the Joint Forces Command (formerly Atlantic
Command) in the training, integration, and provi-
sion of joint forces and experimentation with new
concepts. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense
has clearly been doing “A” work in the Goldwater-
Nichols s t ruc ture to improve operat iona l
effectiveness.
In the remaining objec t ive areas , the
Goldwater-Nichols experience has been less pleas-
ant. Strategy formulation has improved, but the
results are not yet very strong; published strategic
documents still betray strong attachment to the past.
Contingency plans have been improved tremendously,
but there are still barriers between the civilian policy
makers and operational staffs in crisis-action contingency planning. Strategy
making and contingency planning under Goldwater-Nichols collectively merits
a grade of C—unimpressive.
The effect of Goldwater-Nichols with respect to more efficient use of resources
has been barely acceptable, if that—a grade of D. There have been some
positives—the Base Force, recommended after the Cold War by General Colin
Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to reduce the military by 25 per-
cent; and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments developed in the Joint
L O C H E R 1 1 1
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Staff, largely at the initiative of Admiral Owens. But the services continue to fund
Cold War systems, cannot seem to break their attachment to them, and the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council has rubber-stamped the services’ choices. As
Admiral Owens has argued, the inability of the defense establishment to make
some fundamental decisions has squandered the post–Cold War period.30
The qualifications of joint officers have improved dramatically—thanks not
to the Department of Defense, which has been until recently indifferent in its
implementation of the act’s joint officer provisions, but to the initiative of the
officers themselves. These officers have come to see joint experience as some-
thing that can promote their careers or provide useful skill sets for the future.
The department itself, however, still has no concept of its needs for joint officers
or of how to prepare and reward them. The officer corps is much smaller now
than it was when Goldwater-Nichols was passed; this is no area in which to be
adrift. It requires, again, a balance between joint and service emphasis. Joint offi-
cer education can be pushed too far; service capabilities and perspectives are
very important, for instance, and they can be taught only at command-and-staff
and war colleges. The bottom-line grade for Goldwater-Nichols’s objective of
improving joint officer management is a C+.
Finally, the remedies applied by Goldwater-Nichols to defense management
and administration have largely been ineffective. They were never a priority for
the act’s drafters, and troubling trends remain. Management of the large defense
agencies is still weak. The Pentagon, with its large staffs including two (or three)
headquarters staffs in each military department, is choking on bureaucracy. The
division of work among the major components is blurred. The orientation to
mission in business activities is still weak, and management doctrine, so to
speak, is a relic of the 1960s. The Defense Department under Goldwater-Nichols
gets a D here—barely getting by.
The overall report card, then, is mixed. In the areas that the original sponsors
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act considered most pressing—military advice, the
unified commanders, contingency planning, joint officer management, and
military operations—the Department of Defense has made gratifying, some-
times striking, progress. That is, the act has been very successful in improving
the operational dimension of the Department of Defense. The “business” re-
forms of Goldwater-Nichols, however, have not worked. These concerns, which
may have been secondary fifteen years ago, are urgent now.
YESTERDAY’S WINNING FORMULA
The unfinished business of Goldwater-Nichols cannot be resolved from the bottom
up; the Department of Defense is too large, and the rate of change it confronts is
too rapid. The process will have to be driven from the top, by leadership with vision
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and communication skills. In 1997, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen sought
to stimulate a “revolution in business affairs” in the Defense Department—the of-
fice of the secretary, the military departments, “business activities,” and the defense
agencies. He wanted to “bring to the department management techniques and busi-
ness practices that have restored American corporations to leadership in the mar-
ketplace.”31 The effort needs to be accelerated tremendously—in a Defense
Department with a culture that is markedly change resistant.
Resistance to change is a natural tendency of both humans and large organi-
zations, but in a world characterized by accelerating change, it is a strategic lia-
bility. As two business scholars observed, “Yesterday’s winning formula ossifies
into today’s conventional wisdom before petrifying into tomorrow’s tablets of
stone.”32 The world is moving very rapidly—and the U.S. Department of De-
fense is too attached to the past.
The dual headquarters at the top of each of the military departments must be
combined into one; the current arrangement is far too inefficient for a fast-paced
world, and it consumes far too much manpower. The defense agencies—which
now expend more money than the Department of the Army—should be col-
lected into a “fourth department,” for support of the entire Defense Depart-
ment—under an executive, a director of defense support, who can impose
high-quality management techniques in this vital area. In the operational area,
standing joint task force headquarters should be established in each regional
unified command, despite the personnel and resource commitment that will
involve; as it is, the military assembles forces for operations as if it were picking
teams in a neighborhood basketball game. Joint Forces Command needs—in
fact, all joint activities should have—a budget and authority to buy systems
unique to joint operations. The present dependence on service executive agents
gives the services too much control over progress in joint activities.
The Goldwater-Nichols story offers, in my view, two key lessons. First, defense
organization is important; it deserves continuous and innovative attention.
Congress came to the department’s rescue in 1986, but today the Pentagon’s or-
ganizational problems are again stacking up, and at an ever faster pace. Second,
Goldwater-Nichols brings to the fore the struggle of each officer to find that bal-
ance between loyalty to service and devotion to the larger needs of the nation.
All who work in elements of large organizations face a similar challenge. The
natural impulse is to defend that element—to protect it against marauders, to be
sure it gets its fair share, to demonstrate that its contributions are more vital
than those of others, and, when necessary, to fight against its evil foes. Such im-
pulses have their time and place, but increasingly, America will need officers
who can resist them when the nation’s security demands something more.
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AFTER THE STORM
The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and Navy
Major General John L. Barry, U.S. Air Force, and James Blaker
Over the last decade, military reformers have argued that when it comes todeveloping joint warfare capabilities, the U.S. military services have rou-
tinely substituted overblown rhetoric for heartfelt commitment.1 The services
may have redundant capabilities, critics complain, but they continue to stage
knife fights over doctrine; they still have problems communicating with each
other during actual operations; and they continue to squabble—quietly or
not—over their “fair shares” of the defense budget.
There have been, however, few acknowledgements that the ability of U.S.
forces to operate jointly is better now than it was a generation ago, when joint
operations were rarely on anyone’s “radar screens.” In fact, it took the “Desert
One” disaster, the resulting Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and the ongoing de-
bate over the current revolution in military affairs to lead us up to two funda-
mental questions. Are the four services trying to improve their joint operational
abilities fast enough? How will their ability to operate jointly evolve over the
next several years?
The answer to the first question, as this historically based article will demon-
strate, has its roots in an expanding technological base; the centrifugal,
go-it-alone behavior of the services in the late 1970s and 1980s; and the eventual
march toward convergence, especially by the Navy and Air Force, since DESERT
STORM. The answer to what happens in the future may be a bit trickier, but we
offer a hypothesis: joint operational capabilities will accelerate dramatically,
because of ever-expanding technological capabilities, and because of the grow-
ing convergence between service visions and doctrines, particularly in the case
of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy.
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THE EXPANDING TECHNOLOGICAL BASE:
THE DIFFERENCE A DECADE MAKES
Joint operations used to mean nothing more than the participation of two or
more services at the same time. There were a number of cultural, organizational,
and political reasons for this orientation, but as recently as a decade ago there
were important technological reasons as well. For example, given the size, heter-
ogeneity, and different modernization rates of the armed services, the United
States simply could not achieve, with few exceptions, cross-service data inter-
operability. The commanders of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units
could communicate with each other, but the computers that actually ran and
supported the equipment in their units generally could not exchange data
quickly or establish the kind of information flow that was often needed. What we
had, therefore, were military services entering the information revolution, but
mostly within themselves rather than between each other.2
Then a second wave of the information revolution hit the U.S. military. This
second wave included a bewildering array of technologies, including informa-
tion “layering,” new architectures and data standardization, the Global Com-
mand and Control System, Link 16, and more.3 Much of this second wave
remains esoteric, complex, and incomplete. Overall, however, its impact over the
last ten years has been profound. While the technical integration of all major
military systems and functions into a true system of systems is far from com-
plete, enough is in place to achieve joint interoperability at the systems and data
levels. From a technical standpoint we are literally entering a whole new world of
joint forces.4
However, our technological ability to change the concept of joint operations
from one that means, essentially, “being there with more than a single military
service” to something that involves true interoperability, functional integration,
and order-of-magnitude improvement in capability does not make the shift
automatic. Changing the meaning of jointness requires willpower, and that is a
function of culture, history, politics, and vision. To show how far the U.S. Navy
and U.S. Air Force have come in these areas, we need to delve into what they have
been saying about who they are, where they want to go, and why. From a joint
operations perspective, it is a tale of divergence and yet convergence that started
three decades ago.
FROM VIETNAM TO DESERT STORM:
DIVERGING NAVY AND AIR FORCE DOCTRINES
In the early 1970s, as it became increasingly clear that the United States was
pulling out of Vietnam, each of the military services began to assess what the
previous decade had meant to it and, more importantly, what lay ahead. The
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Army refocused its attention on Central Europe and developed the “AirLand
Battle” concept, which eventually provided the foundation for its successful
hundred-hour operation against Iraqi forces in DESERT STORM. The Air Force
also turned toward planning for a war on the central front in Europe, as did the
Navy. But the latter did so in the context of a general shift toward a war at sea,
and under it. It was clear that the Soviet Union was building a naval force that
could challenge our ability to flow men and materiel across the Atlantic, in the
event of a conflict in Europe, and also test our control of the sea. As a result, Navy
planning soon focused on blocking Soviet access to the Atlantic sea-lanes, ini-
tially between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, and subsequently
farther north, under the Arctic ice cap and into the Norwegian Sea.
By the late 1970s, however, a new pattern emerged in the Navy’s thinking.
Navy strategists accepted the fact that however vital the Navy’s contributions to
a Nato–Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe would be, they would be strategic in level
and scope, and indirect in nature. At the same time, the strategists saw opera-
tions in the Norwegian Sea as increasingly important, and not only because they
could bottle up the Soviet submarine threat. By threatening to conduct air oper-
ations from the Norwegian Sea, the Navy could also tie down Soviet ground and
air forces that otherwise might be thrown against the Central European front.
That, of course, was the basic assumption underlying what became the “Mari-
time Strategy.”5
As attractive as the Maritime Strategy was to Navy thinkers, its fundamental
problem boiled down to protecting aircraft carriers, and doing so within the
confines of a strategic paradox. To tie down Soviet forces, the carriers had to get
close enough to their northern flank to pose a serious attack threat to the Soviet
homeland. The closer the carriers came to the Kola Peninsula, however, the eas-
ier it would be for waves of land-based, medium-range Soviet aircraft to find
and attack them.6 This posed a difficult tactical problem, for in the 1970s
the Soviets were developing air-to-surface missiles that, delivered in repeated
long-range attacks from multiple directions, were likely to inundate U.S. naval
battle fleets.
The Navy’s response was to extend its airpower-projection capabilities far-
ther and to deploy multilayered defensive shields as far out from the aircraft car-
riers as possible. In the first case, to extend its power projection capabilities, the
Navy bet on the A-12—a relatively long-range bomber designed to replace the
A-6—and on long-range cruise missiles (the Long Range Cruise Stand-Off
Weapon, for example). Neither bet paid off. Both programs were canceled in the
late 1980s because of development delays, cost escalations, and premonitions of
a Soviet collapse.
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The Navy’s efforts to push an effective defensive shield farther out from the
carrier were far more successful. The undertaking involved capital investments in
attack submarines, new carriers, Aegis-equipped surface ships, the F-14 long-range
interceptor, and the F/A-18. It also involved an early information-technology
“revolution” of sorts; though the post-Vietnam ship modernization and buildup
tended to overshadow the fact, the Navy invested heavily in space-based commu-
nications and networked computers.
Much of the above architecture might have developed without a Maritime
Strategy. Large, modern carriers, with their ability to carry and operate more air-
craft, made sense economically.
The buildup of attack submarines
was directly linked to the growth
of Soviet attack and ballistic mis-
sile submarine inventories from
the 1970s onward. The Navy’s
growing capabilities in data link-
ing and communications had been anticipated in the 1960s, at the height of, and
in the context of, the Vietnam War. When all is said and done, however, it is hard
to separate the Navy’s procurement history from its parallel development of the
Maritime Strategy. Whether the strategy drove procurement patterns or merely
justified them, by the early 1980s the corporate Navy saw both elements as inte-
gral parts of a greater whole.
Committed as it was to a forward strategy that would face formidable and
numerous air threats, the Navy recognized the value of engaging those threats as
far away from its battle groups as possible, before Soviet Tu-22M Backfire
bombers could launch their missiles. But the farther out the shield extended, the
more porous it became. That, in turn, dramatically increased the need for inte-
grated cooperation and communication among the ships and aircraft, a need
that supported the Navy’s proposed Cooperative Engagement Concept. (The
CEC, still in development, envisions the creation of a common “battlespace”
picture by combining the separate radar and other sensor returns received by the
aircraft and ships that make up a battle group.)
The idea of developing a common understanding of a highly complex
military situation that encompassed a vast geographic area was, of course, not a
revolutionary concept. But two aspects of the U.S. Navy’s CEC efforts are worth
noting. One was the increased importance the Navy put on space-based surveil-
lance. The other lay in the beliefs and assumptions related to command and con-
trol that it developed on how to react to a common battlespace picture. In
retrospect, the Navy’s interest in both areas appears to have set the foundation
for closer joint operational convergence with the Air Force.
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If space-based communications had been a central Navy interest prior to the
emergence of the Maritime Strategy, within that strategy the tactical necessity of
extending an air defense shield beyond the horizon put a premium on this type
of communication. (This remained true as the Navy began to build a common
battlespace picture to link computers with data streams within its Cooperative
Engagement Concept.) At the same time, the Maritime Strategy also elevated
space-based surveillance from a “nice-to-have” operational adjunct to a key
need, particularly as technical improvements in U.S. satellites in the 1980s of-
fered near-real-time notification of Backfire takeoffs. Through the 1970s and
1980s, then, as the service-centric Maritime Strategy increasingly dominated
Navy thinking and planning, it was also helping to construct a common interest
area with the U.S. Air Force—in space-based surveillance and in the ability to
track what other land-based air forces were doing.
In fact, by the outbreak of Operation DESERT STORM, the Navy had essentially
committed itself to two “Air Force” notions. First, the type of battlespace aware-
ness that matters most is that which allows one to focus on what an opposing air
force is doing on and over its own territory. Second, in order to deal with this
opposing force effectively, one needs centralized command. Now, decentralized
operational command and control, of course, was deeply embedded within the
U.S. Navy. The service had not only delegated decision-making authority to in-
dividual ships but had wrapped decentralization within its own culture and tra-
dition. But as the Maritime Strategy took hold and communications improved,
the Navy increasingly moved toward more centralized decision making, at least
when it came to coordinating responses to air attacks. Its creation of “composite
warfare commanders” for its carrier battle groups was a key milestone. Battle
group commanders now had the authority to coordinate their groups’ air de-
fense assets as a whole. The doctrine also illustrated, in a small way, that the seeds
of convergence lay within a Navy-centric strategy.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force, long characterized by more centralized con-
trol, was moving toward convergence as well. The process started in the 1960s,
partly driven by the strategic nuclear attack planning efforts tied to the Single
Integrated Operations Plan. The Vietnam War, where the Air Force began to em-
ploy the centralized planning and coordination of attack, fighter, tanker, and
rescue air operations that communications and radar tracking improvements
made increasingly possible, helped push the service into the nonnuclear realm.
The trend accelerated with the deployment of the Airborne Warning and Con-
trol System (AWACS) in the mid-1970s and with the emergence of AirLand
Battle doctrine in Europe.
However, the limited types of conceptual convergence we have just described
were outside the planning mainstreams of the Navy and Air Force for most of
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the last thirty years. They made little progress toward creating “ties that bind”;
from the end of the Vietnam War to at least the mid-1990s, the Air Force and the
Navy simply thought about and operated within two separate conceptual worlds.
This division was not irrational. Implementing the Maritime Strategy had the
practical effect of separating the focus of the Navy power projection from the
focus of Air Force operations by over a thousand miles. This kind of geograph-
ical separation simply ruled out
any concern with or interest in
cross-service synergies at the op-
erational or tactical levels. Indeed,
the separation tended to promote
the opposite effect and reinforce
parochialism in both camps. To the Navy, for example, the prospect of operating
on its own in the northern reaches of the Norwegian Sea (or off the Kamchatka
Peninsula in the Pacific) allowed optimization for a conflict that would probably
involve only two forces—those of the U.S. and Soviet navies. Over the years, that
fundamental assumption affected a myriad of incremental decisions on weapon
designs, stockpiles and logistics, and information and communications systems.
As a result, fleet-defense “fire-and-forget” weapons increasingly became the
weapons of choice. In planning scenarios uncomplicated by the presence of
other services, allied forces, or nonbelligerents, the choice of such weapons was
less hindered by concerns that once launched they might have unintended
consequences.
The Air Force, for its part, went down a different path. Its planning context
was “denser”; its operating area was filled with a greater variety of forces. Allied
aircraft, for example, would be in the air along with hostile ones. The AirLand
Battle concept would require close Army–Air Force planning and coordination.
Finally, the Air Force could not count on the presence or contributions of U.S.
naval forces, nor would it have to worry much about what that service was doing
a thousand miles to the north. These were just some of the givens that drove Air
Force planning, acquisition, and operational doctrine for most of the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century.
So it was that the Navy and Air Force’s divergent planning contexts over-
shadowed their growing agreement in the areas of centralized command and
control of air operations, and the utility of space-based communications and
surveillance. In fact, one could argue that the divergent planning streams twisted
the fragile agreement into competition. The Navy and Air Force were each
moving toward greater centralized control, but only if that control was central-
ized under its own authority. Likewise, both agreed on the increasing utility of
space-based communications and surveillance, but each demanded that its own
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requirements be met first, and that it, and not the other service, be given author-
ity to set priorities regarding space-based activities.
DESERT STORM AND THE RETURN TO CONVERGENCE
The effects of the Navy and Air Force’s divergent planning paths became dra-
matically visible during the Gulf War, and they subsequently affected the Navy’s
future planning far more than they did that of the Air Force. This is probably be-
cause DESERT STORM fit the Air Force’s planning approach much better than it
did the Maritime Strategy, and because civilian and military leaders prevented
the Navy from using its full arsenal of fire-and-forget weapons. (There were too
many friendly and allied forces in the area, and naval aviation lacked some of the
“identification friend or foe” capabilities of the Air Force.)7
The Gulf War, in short, was a “wake-up call” for the Navy. The Army and Air
Force felt that their strategies and concepts of operations were largely vindi-
cated.8 This was less true inside the Navy, which came out of DESERT STORM with
the sense not only that had it been overshadowed by the Air Force but that the
strategic concept it had so carefully developed was essentially irrelevant. As a re-
sult, the Navy shifted toward a more “joint” posture—but so did the ever restless
Air Force.
The Air Force’s Transition to Jointness
Beginning in 1990, each of the military services published a series of “white
papers” that provided “vectors” on how to deal with a new security environment
and the consequences of the Gulf War. The Air Force published its initial white
paper, “Global Reach—Global Power,” in 1990. It argued that the United States
was now able to strike anywhere in the world with precision, speed, and accu-
racy. In retrospect, the document was remarkable not only for its prescience but
also for its advocacy of change. It anticipated replacing a cold-war Air Force—that
is, a forward-stationed garrison force—with an expeditionary Air Force that
operated globally out of the United States.
“Global Reach—Global Power” also recognized that expeditionary forces
required new and higher levels of situational awareness. The challenge appeared
simple—“If we’re going to have fewer people based forward around the world,
then we’re going to have fewer eyes and ears out there, so we need to provide the
national command authorities with worldwide situational awareness.”9 A par-
tial answer, or so the white paper argued, was to accelerate America’s interest in
and use of space for communications and for intelligence collection, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance.
Late in 1996, the Air Force updated its vision. “Global Engagement: A Vision
for the 21st Century Air Force” had a threefold significance. First, the document
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asserted that the concepts outlined six years earlier in “Global Reach—Global
Power” had proved more than mere rhetoric, that the U.S. Air Force had for-
mally embedded them into its long-range planning process. Second, it stressed
the growing importance of space in this process. Finally, “Global Engagement”
spelled out what “expeditionary operations” truly mean.
These operations mean deploying more rather than less. They involve going,
for particular tasks, anywhere in the world—as quickly as possible. They mean
depending upon stealth technology, precision weapons, and space-based opera-
tions. In short, the Air Force had
to become an aerospace force. It
had to become faster, more po-
tent, more accurate, and more ef-
fective in its use of force. It had to
shift from a reliance on mass to a
reliance on knowledge and information. In the end, the Air Force had to do
these things because they were the essence of true expeditionary power.10
The most recent Air Force vision—“America’s Air Force: Global Vigilance,
Reach, and Power” (2000)—builds upon these themes. It emphasizes—yet
again—the fundamental importance of space-based surveillance, command
and control, and targeting in enhancing freedom of action and movement, and
in preventing adversaries from interfering with U.S. operations. In the Air
Force’s case, this means that expeditionary aerospace operations will only be
possible by compensating for the loss of an “on the scene” perspective with a
perspective from space.
That, in turn, inevitably commits the Air Force to joint rather than indepen-
dent operations. It is a matter of physics. By recognizing that forward-stationed
U.S. forces are going to be increasingly vulnerable and sometimes even counter-
productive, the Air Force’s vision of global vigilance, reach, and power commits
the service to building better situational awareness than could be garnered, or
would be necessary, if one were already on the scene.11 (For one thing, it is neces-
sary to compensate for the time and distance involved in responding from the
continental United States, if military force is to be used.) The view from space is
probably essential if we are to deter or prevent errant behavior, for it represents,
almost literally, high ground from which to perceive and understand phenomena
spread across great expanses.
But if the perspective from space—generated by technology that allows us to
observe, understand, and communicate—is vital, it is not sufficient. The Air
Force’s current vision recognizes fully that the nation will always need the addi-
tional perspectives that come from the air, sea, and ground, particularly if it
wishes to deter undesirable events or respond to them from afar. Greater distance
1 2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
The Navy and Air Force were each moving to-
ward greater centralized control, but only if
that control was centralized under its own
authority.
128
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss4/1
means more time. More time means a greater need for precision, accuracy, and
effectiveness in any use of force. Precision, accuracy, and effectiveness de-
mand the best, most comprehensive situational awareness and actionable
knowledge that can be obtained, from all sources. Together they give the United
States the information edge that—along with stealth and precision—lies at the
heart of the American revolution in military affairs and is the fulcrum of mili-
tary superiority.
In summary, the last decade represents a clear progression for the Air Force
and its vision. The journey included the limited use of stealthy and precise force
in DESERT STORM, and its full use over Kosovo in Operation ALLIED FORCE (and,
very recently, over Afghanistan). In the interim, the Air Force transformed itself
from one of the most outspoken advocates of a specialized view of joint opera-
tions to a believer in synergy. It went from hinting that it alone could deal with
most of the nation’s military challenges to the conviction that its global, expedi-
tionary forces will have to integrate improved technologies and situational
awareness to enhance the military capabilities of the United States as a whole.
The Navy’s Transition to Jointness
If DESERT STORM was an important milestone for the Air Force, it is difficult to
exaggerate the impact the conflict had on the U.S. Navy. Within a year, the Navy’s
general planning context moved from sea control and the open oceans to littoral
zones and the projection of power and influence over land. (To reinforce the
point, consider the titles of the Navy’s key white papers of the 1990s—“. . . From
the Sea,” September 1992;12 “Forward . . . from the Sea,” 1994;13 “Forward from
the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept,” 1997;14 and “Forward from the Sea
Anytime, Anywhere,” 1998.15)
Some of this transition almost certainly would have occurred even had there
been no Gulf War, for by the early 1990s the Soviet Union was gone, and with it
the perceived challenge to U.S. supremacy on the open seas. The early 1990s were
also a time of declining budgets, and although General Colin Powell, then chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs, had proclaimed that cuts would be shared equally (in
percentage terms) by all the military services, the Navy, like the Air Force, de-
cided to promote a post–Cold War concept that justified at least a claim for in-
creased budget shares.16
“. . . From the Sea” argued that U.S. naval power provided presence, enhanced
diplomatic contacts, reassured friends and allies, bolstered coalitions, and dem-
onstrated power and resolve. It also argued that forward-deployed naval forces
could accomplish their goals without extensive forward basing, which might not
be easily available during peacetime. Finally, the white paper asserted, if military
force had to be used, forward-deployed naval forces could bring their own joint
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maritime, ground, and air power to the fight. The Navy, in short, basically
claimed that the Navy–Marine Corps team, without any involvement from the
other services, was capable of undertaking joint operations, at least in the
world’s littoral zones.
The Navy’s argument was highly effective during the Defense Department’s
1993 Bottom-Up Review, which attempted to set new force levels. While the re-
view based most of the services’ force requirements on hypothetical conflicts,
it made an exception in the case of carrier battle groups, postulating that the
value of naval peacetime presence was sufficient to warrant two groups beyond
what conflict-based calculations indicated.
“Forward . . . from the Sea,” however, retreated from the suggestion that the
Navy was capable of handling most “joint” warfare demands by itself. Instead,
it portrayed the service as a facilitator for joint operations—once it had cleared
the way. The shift in emphasis
may have been in response to the
criticisms by the other services of
the original white paper’s claims.
The Army, for example, had ar-
gued that naval presence offshore,
even in littoral zones, had very little political-military leverage in peacetime
until the Marines actually planted their “boots on the ground”—and if boots on
the ground were the real gauge of leverage, the Army offered the greatest lever-
age of all. The Air Force, in contrast, had been less directly critical. It had agreed
with the Navy’s contention that the United States could achieve high political
and deterrent leverage without necessarily having boots on the ground. But
in the Air Force’s view, what most concerned would-be challengers was what
“Global Reach—Global Power” had emphasized, the ability to strike quickly
over great distances with precision and accuracy. By that criterion the Air Force,
not the Navy, was the service of choice.
But there was more to the Navy’s edging toward “jointness” than the sting of
Army and Air Force criticisms. The very individual who had convinced Secre-
tary of Defense Les Aspin that a naval force in excess of calculated warfighting
requirements was justified—Vice Admiral William Owens, then the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assess-
ments—had also introduced a new, joint perspective into Navy force planning.
The assessments undertaken at his direction pointed to dramatic increases in
warfighting capabilities through joint theater ballistic missile defense and air
strikes. In other words, by 1994 the Navy was analytically rediscovering both
how dangerous it would be to operate in the littorals, relatively close to shore,
and how impressively combat power could be enhanced by the involvement of
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all the services. Both prospects influenced the way the Navy thought about fu-
ture littoral operations.
Not surprisingly, then, “jointness” became a prominent subtheme of “For-
ward from the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept” and the 1998 posture state-
ment “Forward from the Sea: Anytime, Anywhere.” The posture statement,
although it noted the Navy’s unique capability to shape the peace and respond to
challenges short of war, emphasized that “the Navy and Marine Corps . . . can
integrate forces into any joint task force or allied coalition quickly” (by provid-
ing key command and control options).
CONCEPT CONVERGENCE OR “POLITICAL CORRECTNESS”?
By the late 1990s, then, both the Air Force and the Navy were seeing the virtues
of joint operations, and in something like the same ways, whereas both services
had begun the decade with what appeared to be assertions of exclusive primacy.
To put the matter another way, many observers and commentators had seen
the Air Force’s “Global Reach—Global Power” and the Navy’s “. . . From the Sea”
as seminal texts, both for the internal, service-specific adjustments they ad-
vocated and for the increased funding they potentially justified. The pundits
also saw in “Global Reach—Global Power” the handiwork of long-range-attack
advocates inside the Air Force, who were perhaps working at the expense of the
tactical aviation community, which had provided many of the Air Force’s leaders
after Vietnam. To Navy watchers, “. . . From the Sea” marked a dramatic rise in
Marine Corps influence within the naval services, and a concomitant rise of the
countermine and amphibious warfare communities as well.17 Ultimately, though,
the two white papers of the early 1990s had agreed on a common general strate-
gic context. The documents shared the perception that the world had changed
profoundly, and would change further, because of the decline and collapse of the
Soviet Union; both assumed that the structure and character of U.S. overseas
deployments would change; and both pointed to shifts in the allocation of U.S.
defense resources because of these changes. Where they disagreed, of course, was
on which service should be the major beneficiary of any reallocations.
“Jointness,” in the context of asserting the respective service’s primacy, was a sec-
ondary concern.
By the end of the decade, however, the official views of the two services had
changed both in tone and in substance. While both services continued to assert
their relative importance in the post–Cold War era, they had refined their argu-
ments as to why. If their arguments at the beginning of the decade had essen-
tially ignored the question of how the Air Force and Navy would operate in
conjunction with the other services, by the end of the decade each was empha-
sizing how it could enhance joint operations.
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But was the shift a result of logic embedded in the concepts the Navy and Air
Force had developed in the last decade? Or was it still rhetorical, driven by the
rising prominence of, and dedication and priority given to, joint operations
outside the military services? Certainly, the decade of the 1990s saw “jointness”
rise in the Defense Department as an increasingly important measure of effec-
tiveness for combat operations
and the allocation of resources.
For example, Joint Vision 2010, is-
sued by the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, established a gen-
eral template for joint opera-
tions. The secretary of defense’s annual posture statements increasingly
focused on improved joint operational capability as a central criterion for evalu-
ating the department’s performance. No fewer than four major defense reviews
trumpeted the importance of jointness in the post–Cold War world.18 It is hardly
surprising that the goals and directions articulated by the military services
would adopt the value-laden terminology of the times.
But a more detailed look at the operational concepts the Air Force and Navy
were injecting into their own strategic planning reveals that their growing sup-
port for joint operations was more than expedient and political. The Navy’s de-
velopment of network-centric warfare is a case in point.
Network-centric warfare, as the Navy has developed it, grew in part from the
Cooperative Engagement Concept described earlier. The essence of the concept
was that merging different perspectives into common awareness provided a dra-
matically better way to deal with the complex problems now posed by warfare.19
As the Navy improved its communications links and its computing power,
Cooperative Engagement’s advocates increasingly turned to network theory to
help design modes of cooperation among ships and aircraft—or rather, the
computers they carried—and measure how different approaches increased the
overall effectiveness of fleet operations. As naval pragmatists applied network
theory to solve the severe problems of defending a fleet, they hit upon the real
power of networks—it was not the number of ships, aircraft, and other plat-
forms that finally mattered but how those entities shared their capabilities.
Not surprisingly, then, by the time Robert Metcalfe (founder of the 3Com
Corporation and designer of the Ethernet) formulated his “law”—that the
utility of a network is proportional to the square of its nodes—the Navy was
already seeking to apply the concept systematically. Today, the Navy’s efforts are
driving it toward joint operations for that very reason; if other service compo-
nents become part of a larger, multinode network, the power of the joint force
and its parts will increase exponentially. The growing availability of secure
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communications links, for example, will allow the U.S. military to build the kind
of joint force networks that promise to operationalize Metcalfe’s Law. Once they
are established, no amount of service parochialism is likely to be able to stand
long in the way of this process.
TOWARD A SINGLE CONCEPT OF JOINT OPERATIONS
Until recently, there were two broad, and competing, views of how the U.S. mili-
tary ought to think about, organize for, and conduct joint military operations.
One argued in favor of functional specialization. That is, it suggested that while
different force components could perform many of the same combat functions,
the best way to conduct joint operations was to assign each function to the ser-
vice component that was “best qualified” for it. The other view advocated
synergy. It argued that because different force components could perform many
of the same functions, the key to increasing combat effectiveness was to combine
operational and tactical-level forces in ways that would result in higher combat
output than would be generated by a single service. Much of the discussion on
jointness in the 1990s was an esoteric debate between these two views—cloaked,
of course, by a unanimous, prior, formal commitment to becoming more “joint.”20
The discussion often relied upon a toolbox analogy. Yes, wrote the “special-
ists,” joint commanders should choose the “right tool at the right time for the
right job.” If, for example, they required widespread, system-level bombard-
ment, they might logically turn to the Air Force to accomplish the task and give
the Air Force component commander carte blanche for planning and executing
attacks. This was essentially the argument advanced by General Tony McPeak,
then chief of staff of the Air Force, following DESERT STORM. The “synergists”
also believed in the toolbox analogy, but they argued that the joint commander
ought to build a customized “tool” for the job at hand (because no job is the
same as its predecessors). The commander ought to create this tool by blending
the desired elements from each of the services. This was essentially the argument
Admiral William Owens, later vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ad-
vanced shortly after DESERT STORM. (Interestingly enough, there are echoes of
both the specialist and synergist views in the “lessons learned” studies that
emerged from Operation ALLIED FORCE, the seventy-three-day air campaign
against Serbia.)
The above views of jointness are of more than academic interest, especially
given the progress of the recent defense review. The schools of thought point
logically to different operational command and control arrangements and to
different resource allocations. Specialization, for example, takes advantage of
inherent efficiencies in the integrated traditions, doctrines, discipline, service
loyalties, and procedures of single institutions. Synergy, in contrast, blends
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particular service strengths on a mission-by-mission basis to provide higher
combat output than any single service could produce.
Pushed to its logical extreme, specialization ultimately argues in favor of a
command and control system that keeps the responsibilities and operations of
various service components distinct and separate. Service interaction, in this view,
should be concerned largely with maintaining clear and distinct lines of authority.
Each service will be able to do what it does best and worry less about what another
service is doing. Yes, there is bound to be redundancy in such a system. The Army,
Navy, and Air Force will need their own logistics, intelligence, communications,
and other support units because of that very specialization. They will need to con-
centrate on honing their particular specialties and reinforce their distinctiveness
to help avoid operational and command confusion in conflicts. But specialization
will pay off in highly effective overall campaigns, so long as each of the services
does what it does best and stays out of the others’ way.
Improbable? Certainly, but extending the logic of synergism leads to unrea-
sonable conclusions of its own. The point is that as long as these two views con-
tended for dominance, it was hard to agree on the practical and objective
meaning of jointness. This disagreement appeared across a wide range of mili-
tary interests. For example, it affected views of what joint experimentation really
entails—whether dealing only with activities that lie outside the purview of the
military services, or getting the services to work together more synergistically.
Further, it made unclear what the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is sup-
posed to do (that is, trading off roles, responsibilities, and resources across the
services, or defining the sum of individual service desires). In short, the dis-
agreement in the 1990s as to what jointness really implies was one of the major
reasons the United States has been slow to transform its military forces, despite
rhetorical claims otherwise.21
Given the trends we have identified, however, we predict the triumph of the
synergistic view of jointness over the next year, particularly where the Navy and
Air Force are concerned. The result will be the closing of a promise-reality
gap, in terms of jointness, that has existed for far too long. The benefit will be
effects-based capabilities that are good for our regional commanders in chief
and right for our nation.
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The Honorable George Bush, born in 1924, became in
June 1943 the U.S. Navy’s youngest commissioned pilot.
Assigned to the aircraft carrier USS San Jacinto (CVL 30)
in the Pacific, he flew fifty-eight combat missions and
earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for “heroism and
extraordinary achievement.”
Graduating Phi Beta Kappa from Yale University in 1948,
he entered the oil business. In 1963 he was elected chair-
man of the Harris County (Texas) Republican Party and
in 1966 to the U.S. House of Representatives from Texas’s
Seventh District, serving two terms. Thereafter Mr. Bush
was appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations
(1971), chairman of the Republican National Committee
(1973), chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in China (1974),
and Director of Central Intelligence (1976).
In 1980 he became vice president of the United States,
and in 1988 the forty-first president of the United States.
Since leaving office, President Bush has coauthored (with
General Brent Scowcroft) A World Transformed and
has published his correspondence, in All the Best.
President Bush serves on the Board of Visitors of M. D.
Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas, and is
honorary chairman of the Points of Light Foundation.
These remarks are adapted from a commencement ad-
dress delivered on 15 June 2001 to the Naval War College
graduating class of 2001.
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“A NATION BLESSED”
The Honorable George Bush
Alittle over a decade ago, a true revolution in world affairs took place. TheSoviet Union imploded; the Baltic States and the captive nations of Eastern
Europe were freed. Then, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the world made a very im-
portant statement in coming together to see that that aggression would not
stand. Such a revolution required a fundamental rethinking of the role of the
United States in world affairs and of the nature of warfare in a radically trans-
formed military environment. The Gulf War forced us to face up to this revolu-
tion, this transformation, almost before we knew it was upon us.
We did not know it at the time, but the Gulf War was in many respects a pre-
view of things to come. It’s hard to remember how surprising it was in 1990
when the Soviet Union stood with us in condemning Iraqi aggression and actu-
ally voted with the United States in the United Nations to condemn Iraq. This re-
markable development was absolutely crucial to our strategy in dealing with
that situation. It also raised the possibility of a new world order, and I think it
stemmed from the way we managed the winding-down of the Cold War.
You may recall that when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, one of the lead-
ing television commentators asked me, “Why, Mr. President, do you not show
the emotion the American people feel and go to the Wall and dance with those
students, as the leaders in Congress are urging you to do?” That might have been
the stupidest thing an American president could have done—to tweak Mikhail
Gorbachev’s nose when things were moving peacefully toward the reunification
of Germany. So we didn’t do that kind of thing.
Consequently, a year later, in the matter of Iraq, the Soviet Union voted with
us in the Security Council. (China abstained—and we had to work very hard to
induce the Chinese to do that.) The Soviet Union’s vote in the Security Council
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was indispensable; it implied a world in which the great powers would stand to-
gether against international aggression—a world in which the United Nations
could undertake to protect world peace as its founders had envisioned in 1945, a
world that was more democratic, and a world that had more market economies.
This vision was not fully achieved while I was president—though we went a
long way toward it—but the world order today is in fact completely new. The
“new world order” we strove for does not mean putting everything under the
United Nations or surrendering an ounce of sovereignty; it means working
cooperatively with other countries so there would be more democracy, more
market economies, more freedom.
The Gulf War taught us several lessons about the use and limits of American
military power in the post–Cold War world. It might be instructive to recount
some of the features of our strategy for that war and some of the lessons we
learned then—lessons that perhaps are taught today in our war colleges.
To begin with, we knew immediately, almost instinctively, that our response
to Saddam Hussein could not and should not be unilateral. We felt—I was
blessed with a wonderful team of people to help me make these decisions—
from the very beginning that we could not do it alone. We had the military force
to do it alone, but we needed other countries with us.
So we went forward. We asked Kuwait to take the issue to the United Nations
Security Council. We ourselves went to Nato to explain what we would have to
do. Richard Cheney, the secretary of defense, and General Colin Powell, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to Saudi Arabia. They asked the
Saudis to do something that was almost impossible, culturally, for them to do,
but that they knew was in their own interest—to accept the deployment of U.S.
forces into the kingdom itself. We urged others to join us in a military coalition.
Eventually thirty-one nations did, and many other nations agreed to support us
in nonmilitary ways.
Our first step was to isolate Iraq, isolate Saddam Hussein, by blockade and
sanctions. The United States, Britain, and France did most of the “heavy lifting”
in the actual interception of ships. I will never forget the day in the Oval Office
the White House staff told me that the maritime interception force intended,
because of persuasive intelligence we had, to permit a ship then in the Gulf of
Oman to return to Aden without being inspected. Someone asked, “Well, who’s
going to tell Margaret Thatcher [the British prime minister] that we’re not going
to inspect every ship? We told her we would inspect every ship.” I looked around
for volunteers; no hands went up. So I called Margaret Thatcher myself. I told
her that we were going to let this particular ship turn around—to violate the
fundamental rule of inspecting all of them—and I told her the intelligence in-
formation that led us to do that. I will never forget Margaret’s words: “George,
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that’s fine with me. But this is no time to go wobbly.” (There was never any ques-
tion that Margaret Thatcher might “go wobbly” herself, I might add.)
Our strategy was to build a grand coalition—although doing so would com-
plicate our own military operations—and (this was absolutely critical) not let
Saddam link the Gulf crisis to the Israeli/Palestinian issue. To do that, we had to
build a network of United Nations
resolutions to solidify the world
community in support, and to
give legitimacy to what I knew
early on we were going to have to
do. We evaluated each action in
terms of its suitability as a model for the future. Further, we had to keep the Sovi-
ets on board—although the Soviets’ major client in the Mideast was Iraq, and
there were many Soviet citizens there, including military advisers.
One of our biggest tasks was to get to the region military strength adequate
for any contingency. There was a huge movement of forces. I remember a meet-
ing at Camp David, Maryland, in October—Congress was fortunately out of
session then. General Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf, the com-
mander in chief of Central Command, told me, in effect, “Mr. President, if you
want to do this right, if you want to use sufficient military strength, if you want
to guarantee to yourself and more importantly to the nation that we will reduce
the risk to every single soldier, sailor, Marine, and airman, you have got to dou-
ble the force.” We had 250,000 at the time; that meant five hundred thousand. I
said, “You’ve got it.” One of the nice things about being president is that you can
make decisions like that without having to go to Congress. It might clobber you
when its members come back to town, but we did it, we doubled the force. We
sent half a million Americans to serve their country halfway around the world.
We had to keep the coalition together in the United Nations, and that was not
easy. It got even harder later, when the Iraqis fired Scud missiles into Israel; it was
absolutely essential for us to go the extra mile diplomatically to make sure that
Israel would not get involved. That was asking a great deal of the Israelis—mis-
siles were falling on them—but if they had entered the war, it would have been
impossible to hold the coalition together. On the other hand, Israel at one point
asked for the “identification friend or foe” codes that would allow its aircraft to
fly over Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We said no; our Air Force aircrews and naval
aviators would do the job. Again, it was a hard sell, but to their credit as friends
and allies, they stood down.
We sought and received from the UN Security Council a resolution—Resolu-
tion 678 of 29 November 1990—authorizing “all necessary means” to enforce
previous council resolutions condemning the invasion if peaceful means failed
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My approach to dealing with the military was
that the White House would take care of the
politics and define the mission—and then get
out of the way.
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and Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. We also had to go to
the Congress for legislation giving the president authority to use whatever
means were necessary to end the aggression. That was not easy, and the final
vote—fifty-three to forty-seven—was more or less on party lines.
In our buildup of forces, we were fortunate to have strength in Europe, ready
for combat. Some of those forces could now be spared from Europe, because the
threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact had sharply diminished. This was
a fortunate set of circumstances that I frankly do not think that anyone who
commands large operations in the future will be able to depend on.
It is worth emphasizing, given our success and what time does to memory,
that the victory we achieved was not assured from the beginning. I’m sure that
many remember Saddam Hussein’s promises of trenches of fire and the “mother
of all battles,” and how the horrors of war were brought to the minds of the
American people by a vigorously anti-action press. We had to convince the
American people that we might have to fight. Also, the coalition was in constant
need of tending. Saddam might stir up radicals in the Arab world; time was not
on our side. It took many presidential telephone calls and much hand-holding. I
ran up a huge phone bill, but the time, effort, and diplomacy we invested overseas
paid off, especially in the United Nations, which proved remarkably supportive
on resolutions.
I confess, however, that there were difficulties with Congress. I can under-
stand why they did not want to authorize the use of force in the beginning—why,
with the memories of Vietnam, they did not want to make the kind of military
commitment that eventually we had to make. Congress supported the early de-
fensive measures, but it parted company with me on using offensive means to
end this aggression. It wanted to let sanctions work. We tried that for a long
time—but sanctions did not do the job. In the background were constitutional
questions that concerned us: should we ask for a declaration of war, or simply
commit our forces to battle, as had happened many times in the past? When
Congress passed its resolution, that ceased to be a major problem.
The war itself was a triumph of “smart” technology. The minute they turned
to the intelligence channel—that would be CNN—everyone in America knew
that this time the “smart bombs” really were smart, that the motivation of our
Navy and Air Force pilots was unlike anything seen in recent years, that the mili-
tary “had it together.”
My approach to dealing with the military was that the White House would
take care of the politics, diplomacy, and the United Nations, and if we had to
fight, it would define the mission—and then get out of the way and let the mili-
tary fight and win the war. That is exactly what happened. So the war was also a
triumph of military training, coupled with leadership—in a sense, the product
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of schools like the Naval War College. The result was a hundred-hour ground
war, with few casualties—although like any president I was concerned about the
loss of every single life. Only the commander in chief, the president, can commit
people to battle, send somebody else’s son or daughter into harm’s way. In DESERT
STORM the military made it look effortless—though, of course, it was not.
Military operations moved so fast that we did not completely devastate Iraq’s
Republican Guard divisions. The question is understandably asked, did we stop
too soon? My answer is and will always be, no. We had defined the mission: it was
not to kill Saddam Hussein; it was
certainly not to occupy an Arab
nation; it was to end the aggres-
sion against Kuwait. We had tried
to do it peacefully; when that
failed, we ended it militarily, with
the cooperation of many countries. If I had told General Schwarzkopf to send
the 82d Airborne Division rolling into Baghdad, we would have become an oc-
cupying power in an Arab land. The coalition would have shattered instantly;
only a handful of nations would have stayed. We would have made a hero out of a
brutal dictator. The Madrid Conference, in which Arabs and Israelis sat down
with each other for the first time, would never have started.
Some argue that if we had kept going only twenty-four hours more, we could
have wiped out another, say, fifty thousand Iraqis fleeing on the “highway of
death.” The American military and the president of the United States do not
measure success by how many people are killed, but by whether the mission has
been completed. In this war—unlike Vietnam—we had a defined mission, and
we carried it out.
Looking back, in what sense was the Gulf War a “preview of coming attrac-
tions”? What lessons did we learn? First, and most obviously, the end of the Cold
War did not mean the end of threats to American interests or to international
peace and security. If we take our security for granted, we do so at our own peril.
Second, American leadership remains absolutely indispensable. I say this
with respect to all from abroad, but it is true—we are a nation blessed. If we do
not act and lead, no one can or will take our place.
However, and third, though we are the world’s only remaining super-
power, we should not act unilaterally; in most cases we could not, even if we
were so inclined. We have to make friends and allies whenever we can, and
bring them along with us; if we have to fight, we will have people at our side.
But we must persuade others to follow; we cannot command their participa-
tion—the national and presidential leadership studied in war colleges is hard
and unrelenting work.
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Fourth, the United Nations can be an invaluable foreign policy tool, but only
if we invest the time and effort to make it so. We must not expect the United Na-
tions to do things that it is not prepared to do, and we must resist the temptation
to use it as a whipping-boy or a dumping ground for messy problems.
Fifth, we have the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led forces, with the most
technologically advanced weapon systems, in the entire world—yet that does
not change the fact that war is a deadly business. If we pursue a “zero-casualty
doctrine,” a policy of “immaculate coercion,” we will find ourselves unable to
employ military force wisely or effectively in the service of American interests.
These are some of the lessons that I learned during that historic time. I am
very proud to have been your commander in chief—the only thing I miss about
being president is dealing with our superb military. Thank you all very much,
and God bless you.
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SET AND DRIFT
THE TALE OF THE RED KNIGHT
Rear Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy
Let me begin with a story.
Once upon a time, a mighty king held a banquet at his great court in central
Europe. He had worked very hard over the previous decade to gather a superb
collection of loyal knights. One evening, a particularly enthusiastic and power-
ful knight clad in red armor returned to the king’s castle after several months
away, the marks of much battle apparent on his armor.
The Red Knight presented himself to the king before all in the court. The king
was pleased with the obvious efforts of the Red Knight and immediately asked him
where he had been fighting. The Red Knight leaned on his sword and proudly said,
“My Lord, I have been fighting in the west, laying waste to the enemies of the king!”
The king pondered this for a moment, looking around the great hall, then replied
in a puzzled voice, “But good sir knight, I don’t have any enemies in the west.”
The Red Knight thought about that, straightened up, saluted the king, and
said, “Well, sire, I think you do now.”
This is a wonderful story, with a variety of lessons about the enthusiasm of sub-
ordinates, the importance of geopolitics, and perhaps even court etiquette, but I
would like to focus on a different aspect of the story—“civil-military relations.”
Over the past several years, much has been written
in the general press, books, academic journals, and
specialized defense literature popularizing the theory
that there is an increasing gap between civilian and
military sectors in U.S. society. It is an important subject
with implications for both society in general and the
military in particular.
Rear Admiral Stavridis, a 1976 graduate of the U.S. Naval
Academy, holds a Ph.D. in international affairs from
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Uni-
versity. He was commander of USS Barry (DDG 52)
and Destroyer Squadron 21. He served ashore as execu-
tive assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and chief of
the Policy Branch on the Joint Staff, J-5. Admiral
Stavridis is currently Deputy Director for Requirements
on the Navy Staff, N81.
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Interestingly, the entire subject of civil-military relations has a long history of
discussion in the United States, one that is reflected not only in scholarly theory
but also in popular culture. Books like Seven Days in May (1962) by Fletcher
Knebel and Charles Bailey II, Guard of Honor (1998) by James Gould Cozzens,
and the recently published A Soldier’s Duty (2001) by Tom Ricks come to mind,
as well as three recent films, No Way Out, G.I. Jane, and A Few Good Men.
A variety of scholarship exists on the subject. Samuel P. Huntington wrote the
classic, The Soldier and the State.1 In it, he focuses on the relationship between
“two active directing elements” in the military and society at large—the officer
corps and the state. Huntington finds the military ethic realistic and conserva-
tive, stressing the supremacy of society over the individual and “the importance
of order, hierarchy, and the division of function.”2 On the other hand, the civilian
outlook in America tends to emphasize individuality and initiative in a loosely
joined heterogeneous whole.3 Clearly, there is potential for conflict and
miscommunication between civilian and military actors in our society.
One sociologist who has taken a broad look at how societies are structured is
Jane Jacobs. Her Systems of Survival identifies two structural approaches in soci-
ety—one facilitates governance and exhibits a “guardian” culture, and the other
facilitates commerce and displays a “trader” culture. Essentially, her theory is
that many actors in a society function as either “guardians” or “traders.”
Guardianship evolves from the very human tendency to protect territory.
Jacobs argues that the guardians in a society—the police, firefighters, politi-
cians, teachers, and the military, for example—have a basic need for boundaries,
stemming from their desire to distinguish between insiders and outsiders. In
such a culture we find clear rules of conduct, a code that requires adherence to
those rules, and an appreciation for respect and authority. The guardian code,
according to Jacobs, includes exhortations to shun trading, exert prowess, be
obedient and disciplined, adhere to tradition, respect hierarchy, be loyal, show
fortitude, and treasure honor.4
On the other hand, traders—largely encompassing the rest of society—are
less concerned about boundaries. In fact, the commercial world usually acts to
reduce barriers and enhance the opportunities for trade. A trader will welcome
knowns and unknowns alike into the shop. What matters most is selling. Traders
include businessmen, merchants, producers of goods and services, entertainers,
and entrepreneurs. Their moral code, according to Jacobs, emphasizes honesty,
competition, thrift, optimism, initiative and enterprise, inventiveness and nov-
elty; traders wish to shun force, come to voluntary agreements, respect con-
tracts, collaborate easily with strangers, and promote comfort and convenience.5
Clearly, the differences between guardians and traders in a society create con-
trasting views of how the world should be structured. All societies face this kind
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of division, and they have dealt with it in a variety of ways. Looking back over
history, it appears there are three basic models of the civil-military relationship.
The first model might be termed “military dominated.” In such a construct,
the guardians—in this case the military—hold the greatest influence in the soci-
ety. Historical examples include, most famously, Sparta in the Hellenic era.
Many other examples exist, of course, among the praetorian societies of Europe,
Asia, and South America. In the modern era, the Soviet Union was to some ex-
tent dominated by the military, although individual civilians tended to use the
military instrument to further their personal and political agendas rather than
creating a culture of pure military domination. During the post–World War II
period, many Latin American, African, and Asian dictatorships were essentially
military dominated as well. Certainly there can be various levels of military
domination within a society, from military influence with civilian control,
through extensive military participation, to military control, either with or
without partners from the civilian sector.6
A second model around which some societies have developed the relationship
of the military and civilian sectors might be termed that of the “citizen-soldier.”
In this construct, military forces are largely made up of citizens who leave their
ploughs, so to speak, and report for combat when required to fight for the state.
The Athenian society during the mid-Hellenic period offered such a structure.
Other examples include the early Roman republic, the United States in its colo-
nial era, and Switzerland today. This construct generally has been found in
smaller states with democratic ideals.
A third model could be termed “separate camps.” This approach consists of
military forces that are professional in nature but are somewhat fenced off from
the larger society. While not disenfranchised or disadvantaged, they certainly do
not dominate or direct the activities of society. The military has only slight influ-
ence in the affairs of the society it protects. Examples might include the British
Empire in the nineteenth century or many modern European military forces
today.
In assessing the relative value of each of these models, curiously, the greatest
strength also tends to create the greatest weakness.
The great strength of a “military-dominated” society is its military readiness
and combat power. Yet the rigidity of the military culture generally leads to to-
talitarianism (Sparta and the Soviet Union spring to mind) and a concomitant
downward spiral in mercantile activity. Economic problems tend to lead to the
eventual unraveling of the international position of the state and the collapse of
the internal political system.
In the “citizen-soldier” model, there is exceptional balance between the mili-
tary and civil sides of society, generally strengthening democratic norms and
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processes. But there is a trade-off in combat capability and power because farm-
ers and merchants are not always effective as part-time warriors. Military unpre-
paredness can then lead to the rise of “the man on horseback,” usually a dictator.
This type of individual is capable of dominating the society and destroying
democratic norms, as was the case in early Rome and in many weaker, loosely or-
ganized states in the post–World War II period.7
The world of “separate camps” holds promise and can create an effective
compromise position, but there seems to be a growing gap between the two
camps in many societies today, which can often lead to misunderstanding,
political turmoil, and other tension. It can also make it increasingly arduous to
recruit and retain men and women to serve in what is perceived as a very sepa-
rate and difficult world.
Huntington, writing with retired Army general Andrew Goodpaster, has
identified three theoretical options for civil-military relations in a society: extir-
pation, transmutation, and toleration. Extirpation so reduces the power of the
military that it exists at the edge of a society; the two sectors rarely come in con-
tact. Transmutation requires the military to morph, essentially becoming more
liberal, more fully in synch with society. Finally, toleration entails that the values
of society shifting from liberalism toward those of the more conservative mili-
tary. In U.S. history, there have been periods in which each of these solutions has
manifested itself.8
So where does America stand today, and for what should it strive?
There is less of a gap between civilian and military sectors in our society today
than many pundits and observers think. Nevertheless, there are, and need to be,
differences.
The best approach for the United States would be to have what might be
termed a “permeable membrane” between its civil and military worlds. Such an
arrangement would permit a free and steady flow of individuals between both
worlds, who would encourage the exchange of ideas, creating a balance between
traditional military conservatism and a more liberal society at large. Also neces-
sary in this approach would be “translators,” who can explain military culture to
civilians and vice versa. Such translators could be individuals, organizations,
and other informational mechanisms, such as publications, Websites, and exhibits.
In terms of flow between the two sectors of society, the all-volunteer force
brings nearly two hundred thousand young men and women into the military
service every year. About two-thirds return to civilian life after five years—a
good thing, by and large. The vast majority take back with them much of what is
thought of as the “good things” the military instills in its people: self-confidence,
discipline, teamwork, and an equitable approach to race relations.9
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Of course, one must recognize that although two hundred thousand sounds
like a large number, more than four million Americans turn eighteen every year,
so in the end only one in twenty serve.10 When compared with the United States
fifty years ago, as the Korean War was ending, the contrast in numbers is star-
tling. In 1954 more than half of all living American males had served in the
military.
Given this dramatic reduction in the proportion of citizens with firsthand ex-
perience in the military, it seems clear that the United States must work hard to
improve the permeability of the membrane between both sides of society while
doing all it can to facilitate translators. Doing so will sustain the most funda-
mental and important aspect of the civil-military relationship, which is civilian
control of the military. It will also permit the flow of values between the two.
From the military can come the benefits of teamwork over prejudice, the values
of self-discipline over hedonism, and the satisfaction of service before self; from
the civilian community, the achievements of personal initiative, the satisfactions
of a good life well lived, and the glories of individual liberty.
So the questions are: how can the United States facilitate such a “permeable
membrane,” and how can we improve, at the same time, mechanisms of transla-
tion so that the cultural and moral strengths of each sector are meaningfully ex-
plained to the other?
First, we need people who can explain to those in uniform the essence of cur-
rent civilian perspectives. These individuals are generally civilians operating
within the Department of Defense who work at all levels in the bureaucracy. The
Secretary of Defense and the leadership in the Pentagon spend a good deal of
their time doing this kind of translation. Many elected officials on Capitol Hill
and their staffs are involved in the same efforts.
Conversely, and at least as important, we need people who can present the
values that strengthen the very structure and substance of an effective fighting
force. Representatives must explain why these different—not “better,” not
“higher”—qualities are required and appropriate in the American armed forces.
Some senior military personnel are involved in this process in formal
ways—giving speeches, writing articles, and offering testimony. There is an im-
portant role here for those in academe, particularly those on the distinguished
faculties of various war colleges and military academies around the country.
Finally, this call for greater representation of civilian and military perspectives
recognizes and applauds the enormous amount of informal translation that
occurs in the day-to-day interaction of military and civilian citizens in their
homes and civic organizations. Today, however, we need more, because the mili-
tary itself is becoming notably smaller, more geographically concentrated, more
economically homogeneous, and more politically uniform.
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This also implies that American service members should participate more
fully in civilian society through voluntary service, exchanges with schools, home
ownership, civic participation, and savings. The opportunities are rife. Many
military commands now give various forms of recognition to service members
who do volunteer work. Some commands have formal programs, such as help-
ing a school with tutors, mentors, and coaches.
An additional approach would be to encourage private civic organizations
that facilitate translation in the accomplishment of their mission. Each of the
services is supported by comparable organizations that are well positioned to
function as part of the effort to create meaningful communication between the
military and society. Additionally, various organizations that support retired
military personnel and veterans have a positive role to play.
Certainly the national and state Guard organizations and the various reserve
units also have an important function here, both in facilitating the flow of per-
sonnel between both sectors and in providing communication between them.
The close relationship between the Guard, the reserves, and Capitol Hill can pay
big dividends to our society.
Programs that put retired service members in the schools as teachers by waiv-
ing certain formal teaching requirements are an exceptional means to help keep
the civilian and military sectors aligned in our country. While this must be done
carefully to ensure only qualified individuals are selected, there are clearly many
in the services with exceptional teaching credentials based on their experiences
in uniform. We should tap into this national resource and put such people in a
position to help large groups of young people while also facilitating their better
understanding of the military.
Resources and command attention on public affairs functions of the military
should be increased. Within the Department of Defense today, we do a reason-
ably good job of telling the military’s story to the larger civilian sector, but we
could do better. Some privatization would be helpful, and “information cam-
paigns” would also help our fellow citizens understand what their military does,
how it does it, and why.
Let me close by going back to the Red Knight. Like the U.S. military of today,
he was full of enthusiasm and sure of his purpose. However, the king in our story
did not have control of the knight, probably through his lack of understanding,
or a tendency not to pay close attention, or perhaps a narrowness of experience.
In our story, the Red Knight did what militaries are trained to do, and a disaster
ensued. The United States must be a country whose knights are fundamentally
part of the fabric of society. When they fight, they do so with the knowledge,
support, and understanding of those who govern—the people. Only by ensuring
that the United States maintains a constant flow of people and ideas between our
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civilian society and our military, and that the two sides understand each other,
will this nation be able to guarantee that it has established the best possible level
of civil-military relations.
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IN MY VIEW
THE AIR FORCE IS ALREADY TRANSFORMED
Sir:
Transformation is a new defense buzzword, and Tom Mahnken addresses it
[Thomas G. Mahnken, “Transforming the U.S. Armed Forces: Rhetoric or Real-
ity?” Naval War College Review, Spring 2001, pp. 85–99] with some useful ideas.
Although he never defines what precisely is a “transformational weapon,” he im-
plies in his first sentence that such weapons should incorporate stealth, preci-
sion, and information technology. He often refers to space.
I don’t know if the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps are transforming them-
selves, so I’ll confine my comments to the U.S. Air Force.
After DESERT STORM the Air Force disestablished the Strategic Air Command
because it was a vestige of the Cold War. That act would be roughly comparable
to the Army disbanding the infantry branch. The Air Force also led the way into
four key technologies—stealth, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), C4ISR*, and
space—the areas that Mahnken implies signify a commitment to transformation.
There are only two operational stealth aircraft in the world, the Air Force’s
F-117 and the B-2; the F-22 will be the third. In DESERT STORM, the Air Force
dropped over 90 percent of all air-delivered PGMs. Over Bosnia and Kosovo its
share was approximately 60 and 70 percent, respectively. There are no other air-
craft anywhere that can command and control the air and land battle with the
speed, accuracy, or breadth of AWACS and JSTARS.† The United States has the
largest, most sophisticated, and most comprehensive space program in the
world. The Air Force currently contributes over 90 percent of the assets, over 90
percent of the funds, and over 90 percent of the personnel to U.S. Space Com-
mand. If stealth, precision, information, and space define transformation, as
Mahnken says, the Air Force is already transformed.
* C4ISR: Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
† AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System (the E-3 Sentry); JSTARS—Joint Surveillance and
Target Attack Radar System (the E-8C).
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Nonetheless, Mahnken singles out unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ar-
gues that, first, they are transformational weapons currently underfunded, and
second, that the Air Force has deliberately thwarted their development. The first
assertion is debatable, and the second is offered without evidence.
UAVs are not new. They were used extensively in Vietnam and have been in
most conflicts since, but they have had a mixed track record. No UAV has ever
delivered a weapon in combat. They are expensive. The Air Force’s new Global
Hawk will cost fifteen million dollars—for the airframe. With a payload, the cost
is forty million—more than a new F-16. UAVs are also vulnerable. Nato lost
more than twenty over Serbia in 1999 (a relatively benign environment), two
were downed over Iraq this past September, and two (at this writing) have been
lost over Afghanistan. One reason for these losses is that UAVs are far less me-
chanically reliable than manned aircraft. That is why the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration refuses to allow them to fly in U.S. civil airspace. It’s simply too
dangerous. In addition, while the great advantage of UAVs is their ability to go
into high-threat areas without risking valuable aircrews, their great disadvan-
tage is that accordingly they often get shot down. Expect heavy, and costly, UAV
losses when we use them in combat. UAVs are important for the future; hence,
the Air Force has pioneered in their development. But there are serious prob-
lems with the technology—stability, control, situational awareness, perfor-
mance, flexibility, bandwidth availability, payload, and vulnerability—that must
be solved before they can replace manned aircraft.
As for the charge that the Air Force has deliberately retarded UAV develop-
ment because they threaten manned systems or the dominance of pilots, Mahnken
offers no proof. He cites no documents, staff summary sheets, internal memos,
etc., that show senior Air Force leaders curtailing funds or delaying UAV devel-
opment for these frivolous reasons. Mahnken makes a serious charge that strikes
at the honor and integrity of an entire service. I hope he has something with
which to back it up.
It is popular to portray the services as a bunch of myopic Colonel Blimps
intent on protecting their turf and fighting the last war, even if that means in-
creasing risk to our military personnel. But condemning all the services with a
series of unsubstantiated assertions is simply not good enough.
As I write this, the United States is at war with terrorism. We will soon see if
our military is up to that task. Mahnken seems to believe it will not be; I think
otherwise.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
Colonel ,U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, Va.
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Professor Mahnken replies:
The thesis of my article was that while the Army, Navy, and Air Force have em-
braced the concept of transformation, “significant organizational barriers to the
adoption of new technology, doctrine, and organizations exist. The services
have been particularly reluctant to take measures that are disruptive of service
culture” (p. 86). While the Air Force, for example, has made a number of signifi-
cant innovations since the end of the Cold War—including reorganizing its air
assets into expeditionary air forces, developing the global strike task force con-
cept, as well as pursuing network-centric warfare and effects-based operations
(pp. 93–4)—its support for UAVs has been lukewarm. This bears repeating, be-
cause Meilinger’s letter seriously distorts the thrust of my article. While I do not
expect him to agree with me, I would have expected him to take issue with my ar-
gument, not a straw man.
Meilinger is simply incorrect when he writes that my article amounts to “a se-
ries of unsubstantiated assertions.” In fact, I provide two types of evidence to
support my contention that the services have neglected unmanned platforms.
First, one of the best ways to determine what an organization values is to see how
it spends its money. In my article I note that the Defense Department spends ten
times as much on manned combat aircraft in a single year than it spent on UAVs
over the past twenty years. Second, I note two instances in which Congress inter-
vened in the department’s management of UAVs because of the Pentagon’s per-
ceived neglect of unmanned systems (p. 95). Meilinger may not find these facts
compelling, but they are facts nonetheless.
Meilinger is correct when he points out the technical limitations of UAVs. On
page 95 of my article I note that UAV technology remains short of its potential.
Still, one wonders what technological and operational hurdles might have been
surmounted years ago if the Defense Department in general, and the Air Force in
particular, had devoted more money to developing and fielding unmanned
vehicles.
Contrary to Meilinger’s assertions, my article does not “portray the services
as a bunch of myopic Colonel Blimps.” Nor does it in any way “strik[e] at the
honor and integrity of an entire service.” In fact, I argue that “it would be wrong
to view the services as uniformly opposed to fundamental change. Rather, each
service is split between traditionalists and elements who are enthusiastic about
new ways of war.” In case he missed this passage in the text on page 96, it also
appears in large italics in a text box on page 87. A similar statement appears on
page 86. I can only conclude that he either did not read these passages or chose to
ignore them.
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Reasonable people may disagree over the extent of Air Force transformation
or the value of unmanned systems. But Meilinger crosses the line between civil
discourse and ad hominem attack. Closing his letter with language heavy in in-
nuendo, he implies that anyone who questions the services’ enthusiasm for new
ways of war is unpatriotic or defeatist. Such a statement is unwarranted, unpro-
fessional, and unworthy of further response.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN
Naval War College
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REVIEW ESSAYS
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NONPROLIFERATION
Carnes Lord
Sokolski, Henry D. Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign
against Strategic Weapons Proliferation. Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 2001. 184pp. $59.95
After the presidential inauguration of George W. Bush, global discussion of stra-
tegic issues focused largely on the meaning and implication of a renewed com-
mitment by the United States to defense against ballistic missiles. This book
reminds us that missile defense is part of a larger complex of strategic issues hav-
ing to do with the long-standing American effort to prevent the worldwide
spread of weapons of mass destruction. At first sight, the embrace of missile de-
fense as a major new defense priority might seem to suggest that the current ad-
ministration has written off past American nonproliferation policy or has
simply accepted the idea that the only effective approach when dealing with
proliferators is the military one rather than diplomacy, arms control, economic
inducements or any of the other tools the United States has relied on in the past.
However this may be, it is far from the point of view reflected in this work. Henry
Sokolski makes a sophisticated case that, though U.S.
proliferation policy is not hopelessly broken, it needs
significant repair.
Best of Intentions is a deeply informed, well docu-
mented, analytical study of the history of American
nonproliferation policy from its beginnings immedi-
ately after World War II. By reducing a potentially un-
wieldy subject to little more than a hundred pages of
text and notes, Sokolski has performed an important
service; the book is the only one of its kind. What
Carnes Lord is a professor of strategy in the Strategic
Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare
Studies, Naval War College. He was director of interna-
tional communications and information policy on the
National Security Council staff (1981–83), assistant for
national security affairs to the vice president (1989–91),
and distinguished fellow at the National Defense
University (1991–93). Dr. Lord has also taught political
science, most recently at The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy. He is the author of The Presidency and the
Management of National Security, published in 1988.
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makes this account particularly valuable is Sokolski’s focus on the strategic as-
sumptions underpinning American policy at various stages of its development,
and on how these contributed centrally to the success or failure of the overall
nonproliferation effort.
Sokolski distinguishes six “initiatives” that have tended to dominate what he
argues were relatively distinct phases in the development of nonproliferation
policy. The first was the Baruch Plan of 1946, which sought to institute strict in-
ternational ownership and control of all nuclear materials. This approach re-
flected the beliefs that it would be impossible to distinguish between benign and
military applications of nuclear technology, and that the existence of any signifi-
cant nuclear stockpiles would inevitably lead to arms racing and preemptive nu-
clear war. The Baruch Plan, which soon foundered on Soviet objections, failed to
foresee the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons and therefore was based on an
extreme view of the dangers of the atomic age. Sokolski argues, however, that in
some ways this view was more sensible than what followed.
The centerpiece of the second phase was Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” pro-
gram, which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
as the facilitator of peacetime nuclear energy development in non–nuclear
weapons states. The ultimate strategic purpose of this program (the brainchild
of Eisenhower himself) was to limit and eventually draw down stockpiles of
fissile material in the Soviet Union through transfer to the IAEA, thereby depriv-
ing the Soviets of a weapons inventory capable of launching a crippling attack
against America’s industrial base. At the same time, unfortunately, “Atoms for
Peace” took an excessively casual attitude toward the spread of nuclear materials
and technologies to additional countries, establishing a regime of safeguards so
permissive that it may actually have encouraged proliferation. The underlying
assumption of Eisenhower’s plan was that very small nuclear arsenals would
have little strategic value, and so some leakage in the control mechanism was
tolerable.
The next major development was the protracted negotiation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which reflected renewed global concern over
“horizontal” proliferation. Sokolski shows that this period actually represented
two distinct phases: an early one dominated by the original (1958) Irish pro-
posal for a multilateral treaty that would simply prohibit further spread of nu-
clear weapons, and a later one (culminating in the signing of the treaty in 1972)
dominated by the very different attitude that nonpossessing states would be
willing to forgo their inherent “right” to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange
for full access to the benefits of civil nuclear technology and for serious progress
toward reductions in the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals. These contrasting phases
reflected contrasting strategic premises. The first, that the greatest danger to
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international security stems from accidental or “catalytic” war initiated by new
nuclear states, implies that stopping proliferation is equally in the interest of all
states. The second, holding that small nuclear arsenals are a legitimate and be-
nign exercise in “finite deterrence,” contends that the real danger comes from the
possibility of central strategic war between the superpowers.
The fifth phase began in 1975, with a meeting of advanced industrial nations
(including the Soviet Union) to develop informal controls on exports to coun-
tries of particular concern. Later formalized as the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), this cartel-like organization fundamentally repudiated the NPT regime’s
first premise, the principle of nondiscrimination, which in effect gave the bene-
fit of the doubt to potential proliferators. Meeting in secret, the NSG strove to
build consensus on strategies for dealing with countries of particular concern.
The NSG’s record proved a mixed one. Notwithstanding some successes in slow-
ing proliferation in Taiwan, South Korea, and Pakistan in the late 1970s, it sig-
nally failed to stop the acquisition of dual-use nuclear technologies by Saddam
Hussein in the 1980s (belated efforts were made to close these loopholes after the
Gulf War). However, the organization did provide the model for later “supplier
groups”—for missiles (the Missile Technology Control Regime) and chemical
and biological weapons (the Australia Group). Significant successes were regis-
tered by these groups, particularly when their efforts were backed with the threat
of legislatively mandated sanctions by the United States in the early 1990s.
With the end of the Cold War, however, it became increasingly difficult to
sustain any export control regime against the pressure of commercial interests
in the United States, as well as the multiplication of suppliers elsewhere. In a vain
attempt to moderate their adverse proliferation behavior, Russia and China were
brought into the Missile Technology Control Regime and were provided various
technological inducements, thus assimilating this arrangement increasingly to
what Sokolski calls the “concessionary, universalistic” nonproliferation treaty.
By 1998, it was obvious that these approaches were not working adequately. In
that year India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, while Iran and North Korea
tested new long-range missiles. Moreover, not only did China continue to pro-
vide help to such countries, but it pulled off an extraordinary theft of U.S. nu-
clear and missile secrets that directly contributed to the quantum improvement
in Chinese nuclear capabilities taking place today. This was a case, one might
add, of “vertical” proliferation as destabilizing as any other proliferation failure
of recent years, if not more so.
These developments made the United States increasingly impatient with tra-
ditional proliferation approaches and more open to what the Clinton adminis-
tration began vaguely to describe as “counter-proliferation.” This, the current
phase in American proliferation policy, seems to call for reliance on military
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force—especially in the form of preemptive air or special-operations assault—to
cope with what now appears to be the inevitable spread of weapons of mass de-
struction to rogue states. Iraq has been the demonstration case of such an ap-
proach, first at the hands of the Israelis in their 1981 raid against the Osirak
reactor, then at the hands of the allies in the Gulf War and after. But the practical
as well as the legal difficulties inherent in “counter-proliferation” actions have so
far prevented that strategy from gaining wide acceptance.
Where do we stand today? What should the United States do differently to
curb proliferation in the future? What should be the place of nonproliferation
strategies in U.S. foreign policy and in national security strategy overall? This
volume offers no simple answer to such questions. Sokolski cautions against
overblown expectations, while calling attention to the undeniable successes
nonproliferation policies have had. Thanks to concerted international—partic-
ularly American—diplomatic efforts, active nuclear weapons stockpiles or pro-
grams and associated missile capabilities have been liquidated in Argentina,
Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. It
is less clear, however, that such proliferation victories are possible with today’s
rogue states. Nevertheless, these states remain vulnerable (as the case of South
Africa nicely illustrates) to internal political developments in a more liberal
direction—probably the single most potent nonproliferation tool available,
Sokolski argues, yet one that has been largely neglected.
More generally, Sokolski’s argument is that nonproliferation needs to be ap-
proached within a more self-consciously “strategic” framework than in the past.
This means, in the first place, paying greater attention to the character and stra-
tegic interests of proliferator states rather than relying on formal and universal
arms control schemes. In the second place, it means paying more attention to the
larger strategic effects of the variety of nonproliferation regimes of which we
have experience. In general, Sokolski is partial to elements of the Baruch Plan, to
the Irish approach to the NPT, and to the original Nuclear Suppliers Group; in
contrast, he makes clear how much damage has been done to sound thinking
about proliferation by Atoms for Peace and the final NPT regime. It is hard to
quarrel with these judgments, or for that matter with his bedrock conviction
that nuclear proliferation remains a bad thing, that more nuclear actors greatly
increase the danger of accidental or catalytic nuclear war.
For all its comprehensiveness, Sokolski’s book leaves a number of issues un-
explored. It has little to say about the NPT regime as it exists today, or the viabil-
ity of the IAEA as a proliferation policeman—a particularly important issue in
the wake of that organization’s performance in Iraq before and after the Gulf
War. In fact, the book is mostly silent about the entire problem of monitoring
formal or informal proliferation curbs and of responding to evidence of deliberate
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violations, which has vexed the international community in this and other areas
of arms control since the days of the Baruch Plan. Nor is there any discussion of
the question of U.S. policy toward out-of-the-closet proliferators like India and
Pakistan—another issue of current relevance, given the recent warming of U.S.
diplomatic and military relations with both nations.
Further, Sokolski might have been clearer on the question of the evolving def-
inition of proliferation, specifically on the implications of the shifting focus of
nonproliferation efforts in the 1990s from nuclear materials to missiles and
chemical and biological weapons. This seems a particularly significant omission
given his emphasis on the need to understand the strategic premises that moti-
vate the actors in every nonproliferation regime. Sokolski acknowledges at one
point that new technologies and weapon systems considered elements of the
emerging “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) will be a focus of non-
proliferation efforts in the future, but he fails to examine the implications of
such a development.
Let us assume that these new technologies and their associated weapon
systems become a nonproliferation focus, as indeed seems likely. Under those
circumstances, it might be argued, a new general strategy against proliferation
should be devised that gracefully cedes the terrain of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical weaponry (prospectively devalued in any case by the development of the-
ater and national missile defenses) while drawing a bright line that would
protect key enabling technologies of the RMA—for example, space-based sen-
sors and precision-strike capabilities for cruise missiles. Would such a shift de-
fine nonproliferation out of existence? Not necessarily. It might remake it as a
new strategic framework for U.S. technology export control policy and counter-
intelligence generally—something that seems very much needed in the wake of
our recent experiences with China.
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WHAT ARE CHINA’S INTENTIONS?
Andrew R. Wilson
Timperlake, Edward, and William Triplett II. Red Dragon
Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Regnery, 1999. 271pp. $27.95
Manning, Robert, Robert Montaperto, and Brad Roberts.
China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary As-
sessment. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000.
91pp. $10
The release of the Cox Committee Report in May 1999 inspired a surge of con-
cern over China’s military modernization, and it heightened anxieties about the
ability of the People’s Republic of China to steal America’s most advanced nu-
clear weapons technology. While many of the claims made by that committee
have yet to be substantiated, the Cox Report contributed to a fractious debate
about the Clinton administration’s China policy and complicated an already
difficult task of assessing Chinese intentions and capabilities. Moreover, the
worsening of U.S.-China relations that began with the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade and continued through the EP-3 incident earlier this year
convinced many that China would represent the greatest challenge, and perhaps
the greatest threat, to U.S. interests in the twenty-first century.
Both books use the Cox Report as their starting point. Both also offer assess-
ments of Chinese capabilities and intentions as a basis to make policy prescrip-
tions for the new administration. All similarities, however, end there.
Apparently written to capitalize on the public interest created by the Cox
Report, Red Dragon Rising approaches the issues of
China’s military modernization and policy objectives
as an opportunity for a damning critique of both
Beijing and the Clinton administration, which the
authors argue was complicit in the recent technologi-
cal and tactical advancements of the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) and turned a blind eye to China’s
continued human rights abuses, intimidation of Tai-
wan, and sale of advanced weaponry to states that are
openly hostile to American interests. The thesis of this
work is simple: democratic countries are about to be
unpleasantly surprised by the emergence of a hostile,
Andrew R. Wilson is a professor of strategy in the Strat-
egy and Policy Department, Naval War College. He re-
ceived his Ph.D. in history and East Asian languages
from Harvard University. Dr. Wilson was an assistant
professor at both Harvard University and Wellesley
College, and a teaching fellow at Harvard, where he re-
ceived awards for teaching excellence. He is the author
of several articles on Chinese military history, Chinese
seapower, and the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia.
He is a former winner of the Sawyer Fellowship for Soci-
eties in Transition and a fellow of the Fairbank Center
for East Asian Research. Professor Wilson is working on
a book about the Chinese community in the colonial
Philippines, and a new translation of Sun Tzu.
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expansionist, nondemocratic superpower armed with the most modern weap-
ons—and it will be the fault of the United States.
Edward Timperlake, a former Marine aviator now on the staff of the House
Committee on Rules, and William Triplett II, the former chief Republican coun-
sel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seek to effect a fundamental
change in U.S. China policy—a change that would recognize China as the great-
est security threat both to the United States and to the democratic nations of the
world. A litany of China’s arms sales, acts of oppression, and wars of territorial
aggression serves as evidence to support their view. It is odd that a book ostensi-
bly concerned with the future of China and the emerging China threat would
spend so much time discussing the past, but the authors argue that a look at the
“real history” of Chinese brutality and territorial aggression is necessary to
gauge China’s intentions. As a historian of China, I heartily agree with this ap-
proach in principle; however, the authors’ claim that they are in possession of
China’s “real history” is problematic. Not only are Timperlake and Triplett’s
discussions of the Tiananmen massacre, the occupation of Tibet, and China’s
foreign wars based on dated scholarship, but they are plagued with factual errors
too numerous to list here, and there is at least one glaring contradiction that un-
dermines their entire argument.
By their own admission it is internal security, the suppression of dissent, and
the military occupation of border regions (such as Tibet) that consume the ma-
jority of money, manpower, and attention within the Chinese military. If this is
the case, as the authors claim, how can the People’s Republic also be actively
pursuing hegemonic aspirations throughout Asia? Moreover, as their descrip-
tion of Tibet indicates, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is very aware of the
cost and time commitment necessary to hold even a sparsely populated region
in the face of minimal resistance. This fact would seem to militate against terri-
torial aggrandizement at the expense of China’s neighbors, but Timperlake and
Triplett do not address this critical point.
In terms of military modernization, Red Dragon Rising presents an extreme
view of China’s emerging capabilities. While most of the debate over the Chinese
military arises between those who are skeptical about China’s future military ca-
pabilities and those who believe that the PLA will achieve some significant ad-
vances, the authors take all Chinese claims at face value. As a result, Timperlake
and Triplett credit the PLA with an across-the-board force modernization and
doctrinal innovation that will rapidly outstrip U.S. ability to respond. Unfortu-
nately, Timperlake and Triplett do not use the abundant open-source material
on the Chinese military to support their dire predictions about the PLA’s abil-
ity to develop and master new weapons systems and engage in information
warfare. Nor do the authors make reference to the equally available scholarly
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literature on the significant problems confronting China in terms of its political,
social, and economic cohesion that may constrain military modernization.
Consisting primarily of speculation and innuendo, almost completely bereft
of scholarly merit, seemingly inspired principally by hatred for Bill Clinton and
Al Gore, and wholly loyal to the Taiwan lobby, Red Dragon Rising will be of little
value to readers who are truly interested in serious debate about U.S. policy
toward China. The book’s inflammatory polemics can only serve to politicize
further what the authors correctly identify as an issue of concern to all Ameri-
cans. Moreover, the desire to list every evil ever perpetrated by the People’s
Republic serves only to obscure the most critical and alarming new trends—the
improvements in China’s nuclear capabilities and its growing strategic partner-
ship with Russia.
While equally concerned with China’s capabilities and intentions, Robert
Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts approach the same issues with
significantly more critical objectivity in China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Con-
trol: A Preliminary Assessment. The result is a provocative, at times alarming, but
quite balanced discussion of several alternative futures for China’s strategic arse-
nal and nuclear doctrine, and for U.S. policy. This short volume is the first prod-
uct of a series of roundtable discussions among senior China analysts, national
security specialists, and nuclear experts. The authors state, however, that this
book represents not a consensus among the entire group but rather their own
preliminary assessment. Manning is a former Asia policy analyst at the State De-
partment for the George H. W. Bush administration; he is now the director of
Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Montaperto, a China expert
who was formerly on the faculty of the National Defense University, is dean of
academics at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Roberts is an arms
control expert at the Institute for Defense Analyses. The three authors possess
sufficient scholarly expertise to make this book essential reading for anyone who
wishes to understand the basic context of China’s nuclear policy and the forces
that drive China’s nuclear decision making.
Rather than accept the Cox Report’s suspicions as fact, Manning, Montaperto,
and Roberts begin with what little we do know about China’s strategic weapons,
delivery systems, fissile material stockpiles, and nuclear doctrine. They use this
sketch of current and potential capabilities to posit five notional-force futures
for China’s strategic arsenal. Drawing from analyses at both ends of the spec-
trum regarding PLA capabilities, as well as best and worst-case assessments of
Chinese intentions, these scenarios run the gamut from minimum deterrence to
parity with the United States. Perhaps of more significance, however, is the au-
thors’ discussion of how Chinese decisions on force structure and doctrine
might be influenced by a variety of factors. While internal forces like interservice
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competition for resources, changes in regime, and economic growth will inform
Chinese actions, and international trends, such as South Asian proliferation and
Japan’s changing security posture, will influence China’s nuclear planning, the
authors contend that it is the American approach to nuclear weapons in general
and to China specifically that will have the greatest impact on Beijing. This
prospect bodes well for the ability of the United States to exercise influence over
China’s nuclear arsenal, but it also demands a significant reorganization in U.S.
nuclear policy, which would include a linkage between nuclear policy, China
policy, and planning for both theater missile defense and national missile de-
fense. According to the authors, the decisions that the Bush administration
makes regarding the scale and deployment of missile defenses will undoubtedly
have a significant influence on China’s nuclear doctrine.
From Beijing’s point of view, the prospect of a U.S. national missile defense
system implies the prospect of living in a world in which Washington can dictate
terms to China anywhere and everywhere that Washington has interests, be it in
the service of Taiwanese independence or human rights in Tibet.
While these statements are likely to raise calls from critics like Timperlake
and Triplett that the authors are sympathetic to Beijing, such considerations are
critical to shattering what the three authors view as the dominant “bipolar” par-
adigm of U.S. nuclear policy, which is fixated on U.S.-Russian relations, and to
building a new, more nuanced approach that takes second-tier nuclear powers
like China seriously. Likewise, U.S. policy choices may influence China’s willing-
ness to participate in and abide by international arms control regimes.
Finally, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control makes the rarely heard ar-
gument that policy makers in Washington must address the role that Russia will
play in the Sino-U.S. equation. Russia currently occupies the second spot in
China’s hierarchy of bilateral relationships, after the United States, and this dy-
namic must be incorporated into a new “tripolar paradigm for nuclear arms
control.” The intersection of these three powers, the authors argue, is what
should drive an entirely new American approach to nuclear policy and to discus-
sions with China on nuclear issues. This approach will require combining the is-
sues of nuclear weapons, missile defense, and China in a wider U.S. national
debate and within U.S. security institutions. This could in turn lead to a more
constructive dialogue with both Russia and China, and maximize the ability of
the United States to influence Chinese policy choices for the better. While I do
not share the authors’ optimism about positively influencing either Chinese de-
cision making or Chinese impressions of America, I do find their ultimate pre-
scriptions for a new nuclear policy framework to be persuasive.
The major shortcoming of China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control is its
frustrating brevity. To be fair, this is more the result of the paucity of reliable
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open-source material and secondary works on China’s strategic forces and doc-
trine, as compared to the abundant material on both the PLA’s conventional
forces and its emerging information warfare doctrine. While Timperlake and
Triplett rely primarily on speculation “to accurately chronicle” China’s rise,
neglecting readily available open-source material, Manning, Montaperto, and
Roberts are forced to speculate, because the relevant material does not yet exist.
However, given the prolific publishing records of all three authors, we can antici-
pate more detailed works to follow that will flesh out this preliminary assess-
ment. A secondary weakness of the book is its lack of a bibliography. While the
footnotes are a useful reference for further reading, a full bibliography of rel-
evant primary and secondary sources, perhaps even annotated by the knowl-
edgeable authors, would have been invaluable. Yet even with these flaws, the
book is a concise, scholarly, and balanced assessment of a topic that is critical to
U.S. national security.
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BATTLE ON THE POTOMAC
Thomas C. Hone
Wilson, George C. This War Really Matters: Inside the Fight for
Defense Dollars. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000. 239pp.
$19.95
If you plan someday to work in the Pentagon, then you need to read this book. If
you are a citizen just trying to grasp how defense budgets are made, you need to
read this book. If you are one of the so-called “policy makers” in Washington,
you also need to read this book, because it is about you and what you do.
George C. Wilson was the defense correspondent for the Washington Post for
twenty-three years. People like me looked forward to Wilson’s reports and books
because he had (and still has) a nose for war, and for the people and institutions
that make war. He also has a knack for getting to the point and for getting people
he interviews to do the same. He has certainly packed this slim book with candid
comments about the defense budget process. If you did not know why people
compare the budget process to sausage making (you can eat the product but you
don’t want to see it being made), then you will know after you have read this re-
vealing account of making the budget and approving the most recent Base Re-
alignment and Closure list.
Why did Wilson write this book? He wrote it because, as he says, few Ameri-
cans “know much about the bloodless but vital fight for their defense dollars.
This book provides a ringside seat for watching this fight up close and personal.”
Why select the 105th Congress (1997–98) to watch? The reason is that “the
105th, because it fell between the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, was less
distorted by seasonal electioneering.” Is there a bottom line to the book, a central
message? Yes. “Military leaders . . . must engage in the art of the possible to
achieve their goals.” They must master this art in order “to maximize their effec-
tiveness in government councils.”
I can hear the teeth of professional military officers
grinding. How often have I heard officers say, “I don’t
want to be a politician!” As Wilson shows, however,
the nation’s military leaders—especially the chairmen
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—have no choice in the
matter. They are intimately involved in the debate
over how to use the nation’s resources to defend the
Thomas C. Hone is the principal deputy director, Pro-
gram Analysis and Evaluation, of the Office of the Secre-
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nation’s interests. To the degree that they bring truth, integrity, intelligence, and
tactical human skills to that debate, the nation benefits.
Yet officers are right to be wary of the political process in Washington. The
people who dominate it at the highest levels are intelligent, calculating, ambi-
tious, energetic, and committed. They are also frequently at odds with one an-
other. Getting involved with them is often like trying to mediate a fight between
two cats. Increasingly, however, most of them— whether elected or appointed,
in the executive branch or in Congress—lack military experience, so senior mili-
tary officers must contribute their professional opinions, insights, and prefer-
ences to policy and budget debates.
The value of This War Really Matters is that Wilson gets almost all the partici-
pants in the partisan political process of making the budget to speak candidly
about their views, their motives, and their tactics. The book is a classic case study
of how Washington works, and it is told largely in the words of the movers and
shakers themselves. By drawing on extensive interviews with officials in the Pen-
tagon and with members of Congress, Wilson breathes fire into what most citi-
zens regard as a confused, frustrating, and dull process. The fact that he does this
in a little more than two hundred pages of text means that readers can casually
peruse this book on an airplane or master the text in a few evenings. The author
makes reading even easier by providing chapter summaries in his introduction.
Readers short of time or interested in just one of the issues Wilson explores can
first consult these summaries; they are excellent guides.
This War Really Matters begins by considering the responses within the De-
partment of Defense and Congress to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
in 1997. Wilson focuses his attention first on John Hamre, then Pentagon comp-
troller, and his efforts to persuade the media and members of Congress that the
Clinton administration was providing enough fiscal support to the Defense De-
partment. Wilson then shifts to William Cohen, the secretary of defense. Given
what Wilson calls President Bill Clinton’s “detachment” from the QDR process,
it was up to Cohen to persuade the administration’s Republican opponents in
Congress that a “no-growth” level of defense spending was adequate to meet the
nation’s needs.
Wilson goes on to reveal the reactions of senior military officers in the Penta-
gon to the QDR and to the administration’s desire to hold defense spending
down. On one hand, the president and the leaders of the congressional majority
had agreed to spending caps for all nonentitlement programs. On the other,
both parties to the agreement felt there was a need to increase spending in cer-
tain areas. Because neither side wanted to take the blame for “busting the caps,”
both sought the support of the uniformed service chiefs. Secretary Cohen
needed them to say that they could live with a “no growth” budget. Cohen’s
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critics, such as Republican representative Floyd Spence, then chairman of the
House National Security Committee, wanted the service chiefs to declare that
they could not carry out their legal responsibilities without additional funding.
The chiefs were in the middle. Wilson interviewed a number of senior officers
for this book, including Army general John Shalikashvili, and his deputy for the
QDR, Air Force general Ronald Fogleman. These interviews make fascinating
reading. They reveal strong but honest differences among uniformed service
leaders about the roles their forces should play in the future. If one purpose of
the QDR was to force service leaders to resolve those differences, these inter-
views show that it failed. The interviews also show how sensitive the officers
were to competition among the services, and how often they found it hard to get
people without military backgrounds to understand the special problems faced
by military forces entrusted with worldwide missions.
The chiefs supported Secretary Cohen when the QDR was issued in the spring
of 1997 and again in testimony to Congress in February 1998. Yet the escalating
political conflict between the Republican majority in Congress and the White
House kept both houses of Congress from passing a joint budget resolution for
fiscal year 1999. This turned out to be an opportunity for the service chiefs to go
after the additional funding that they had foresworn the previous year.
In the run-up to the 1998 congressional elections, neither political party
wanted to be tagged as “obstructionist.” However, neither party was happy just
to continue the budget “caps” agreed to in 1997. In early September 1998, for ex-
ample, President Clinton met with the service chiefs and told them to take their
cases for more funding to Congress. When the chiefs testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee at the end of September, they took a coordinated
and prepared position. Wilson calls it “smart politics.” The trick was to get the
Republicans in Congress to take the responsibility for “breaking the caps.” The
Republicans understood the game and tried to place the onus on the White
House. Wilson’s description of the resulting political maneuvering is fascinating.
There is a lot more to this book as well. For example, Wilson persuaded both
Representative David Obey, then the ranking Democrat on the House Appropri-
ations Committee, and Republican Robert Livingston, then the committee’s
chairman, to speak candidly about the budget process. Obey’s views are particu-
larly interesting. Obey claims that the budget process institutionalized in 1974
had failed, and that there was an urgent need for structural reform. Livingston
does not agree, but the comments of both representatives merit consideration.
There are more gems, including the travail of F. Whitten Peters, appointed
Under Secretary of the Air Force in November 1997. In the dispute between
President Clinton and members of Congress over the base realignment report
submitted in 1995, Peters was caught in a partisan political battle that also
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included major defense contractors, such as Lockheed Martin. A memo Peters
wrote at the end of April 1998 to John Hamre, then deputy secretary of defense,
describing a way to preserve jobs at a major Air Force depot on the “cut” list, was
soon leaked to House Republicans. Peters, trying to find a solution to the dispute
that was acceptable to all parties, was soon pilloried by all sides. Yet he managed
what Wilson calls “a remarkable turnaround. He converted his former critics
into supporters” and may well have saved the process itself.
The scandal over the president’s conduct with White House intern Monica
Lewinsky dominated political news in 1998. As George Wilson shows, however,
the debates and political maneuvers that affected the fiscal year 1999 defense
budget were just as dramatic, if far less visible in the media.
This book is the best introduction in print to the defense budget process. It is
also a wonderfully revealing examination of how influential people in the Penta-
gon and Congress think about their jobs and their constitutional responsibilities.
This War Really Matters has only two weaknesses. The first is that Wilson did
not interview President Clinton. As a result, the president’s views in the book are
those he gave publicly to the media, or those that could be gleaned secondhand
from others whom Wilson interviewed. The second weakness is that it lacks a
chronology. The book contains a glossary and a host of useful charts in an ap-
pendix, but a chronology would have helped readers—especially if it tracked the
Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment of the president in parallel with the
progress of the fiscal year 1999 budget.
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Clark, Wesley K. Waging Modern War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. 479pp. $30
This book is retired Army general Wesley
Clark’s anxiously awaited account of
Nato’s operations in Kosovo, dubbed
ALLIED FORCE. As Clark was the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)
during Nato’s first war, his account of
this major operation is an important
contribution to the historical record of
events that led to what many consider a
very controversial military endeavor.
Waging Modern War is divided into four
parts. The first briefly addresses General
Clark’s career and his early reputation as
a “fast-burner.” It introduces Clark as the
new Director for Strategic Plans and Pol-
icy (J-5) during the Bosnia-Herzegovina
war and presents the same cast of
characters that he would see again later
in his career as SACEUR. The J-5 posi-
tion allowed Clark to cut his diplomatic
teeth while supporting Ambassador Rich-
ard C. Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy,
which eventually led to the Dayton
accords. Most importantly, it was at this
time that Clark began to gain his own in-
sights into Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic and what made him tick.
Though Clark discounts any patronage
from his previous Arkansas connections
with former President Bill Clinton, he
makes it quite clear that he was seldom
the Army’s favorite because of the many
key positions he had held that helped po-
sition him for his selection to SACEUR.
This section helps the reader to under-
stand a bit about Clark’s leadership style
and attention to detail (less charitable
people would label him a micromanager)
and his view that the rest of the Army
perceived him as an intellectual and not
from the war-fighter mold. This is a key
insight of a soldier never fully accepted
by his own, and it establishes a thread
woven through the remainder of the
book.
The second section details the events and
preparations that led up to Operation
ALLIED FORCE. Clark lays out the plan-
ning challenges he encountered in an alli-
ance that had been formed for an entirely
different threat. At every turn he faced
the need to compromise already accepted
planning procedures. To complicate
things, Clark discovered that his own na-
tional strategic-level leadership had little
understanding of his dual-hatted role as
Commander in Chief, U.S. European
Command, and SACEUR, and of the po-
litical responsibilities attendant upon the
latter position. This was further
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complicated by the apparent lack of in-
terest that was displayed by both the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national
command authorities in focusing upon
the Kosovo situation.
The third part of the book, “The Air
Campaign,” addresses the execution
phase of ALLIED FORCE. Here Clark’s
shortfalls in planning and his inability to
forge a supportive relationship with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of
defense become apparent. Two days into
the operation, Clark wrestled with the
implications of having no defined
end-state and the resulting fuzzy linkage
between military and political objectives.
Incredibly, he attempts to deflect criti-
cism toward the political leadership for
the fundamental flaws in the plan. The
effects of this confused strategy vacuum
lingered throughout the operation. In ad-
dition to the strategy challenges faced by
Clark, the Washington leadership was
not supportive—indeed, Clark depicts it
as an impediment. His assessments of
then Secretary of Defense William Co-
hen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Hugh Shelton, and Army Chief
of Staff General Dennis Reimer are
damning. Clark is unambiguous that
from his perspective, all three men con-
tributed to a lack of national strategic co-
herence during the operation. This
section ends by depicting a slippery slope
toward an inevitable ground invasion of
Kosovo—something that everyone
wanted to avoid.
The final section of the book, “End-
game,” details the sudden change in cir-
cumstances and Milosevic’s willingness
to accept a deal. Clark outlines the
time-sensitive and painstaking negotia-
tions required to ensure an executable
plan for the Nato peacekeeping force. He
also addresses the now famous refusal of
his subordinate, Lieutenant General Sir
Michael Jackson of the British army, to
send forces into Pristina airfield to block
the impending arrival of Russian forces.
Clark concludes with an examination of
his experience and its implications for fu-
ture warfare.
This is a worthwhile book for those inter-
ested in the Kosovo conflict and how the
Nato alliance works in practice. Subse-
quent memoirs from other key partici-
pants will add balance to this historical
perspective. As for contributing to the
body of knowledge on military theory, as
the title implies, one must be less enthu-
siastic. Instead of presenting new theo-
retical constructs applicable to modern
war, in reality the book displays the pit-
falls faced by a joint-force commander
and his national-level superiors when





Watts, Barry D. The Military Use of Space: A Di-
agnostic Assessment. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001. 130pp.
Barry Watts, former director of the
Northrop Grumman Analysis Center and
now the director of the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense (OSD) Program Analy-
sis and Evaluation, has written an
assessment of military competition in
near-earth space and how that competi-
tion may evolve over the next twenty-five
years. Aside from the importance of its
subject, this book is of particular interest
because it explicitly attempts a “net as-
sessment.” Watts worked for Andrew
Marshall, director of the OSD Office of
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Net Assessment (ONA) from its estab-
lishment in 1973. Marshall played a ma-
jor role in, among other things, the
conceptualization of the “revolution in
military affairs” (RMA) and is currently
playing a major role in the Bush adminis-
tration’s defense review. Much of the
work of ONA is highly classified, and it
has been difficult to understand just what
is involved in “net assessment.” Now we
have an example. How does it look?
Watts observes that the United States is
the preeminent user of space today and
that the way it uses space has changed
from the preconflict reconnaissance and
warning of before, say, 1991 to enhance-
ment of operations by traditional sea, air,
and land forces since then. Watts argues
that the U.S. primacy is unlikely to
change, because the cost of moving mass
into orbit is likely to remain high, and
because much of the U.S. advantage orig-
inates in its organization and the tacit
knowledge of its operators rather than
the assets themselves. A key asymmetry
between the United States and its poten-
tial adversaries is that America is inher-
ently more dependent on space-
based assets. Rather than repeat the U.S.
effort, adversaries without the same bud-
getary and organizational constraints
may be able to exploit commercial and
dual-use technologies to meet their needs
adequately and may attempt to reduce
U.S. capabilities by attacking terrestrial
downlinks rather than space-based assets.
Thus Watts does not think it likely that
overt military competition or conflict in
space will happen over the next
twenty-five years, to the extent that
weaponization of space occurs, but he
does believe it is inevitable over the long
run, if more gradual than abrupt. That
said, Watts does not expect that the mili-
tary use of space for communications
and intelligence in 2025 will be essen-
tially different from its use today.
Watts’s assessment, although nuanced, is
sometimes confusing. One of the most
puzzling issues is whether space is con-
sidered to be a military or economic cen-
ter of gravity. Watts says that the survival
of the United States does not depend on
space-based assets. Yet he repeatedly ob-
serves that U.S. forces are increasingly
dependent on satellites for communica-
tions and intelligence. What would hap-
pen if U.S. satellites were attacked? He
discusses this only in terms of attacks on
satellites in low earth orbits (LEO).
Watts’s judgment that nonnuclear
antisatellite (ASAT) attacks on individual
satellites would be taken seriously by the
U.S. leadership but might not lead to war
seems plausible. In contrast, his argu-
ment that nuclear attacks on satellites in
LEO would not have much military effect
yet would be met with so strong a re-
sponse that even pariahs would be de-
terred seems summary. Why would there
be a strong response if space is not a cen-
ter of gravity? Also, what happens if de-
terrence fails? As Marshall has said, “It is
not a matter of deterring someone like
us, but someone like him.”
The significance of the issue may be visible
in a situation Watts does not consider—the
effects of large-scale nonnuclear attacks
on satellites in higher orbits. Given the
interest in RMAs at Net Assessment, it is
curious that he does not consider what
might be a true RMA for the U.S. mili-
tary, albeit one in reverse—a large-scale
degradation of U.S. communications, re-
connaissance, and Global Positioning
System satellites. For example, while the
cost of moving mass into geostationary
transfer orbit may be expensive (accord-
ing to Watts, moving 2,200 pounds to
geostationary transfer orbit using a
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Chinese Long March 2C costs twenty-five
million dollars), middle tens to low hun-
dreds of millions of dollars for an anti-
satellite program may be an attractive
price for a capability to attack the small
number of high-value U.S. communications
satellites in high orbits. A direct-ascent
ASAT program might cost less.
Indeed, a country contemplating war
with the United States might consider a
billion dollars or so to degrade U.S. capa-
bility substantially by attacking
thirty-five or forty American satellites
money well spent. Hard, yes; guaranteed
successful, no; but the severity of the out-
come might be merely a function of
money for an adversary and a serious
problem for the United States if satellites
move from being force multipliers to
force divisors. In an explicit net assess-
ment the issue of U.S. vulnerability and
the capability of potential adversaries
should be addressed more thoroughly be-
fore the wisdom of raining titanium rods
from space is considered.
This book is recommended as an intro-
duction to an important and insufficiently
understood topic. It is also recommended
as an example of net assessment, though,
perhaps as intended, it is better at asking
significant and useful questions and sen-




Alexander, John B. Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons
in Twenty-first Century Warfare. New York: St. Mar-
tin’s Griffin, 1999. 255pp. $14.95
The purpose of this book is to draw at-
tention to the use of nonlethal weaponry
in future warfare scenarios. The subject is
divided into three major sections that, re-
spectively, discuss the rationale behind
the use of nonlethal weaponry, provide
an introduction to new technologies, and
suggest scenarios of tactical and strategic
uses. Throughout the book, Alexander
focuses the reader’s attention on some of
the more critical issues of the appropriate
use of nonlethal weaponry in the U.S. ar-
senal and, in so doing, demonstrates that
new weaponry is needed to respond ade-
quately to new and emerging types of
conflict.
One of Alexander’s fundamental assump-
tions is that “war has always represented
the controlled application of force” and
that nonlethal weaponry can be part of
that controlled application of force con-
sistent with military objectives. The ques-
tions are: How will new technologies be
used to control the level, type, and effects
of the force? How do these new technolo-
gies relate to changing military and polit-
ical objectives? How can nonlethal
weaponry best be applied when the ob-
jective is to limit force application in a
variety of situations? These are not easy
questions by any stretch of the imagina-
tion, but Alexander has had the temerity
to put them forward for public scrutiny.
Alexander is no dilettante; his expertise
in this area is recognized by the number
of well-known serving military officers
who have written short scenario-vignettes
printed in the front of the book. Neither
should it go unnoticed that Tom Clancy
wrote the foreword and General John J.
Sheehan wrote the introduction. Nota-
bly, Alexander chaired one of the first
major conferences on nonlethal weap-
onry and participated in the landmark
study by the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions on nonlethal weapons. He has ex-
perience as a military commander with
the Green Berets in Vietnam, as Dade
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County deputy sheriff, and as a consultant
for the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
This combination of technical expertise
and real-world experience regarding the
suitability and applicability of nonlethal
weaponry has led to a thoughtful study
that must be taken seriously.
Alexander’s easy writing style belies the
difficulty of the subject. The descriptions
of techno-gadget weaponry may evoke
ideas of science fiction or Nintendo, but
they draw attention to the fact that what
may not have been technologically possi-
ble in the recent past is now common-
place. The reader will be drawn to
descriptions of electronic surveillance de-
vices, new types of (and uses for) chemi-
cal agents, low-kinetic-impact weapons,
acoustic devices, biological agents, and
technologies appropriate for information
warfare. The effect of these weapons on
the human body and their use in conflict
are of critical concern to all Americans,
whether as “users,” potential “targets,” or
as part of the policy community that
writes the rules that enable or restrain the
use of nonlethal weapons.
The author’s use of fictional worst-case
scenarios draws attention to the interface
between weaponry, tactics and strategies,
and appropriate rules of engagement. At
first glance the vignettes seem a bit dis-
tracting, but they are admittedly an effec-
tive device for quick-pacing a difficult
subject. They also tend to make a very so-
ber analysis more palatable.
Military and intelligence experts will crit-
icize the technological information as be-
ing “common knowledge.” However,
Future War was not meant to be a hand-
book for professional practitioners. Its
importance lies in drawing public
attention to several dilemmas in U.S. se-
curity, both domestic and international.
Instructors in professional military edu-
cation should be discussing with military
members not only the technology but the
appropriate uses of nonlethal weaponry
where military and law enforcement ac-
tivities tend to overlap. Academicians
and others who shape public opinion
need to understand and discuss the di-
lemmas faced by military forces and law
enforcement organizations. Finally, pol-
icy makers need to know the excruciat-
ingly difficult decisions that must be
made in the near future regarding the ap-
propriate types and levels of force to be
applied in a wide spectrum of missions.
The appendix alone is worth the price of
this book. Alexander provides simple lists
and diagrams of nonlethal weapons tax-
onomies, nonlethal antipersonnel and
antimaterial weapons, target categories,
specific uses of nonlethal weaponry, and
programs supported by the joint
nonlethal weapons directorate.
It is commonly assumed that the number
and types of violent episodes around the
world are increasing exponentially and
that there is an increasing public aware-
ness due to the growing visibility pro-
vided by the media. If these assumptions
are true, any new type of control mecha-
nism, whether lethal or nonlethal, will be
subject to enhanced public scrutiny. The
use of nonlethal weaponry in new forms
of conflict needs to be discussed, debated,
and understood by American citizens,
whether in uniform or civilian. This book
makes a significant contribution to that
discourse.
PAULETTA OTIS
University of Southern Colorado
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Gottschalk, Jack A., et al. Jolly Roger with an Uzi:
The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 170pp. $26.95
Jolly Roger with an Uzi is an easy, quick,
and interesting read. Despite its relatively
short length, it is a comprehensive exam-
ination of modern piracy. The authors’
arguments and logic are strongly sup-
ported with facts and analysis, making
their book a work of substance. Jack
Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan, with
Lawrence Kahn and David LaRochelle,
do an excellent job of putting modern-
day piracy into historical, legal, and eco-
nomic perspectives.
They begin by looking at the evolution of
piracy through the ages and the socioeco-
nomic and political factors that have
contributed and continue to contribute
to its existence. In chapter 2 the authors
lay out the legal considerations and
framework for the differing thoughts on
what constitutes piracy. Using the United
Nations 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
the authors examine the international le-
gal definition of piracy, as well as such
criminal acts as larceny and robbery. The
authors point out that piracy, by defini-
tion and by its very nature, has always
been a crime for economic gain and, like
other serious crime, often results in acts
of violence.
One of the main points of this book is that
regardless of legal definition, modern-day
piracy has broadened its associated threats
to include organized criminal activities,
drug smuggling, potential environmental
disaster, and common theft, as well as
fraud. The heart of the authors’ analysis
is contained in a regional look at piracy
over the last three decades. Focusing on
Europe, the Americas, Africa, and South-
east Asia, Gottschalk and Flanagan bring
the reader up to date on modern piracy.
The authors establish a clear picture of
the extent and nature of contemporary
piracy by summarizing reports by region
and country. Building on these data, the
authors discuss the economic factors that
influence the actions of governments and
the maritime industry to counter piracy.
This analysis is based on an easy-to-follow
logic that looks at piracy’s impact on le-
gitimate maritime trade from three
points of view: those of merchants who
use ocean transport, the shipping compa-
nies, and the insurance companies. The
authors build a strong and credible case
that, despite the significant increase in
both frequency and violence, current
economic losses due to piracy fail to out-
weigh the apparent costs of significantly
lessening or stopping piracy, and so it
continues. The authors conclude the is-
sues and analysis portion of their book
by discussing the potential for environ-
mental disasters stemming from acts of
piracy, and the differences between pi-
racy and terrorism. In their “Solutions”
chapter, the authors conduct a probing
exploration of the challenges faced in
putting an end to a criminal activity that
has been around since the beginning of
maritime trade. Their ultimate conclu-
sion is that maritime trade, the target of
piracy, is truly global and that therefore
deterring or stopping piracy will require
the cooperation of the international
community of nations and the world’s
maritime industry.
The authors are to be commended. Col-
lectively they have a wealth of profes-
sional expertise and experience in the
maritime arena. Their treatment of “the
rise and threat of modern piracy” pro-
vides an updated foundation from which
to seek solutions to this growing problem
of maritime security. Criminal and
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international in nature, piracy, if left un-
checked, will eventually provide the cata-
lyst for future international crises and
conflicts. This is a worthwhile read for
anyone who is interested in or responsi-
ble for maritime security.
JAMES F. MURRAY
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Naval War College
Menon, Raja. A Nuclear Strategy for India. New
Delhi: Sage, 2000. 316pp. $45
Indian officers have written remarkably
little about nuclear strategy in the more
than quarter-century since India first
demonstrated its ability to produce nu-
clear weapons. The cloak of secrecy that
has traditionally surrounded India’s nu-
clear program, New Delhi’s declared pol-
icy of maintaining a nonweaponized
nuclear stockpile, and a lack of interest in
nuclear issues on the part of the Indian
officer corps stifled discussion of nuclear
issues. It is notable that the two most
comprehensive accounts of India’s nuclear
and missile programs written to date—
George Perkovich’s India’s Nuclear Bomb
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press,
1999) and Raj Chengappa’s Weapons of
Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins India,
2000)—were written by an American
scholar and an Indian journalist, respec-
tively. India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear
weapon tests changed all that, bringing
New Delhi’s nuclear program into the
open and triggering a new wave of think-
ing and writing about nuclear strategy.
Raja Menon’s A Nuclear Strategy for In-
dia represents one of the first serious at-
tempts by an Indian officer to address the
doctrinal and force posture issues arising
from India’s decision to go nuclear. The
author, a naval officer who retired in
1994 as Assistant Chief of the Indian Na-
val Staff for Operations, is well qualified
to write on this subject.
Menon begins by reviewing the history of
New Delhi’s nuclear program and the de-
velopment, such as it is, of Indian nu-
clear strategy. He is sharply critical of the
Indian government and armed forces’
traditional approach toward nuclear
weapons. He argues that decisions on
nuclear weapons have been fueled by a
mixture of political rhetoric and organi-
zational politics but have occurred in a
strategic vacuum. The secrecy that has
always surrounded the Indian nuclear
weapon program has prevented a dia-
logue between the political leadership,
the military, and defense scientists on
strategy and force posture issues. He ar-
gues that rational analysis, not emotion,
should guide Indian nuclear policy.
The remainder of the book offers just
such an analysis. Menon begins by giving
the reader a primer on nuclear strategy,
one that borrows heavily from U.S. liter-
ature on nuclear deterrence of the 1970s
and 1980s. One wonders just how appli-
cable this literature was to the problems
the United States faced during the Cold
War, let alone those India may face in the
twenty-first century. Clearly, Indian
thinking about nuclear weapons is still in
its infancy.
Menon’s prescriptions for India make up
the most interesting part of the book.
While commentators in the United States
have tended to focus on the Indo-
Pakistani nuclear rivalry, the author
makes it clear that it is China’s nuclear
and missile programs that drive New
Delhi’s force posture. He is particularly
concerned that a modernized Chinese
nuclear arsenal carried atop highly accu-
rate missiles will render fixed targets in
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India increasingly vulnerable. He there-
fore argues for a nuclear force that relies
upon mobility to ensure its survivability.
The final section of Menon’s book is a
thorough discussion of the nuclear op-
tions open to India. He recommends that
India adopt a rail-garrison, land-based
missile force until it can shift to reliance
upon ballistic missile–carrying subma-
rines by 2020 (a date that seems ex-
tremely optimistic, given the troubled
history of India’s indigenous submarine
programs). He also argues that India
should field cruise missiles for both con-
ventional and nuclear missions.
Menon is skeptical of the contention that
nuclear weapons themselves offer an ef-
fective deterrent. He argues that a state’s
force posture and command and control
arrangements are also important. Menon
calls for extensive changes in Indian mili-
tary decision making, suggesting arrange-
ments that draw heavily upon those of
the United States. He believes, for exam-
ple, that India needs to adopt its own
version of the national command author-
ity and Joint Chiefs of Staff to command
and control its nuclear forces. He also ar-
gues that India needs to codify its target-
ing policy in its own version of the Single
Integrated Operational Plan.
A Nuclear Strategy for India is likely only
the first of many efforts to think through
the implications of India’s decision to go
nuclear. While but a first step, it provides




Wickham, John A. Korea on the Brink: From the
“12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979–1980.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press,
1999. 240pp. $20
For some reason, Korea is a major blind
spot in U.S. thinking about world affairs.
Public commemoration of the Korean
War’s fiftieth anniversary is almost non-
existent compared to the attention paid
to the Second World War in the first half
of the 1990s. Today, the Cold War lingers
on in East Asia with the continuing divi-
sion of the peninsula, which remains one
of the locations in which the United
States is most likely to go to war in the
immediate future. Yet the American in-
teraction with Korea is in many ways a
success story in U.S. foreign policy, at
least in the southern half of the country.
The Republic of Korea has become an in-
dustrial, market-driven economy with a
civilian-led democratic government that
enjoys grassroots support among its citi-
zenry. The road to this state, however,
was fraught with extreme danger. From
the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, there
was a nearly continuous real possibility
of war on the peninsula again. One of the
periods of maximum danger was between
1979 and 1981, in the wake of the assassi-
nation of President Park Chung-hee and
a military coup that toppled the civilian
successor government.
General John A. Wickham was the com-
mander of U.S. forces in Korea during
this period, and this book is a memoir of
his efforts to keep the United States and
South Korea focused on their combat
missions despite the turmoil of the time.
Even though Wickham was a military
commander, he could not turn a blind
eye to politics. The South Korean army
had become thoroughly politicized after
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Park’s eighteen-year reign. The late presi-
dent had been a general who had come to
power by a military coup. Many of his
protégés worried about their futures after
their mentor’s death. There was also a
good deal of concern and confusion about
the North Korean role and its likely reac-
tion to the assassination. Initially the
South Korean military supported the
constitutional process, but a number of
junior generals with conservative social
views and a strong distrust of civilian
politicians decided to take control of the
government two months after Park’s
death on 12 December (thus “12/12”).
Wickham recommended a hands-off ap-
proach toward the coup. If it turned vio-
lent, or if there were a countercoup, there
would be a good possibility that the
North would intervene. The general
knew this advice would not be popular
back in Washington with President
Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy
team. “The U.S. government obviously
was out of sorts over the ‘12/12 Incident.’
It was a setback to the democratization
process in the ROK [Republic of Korea]
and a poor harbinger for the human
rights goals that were central to President
Carter’s foreign policy.”
Wickham’s efforts were constantly focused
on trying to keep the South Korean army
“facing north”—that is, preparing to deal
with the military threat of North Korea.
This ever-present danger made the politi-
cal maneuverings of coup and counter-
coup leaders all the more dangerous. The
possibility that the North might attack in
an effort to take advantage of the political
weakness of the South was one that intel-
ligence indicated was real. Indeed, the
story Wickham tells evokes images of Sai-
gon in the mid-1960s.
In Wickham’s view, many of the generals
he dealt with were politicians in uniform.
He was drawn into a number of political
matters against his wishes; one of them
almost destroyed his career. One of
Wickham’s themes is the influence the
United States had in South Korea. The
United States had reduced its ground
force numbers in Korea during the ad-
ministration of Richard Nixon, and the
efforts of Carter to withdraw the troops
entirely made many Koreans question
the U.S. commitment. “The American
mission was over a barrel, because our
basic objective was to protect the ROK
from invasion. That left us obliged to ac-
cept the realities of the Korean political
apparatus, with all of its warts, and to
work with it as best we could.”
This memoir is rich with information.
Although Wickham at times overstates
the limits of U.S. influence, his basic
point is correct: Koreans, not Americans,
were going to decide the fate of Korea. It is
also clear that cultural misperception
complicated relations. General Chun
Doo-hwan, the leader of the coup, failed
to recognize that civil-military relations
in the United States were different from
those in Korea and therefore incorrectly
assumed that Wickham played a role in
formulation of policy.
Overall, the United States was fortunate
to have as talented an individual as Wick-
ham in place during this difficult time.
Officers assigned to Korea or to any posi-
tion abroad where they must deal with
matters that involve factors that tran-
scend those of an operational or tactical
nature can profit from this book.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
Texas A&M University–Commerce
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Hill, Richard. Lewin of Greenwich: The Authorised
Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin. Lon-
don: Cassell, 2000. 443pp. £25
Having served with Admiral of the Fleet
Lord Lewin as a midshipman, Prince
Philip, the duke of Edinburgh, notes in
his foreword that in 1979 Lewin was the
last Chief of Defence Staff in the United
Kingdom to have served in the Second
World War. It was serendipitous that this
experience proved to be a force multi-
plier in his final challenge before retire-
ment, as he masterminded the Falklands
War alongside the prime minister, Mar-
garet Thatcher. Conscious of the crucial
importance of ensuring the coherence of
what he called “politico-military issues,”
or what we now call the maintenance of a
policy-strategy match, Lewin knew that
success depended upon being heard as
the single military voice within the War
Cabinet, and on his remaining at
Thatcher’s side throughout.
Richard Hill’s carefully researched biog-
raphy of Lewin paints the portrait of a
man who, from a relatively humble back-
ground in the 1930s, achieved the highest
military position in the British armed
forces, beginning and ending his career
with warfare, at different ends of the
spectrum. Hill himself retired from the
Royal Navy as a rear admiral, having
worked for Lewin in a number of ap-
pointments. Near the end of Lewin’s life,
Hill was asked by Lewin to write his biog-
raphy. Consequently, Hill presents an ex-
tremely authoritative and sympathetic
account of the great man’s life, spanning
four decades of dramatic change in post-
war history and relating Lewin’s part in
the radical restructuring of the British
armed forces, the legacy of which is very
much in evidence today.
Predictably, Hill deals with Lewin’s ap-
pointments sequentially. In this way, the
biography divides itself very clearly into
two parts, reflecting the marked differ-
ences between service at the front line in
an operational unit and the cut-and-
thrust of the Ministry of Defence.
The first half moves swiftly through
Lewin’s childhood before concentrating
on his wartime experience, the highlight
of which was his appointment in the
Tribal-class destroyer HMS Ashanti,
which played a crucial part in the North
Russian convoys. Ashanti was then tasked
to join Operation PEDESTAL in 1942, to
convoy critical supplies to the besieged
island of Malta; the advance of Erwin
Rommel’s Afrika Korps on El Alamein
had been largely a result of the Allies’ in-
ability to use the forces based in Malta to
cut German supply lines. The epic of
PEDESTAL and the drama surrounding
the torpedoed oil tanker Ohio, before it
was towed into Valetta to the delight of
the populace, is a tremendous story in it-
self. Ashanti rode shotgun on Ohio to
Malta and then was dispatched to pre-
pare for the next convoy to North Russia.
As a sub-lieutenant, Lewin distinguished
himself with great aplomb and finished
the war having been mentioned in des-
patches three times and awarded the Dis-
tinguished Service Cross for “gallantry,
skill and resolution . . . escorting an im-
portant convoy to North Russia in face of
relentless attacks by enemy aircraft and
submarines.” Postwar, his very swift pro-
motion provided him with three com-
mands, the last of which was the aircraft
carrier HMS Hermes, aboard which he
faced the challenges posed by the Aden
crisis and the Six Day War of 1967.
In the second half of the biography, Hill’s
emphasis moves from narrative to analy-
sis. Lewin’s appointments in the Ministry
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of Defence, dealing with issues at the
strategic level, exposed him to the ill-
defined world of negotiation and com-
promise and to the requirement to balance
the myriad of interests between politics,
the defence industry, the research lobby,
academia, and the military itself. Here,
Hill’s greater depth and increased granu-
larity of analysis provide a far better in-
sight to the man, who wrestled with the
introduction of Trident as Britain’s stra-
tegic deterrent, and with the reorganiza-
tion of the highest levels of defence to
establish the primacy of the Chief of the
Defence Staff over the service chiefs.
Lewin’s open mind, calm and modern
style of leadership, and determination to
deliver a viable and flexible defence for
the United Kingdom of 2020 made him
unique amongst his peers and still marks
him out as an inspiration for all today.
His vision of the establishment of a genu-
inely joint-service culture and of a bal-
anced fleet that is fully interoperable with
the Army and Royal Air Force and has a
global reach, with a resulting capability
to act as a force for good on the interna-
tional stage, still exists today and contin-
ues to be refined in an uncertain world.
With the Quadrennial Defense Review in
progress, the latter half of the biography
will especially appeal to most of this jour-
nal’s readership. It will be of real value to
Naval War College students only a few
years removed from their first assign-
ment to the Department of Defense in
Washington. Having gone myself straight
from frigate command and the U.S. Na-
val War College to the Ministry of De-
fence for the first time—to face the
Strategic Defence Review (our QDR)—I
would have found Hill’s insight into
Lewin’s match-winning formula an ex-
tremely useful preparation. Notwith-
standing the time lapse and slight cultural
differences, the frenetic activity and the
importance of networking skills and in-
tegrity are the same in the Ministry of
Defence and the Department of Defense,
and the wheels of progress still move




Britannia Royal Naval College
Sandars, C. T. America’s Overseas Garrisons: The
Leasehold Empire. New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2000. 345pp. $65
Christopher Sandars, a career civil servant
at the British Ministry of Defence, has
written a concise and judicious account,
based on published sources, of the
unique global security system developed
by the United States in the years after
World War II. Convinced that this Amer-
ican system was neither a traditional em-
pire nor an attempt to gain worldwide
hegemony, he describes it as a “leasehold
empire,” a novel security system necessi-
tated by America’s anticolonial tradition
and by the surge of postwar nationalism,
in which the United States negotiated a
series of base agreements with largely
sovereign states. His study traces the de-
velopment of this system and the enor-
mous variety within it, ranging from
colonial relationships with Guam, Hawaii,
Panama, and the Philippines to basing
rights by virtue of conquest in Germany,
Italy, Japan, and South Korea, to the re-
vival of wartime arrangements in Great
Britain, and to the acquisition of heavily
circumscribed rights in some Middle
Eastern nations.
In dealing with these categories, Sandars
provides a brief history of America’s
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political relationship with each nation, a
detailed account of the bases acquired, a
shrewd analysis of the various quarrels
that emerged, and a careful description
of the changes that occurred over the
fifty years covered by this book. With
some nations, such as Japan, the security
relationship displayed a remarkable con-
tinuity, while in others, such as Panama
and the Philippines, growing nationalist
tensions forced the United States eventu-
ally to close its bases. America’s relation-
ships with Greece, Spain, and Turkey,
new allies in the Mediterranean, were al-
ways filled with difficulties, while the
United States was never able to obtain
access to permanent bases in the Middle
East. In this area of the world it had to
rely on mobile forces and the
prepositioning of military equipment.
By the mid-1980s America’s leasehold
empire was under serious strain, beset by
nationalist pressures and by what some
scholars described as imperial overreach.
Sandars believes that critics like Paul
Kennedy overemphasized the gap be-
tween American resources and obliga-
tions, and failed to anticipate the end of
the Cold War, the revival of the Ameri-
can economy in the 1990s, and the agility
with which the United States adjusted to
the new international environment and
redefined its informal empire. Between
1989 and 1995 the number of U.S. troops
permanently based overseas fell over 50
percent, from 510,000 to 238,000.
Sandars speculates that America’s lease-
hold empire will last, on a reduced scale,
far into the new century. “After a long
period of mismatch,” he writes, “the de-
mands of the U.S. global security system
and the resources to sustain it are now
back in equilibrium.” He is convinced
that the benefits of this worldwide system
of military bases far outweigh the costs,
and he praises the accomplishments of
American foreign policy in the second
half of the twentieth century. The United
States, he concludes, “has emerged with
credit and honor from this unique exper-
iment of policing the world, not by im-
posing garrisons on occupied territory,




Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Keystone: The American
Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2000.
264pp. $34.95
In the after-action report on the U.S. oc-
cupation of the Rhineland following
World War I, Colonel I. L. Hunt wrote,
“The history of the United States offers
an uninterrupted series of wars, which
demanded as their aftermath, the exercise
by its officers of civil government func-
tions.” “Despite the[se] precedents,” he
lamented, “the lesson seemingly has not
been learned.” The military returned to
this tradition of forgetting after World
War II. Subsequent to that second global
conflict, U.S. forces assumed responsibil-
ity for over two hundred million people
in occupation zones in Asia and Europe
at a cost of over a billion dollars a year,
yet official military histories barely touch
the topic. Texas A&M University professor
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes steps in to fill
part of the void with a thought-provoking
case study of the American occupation of
Okinawa from 1945 to the island’s for-
mal return to Japanese sovereignty in
1972. Sarantakes’s thesis is that bureau-
cratic infighting shaped the course of the
occupation as much as did national
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security strategy and foreign policy. This
finding parallels other research on U.S.
postwar operations.
Sarantakes begins his narrative with the
1 April 1945 amphibious assaults launch-
ing Operation ICEBERG, an imperfect but
ultimately successful campaign. This
story has already been well told (particu-
larly in George Feifer’s Tennozan: The
Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb
[1992]), but Sarantakes’s version is
briskly written and engaging. His pur-
pose in beginning with the fight for the
island is to illustrate the interservice dis-
agreements that marred operations—dif-
ficulties, he argues, that foreshadowed
future problems.
The fundamental obstacle, Sarantakes
finds, was that the United States lacked
an overarching strategy for what to do
with the islands. Normally, the military
wanted to jettison occupation duties as
quickly as possible; Okinawa was a rare
exception. Both the Army and the Navy
saw the island as a potential base from
which to guard against a resurgent Japan
or uncooperative Soviet Union. After a
few typhoons demonstrated the vulnera-
bility of harbor facilities, the Navy
dropped its interest in Okinawa. The
Army, however, saw utility in staging
troops and bombers on the island and as-
sumed overall control of the occupation.
An Army commander was appointed
high commissioner, making him the se-
nior U.S. military, political, and diplo-
matic representative.
The dynamics driving the occupation of
Okinawa bear striking resemblance to
other major postwar peacekeeping and
nation-building efforts, in Germany, Italy,
Austria, Japan proper, and Korea. In the
early years, 1945–48, high commissioners
had a great deal of autonomy in shaping
and implementing policies. At the same
time, they had scant resources for man-
aging the occupations, with the result
that their efforts to rebuild countries, in-
stitute the rule of law, and reconstruct
civil societies were limited. In addition,
commanders faced such challenges as
monetary reform, black-market activity,
crime by occupation troops and civilians,
housing shortages, poor race relations,
and forces ill prepared, inadequately
trained, and ineptly organized for occu-
pation duties.
As the Cold War heated up, the U.S.
State Department took the lead in setting
occupation policies. Most high commis-
sioners became civilians; again Okinawa
was a notable exception. The Department
of State and the Pentagon were often at
odds. The military wanted to hold for-
ward bases like Okinawa, while the State
Department lobbied to withdraw troops
in order to build up good will with fledg-
ling Cold War allies. The debate over
Okinawa was a case in point. Sarantakes
documents well the titanic 1961–64
struggle between the U.S. ambassador to
Japan, Edwin Reischauer, and General
Paul Caraway, U.S. Army, the com-
mander of forces on the island.
The Cold War stimulated overseas in-
vestment in strategic areas and kept the
troops in place. These commitments al-
lowed for the eventual stability, security,
and economic development that would
have shortened the requirement for oc-
cupation in the first place. These bases
did serve their intended purpose. Oki-
nawa was a key support facility during
the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and then
the major staging base for Marine forces
(a role that it continues to play).
The belated return of the island to Japan
in 1972 concluded an arguably successful
but, as Sarantakes demonstrates, troubled
occupation. His research suggests
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important lessons for the practitioners of
military operations other than war. Effec-
tive peacekeeping and nation building
are not cheap, easy, or brief, but their ex-
ecution can be greatly facilitated by com-
petent, cohesive, and effective




Paul, Septimus H. Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American
Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. Columbus: Ohio State
Univ. Press, 2000. 266pp. $42.50
With the collapse of Soviet power and the
end of the Cold War, the paradigm that
helped to explain that era shifted. Scholars
seeking to understand better the period
are now free to reassess that era, taking
into account other variables in the power
calculus with the same degree of atten-
tion previously concentrated upon the
Soviet Union. To cite just one example of
this paradigm shift, since the opening of
recent British archives scholars have con-
cluded that British foreign and defense
policy had a much more decisive impact
on the early Cold War than was apparent
in earlier considerations. The new study
by Septimus H. Paul is one such
reassessment.
Paul is a professor of history at the Col-
lege of Lake County in Grayslake, Illinois.
His Nuclear Rivals is a meticulous exami-
nation of Anglo-American wartime col-
laboration in the development of the
atomic bomb, followed by the decision of
the United States after the war to deny
Great Britain the fruits of that collabora-
tion—the requisite technologies to build
a British atomic bomb. To British eyes,
this was a betrayal of solemn (if secret)
promises made by President Franklin
Roosevelt to Prime Minister Winston
Churchill during the war and of under-
standings between President Harry Truman
and Prime Minister Clement Attlee
afterward.
Part of the complexity of Anglo-American
relations is to be explained by their
multileveled nature. The alliance against
Hitler during World War II forged a
common front, which coexisted with
substantive differences over grand strat-
egy and the postwar political-economic
settlement, particularly on questions re-
lating to open markets and decoloniza-
tion. The desire of the British to exercise
joint partnership with the United States
in the monopoly of the atomic bomb,
and the American reluctance to do so,
proved to be particularly divisive. These
profound differences continued into the
postwar world but were overshadowed by
the American and British governments’
perceived fear of the common threat
from Soviet Russia. One of the truly valu-
able contributions of Nuclear Rivals is
Paul’s fidelity to this complexity and to
the sources in relating the story of Amer-
ican collaboration and noncollaboration
with Britain in atomic weapons develop-
ment. Paul makes no attempt to sweeten
or marginalize the differences between
the two nations in this area; his approach
is explicit, without attention to periph-
eral issues.
The major contribution of this book is its
attention to what used to be called in the
literature “the raw materials question.”
This relates to the American attempt dur-
ing World War II to secure a monopoly
of the world’s uranium supply. One com-
plication for the Americans was that the
source of the highest-quality uranium,
absolutely indispensable for building an
atomic bomb, was the then Belgian
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Congo. Paul presents a compelling pic-
ture of Anglo-American maneuver-
ing—on the American side, for an
indefinite monopoly over the uranium
output of the Shinkolobwe Mine; and on
the British side, to secure first an alloca-
tion of uranium on a fifty-fifty basis with
the United States, and then to trade off
the British allocation in return for the
technical details of the American atomic
bomb. In this relationship, the British
had rather decisive advantages, which
they did not fail to exploit fully—a par-
ticularly close relationship with the Bel-
gian government, and the fact that
British investors owned 30 percent of the
shares of Union Menère du Haut
Katanga, which owned the Shinkolobwe
Mine. Paul’s appreciation of this intimate
relationship and its consequences for the
United States is worth noting. Should
Great Britain be so disposed, “it could
and would secure a monopoly over the
Belgian Congo raw materials. The United
States would then be in a most disadvan-
tageous position.” When the British in
1946 threatened to end the Combined
Development Trust (CDT), the agency,
established in 1944, responsible for joint
acquisition and allocation of raw materi-
als, the United States capitulated to Brit-
ish demands and agreed to a fifty-fifty
allocation of uranium with Britain. This
equitable allocation allowed Britain to
amass a huge stockpile, without which it
could never have detonated an atomic
bomb in October 1952. By 1947 the
United States was experiencing a severe
shortage of uranium, which could be met
only from supplies in the Congo and
from that British stockpile. Tough nego-
tiations secured Britain an exchange of
atomic information in return for Ameri-
can access to all Congo allocations to be
made in 1948–49 and, if needed, addi-
tional supplies from the British stockpile.
This arrangement was sanctified in a
“modus vivendi” signed on 7 January
1948. The political counterpoint to this
“agreement” could be found in the char-
acterization by Edmund Gullion, a spe-
cial assistant to Undersecretary of State
Robert Lovett: Gullion had suggested
calling this agreement a “modus vi-
vendi,” since that was “a term most often
used to describe the relations between
adversaries driven by circumstances to
get along together.”
The single area where I find myself in
disagreement with Paul is his assertion
that “American postwar atomic energy
policy would be formulated, for the most
part, not by the President but by this
[government] bureaucracy.” This is a
very wide generalization, not supported
by the evidence. On the contrary, no
president has abdicated his responsibility
for the formulation of nuclear weapons
policy to a bureaucracy, however talented.
Paul himself makes this very point at the
outset of his book, arguing that when
Roosevelt and Churchill secretly negoti-
ated the Hyde Park aide-memoire in Sep-
tember 1944, they agreed to continue
postwar atomic cooperation. While that
promise was disingenuous on Roosevelt’s
part, the key point was that “the decision
was made with no input from the Presi-
dent’s advisers.” President Truman’s ac-
tion in signing the McMahon Act in
August 1946 is perhaps the clearest indi-
cator of his intent to oppose the sharing
of America’s atomic secrets with any na-
tion, Britain included. The McMahon
Act prohibited transferring to any other
nation the scientific and technological in-
formation necessary to manufacture an
atomic bomb. The successful detonation
of a British hydrogen bomb in May 1957
led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to
overrule such advisers as the chairman of
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the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral
Lewis Strauss, and to secure an amend-
ment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1958.
This amendment provided for a renewed
bilateral exchange of nuclear weapons
technologies with Great Britain. The ex-
tent to which presidential advisers got
out in front of nuclear policy and played
the role of staunch opponents of bilateral
cooperation is well and properly docu-
mented in Nuclear Rivals. Indeed, the ac-
curate portrayal of their roles in both the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations,
in war and peace, is a major asset of this
book. Yet any implication of presidential
abdication of the policy formulation role
in this sphere is a misconstruction.
The caveat above notwithstanding,
Septimus H. Paul has made a particularly
valuable contribution to the literature. In
his use of sources, Paul reveals a sophisti-
cated understanding of the power calcu-
lus and refocuses our attention on some
of the seminal issues and disagreements
of the early Cold War period, with all
their complexities. For just these reasons,
Nuclear Rivals should be required read-
ing not only for historians of this era but
for all students of national security policy
making.
MYRON A. GREENBERG
Defense Contract Management Agency/DCM Dayton
Daso, Dik Alan. Hap Arnold and the Evolution of
American Airpower. Washington, D.C.: Smithso-
nian Institution Press, 2000. 233pp. $23.95
Henry “Hap” Arnold was one of our
great commanders. The only airman to
hold five-star rank, he led the Army Air
Forces through World War II with a
strength, tenacity, and vision that was in-
strumental to victory, while at the same
time breaking his own health. Dik Daso,
a former Air Force fighter pilot, Ph.D.,
and curator at the National Air and
Space Museum, tells Arnold’s important
story with unusual insight and verve.
Graduating from West Point in 1907, Ar-
nold earnestly desired an assignment to
the cavalry but instead was posted to the
infantry. Despite exciting and formative
experiences in the Philippines, he still
hankered for the cavalry. Once again he
was refused. He then transferred to the
Signal Corps, and in 1911 he became one
of our first military pilots. Fate. Over the
next three decades he became widely rec-
ognized as an outstanding aviator (he
won the coveted Mackay Trophy twice),
commander, and staff officer. When Os-
car Westover, chief of the Air Corps, was
killed in a plane crash in September 1938,
Arnold took his place and led the air arm
for the next seven years. But the long
hours and incredible pace he set for him-
self took their toll. He suffered severe
heart attacks during the war, and another
in 1950 took his life.
Other books have been written about Ar-
nold, and his memoirs are packed with
detail. Nonetheless, Daso was able to un-
cover family sources and documents not
previously used that shed new light on
Arnold the man, husband, and father.
This approach makes for fascinating
reading; it is always a comfort to know
that great men are as human as ourselves.
Daso also highlights a unique aspect of
Arnold’s life—his appreciation for the
integral relationship between science,
technology, and airpower. Early in his ca-
reer Arnold recognized that a second-rate
air force was worse than none at all. The
path to aviation leadership was a strong
research-and-development program and
a commitment to progress. Arnold’s vi-
sion in this regard was extraordinary. He
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consciously pursued contacts with lead-
ing scientists, industrialists, and engi-
neers, planting in them ideas and urging
them to move more quickly and boldly.
He supported research into cruise and
ballistic missiles, precision weapons, jet
engines, and rockets. Daso highlights the
special relationship between Arnold and
the brilliant aeronautical scientist Theo-
dore von Kármán, who in 1945 wrote the
seminal Toward New Horizons, a detailed
look at the future of air and space tech-
nology that would serve as the blueprint
for Air Force research over the next two
decades.
Daso points to Arnold’s holistic ap-
proach to airpower as one of his great in-
sights. Arnold understood that it took
more than a collection of military air-
planes to generate airpower. Needed also
were a strong industrial base, robust re-
search and development, a broad avia-
tion infrastructure, a large pool of
qualified personnel, and, perhaps most
importantly, a clearly devised, coherent,
and codified doctrine for the employ-
ment of those assets. Arnold, believing
unshakably in the importance of strategic
airpower, labored to ensure that America
possessed all of these necessary factors.
One of the most interesting and insight-
ful portions of this account is the epi-
logue, where Daso expands upon a letter
that Arnold wrote shortly before his
death regarding his views on leadership.
The general noted several vital qualities:
technical competence, hard work, vision,
judgment, communication skills, a facil-
ity for human relations, and integrity.
One could also add mental and physical
courage. As he went higher in command
and responsibility, Arnold was continu-
ously faced with tough decisions. Having
the courage to do the right thing regard-
less of the consequences and regardless of
the effect on friends and family is enor-
mously difficult. This list of attributes,
which Arnold displayed in abundance
throughout his career, serves as the per-
fect summation for both the book and
the man.
One might quibble with Daso over what
he left out of this book. He spends almost
no time discussing broad issues of strat-
egy in World War II, targeting debates,
interservice rivalries, or Arnold’s rela-
tionships with his commanders. It is use-
ful to recall here that Arnold’s title was
“commanding general” of the Army Air
Forces; he was indeed that. He had far
more control over his air forces and per-
sonnel than does a present-day chief of
staff. An exploration of this aspect of Ar-
nold’s life would have been interesting.
Nonetheless, Daso’s research is prodi-
gious, the numerous illustrations are ex-
cellent, and his writing style is eminently
pleasing. This is an excellent biography
of a great commander; it should be read
by airmen of all ranks, scholars, and
other services’ officers who wish to un-
derstand better the key influence in the
development of the U.S. Air Force.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, Va.
Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. Enigma: The Battle for the
Code. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2001. 403pp. $30
Hugh Sebag-Montefiore has given us a
scholarly and thoroughly researched ac-
count of the code breaking that staved off
unsustainable losses of merchant shipping
and thereby led to victory in the Battle of
the Atlantic. This book is particularly
recommended to communications and
communications security personnel.
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Enigma may be scholarly, but it certainly
is not dull. It is difficult to put aside and
is, in the modern vernacular, “a good
read.” The author traces the history of
the Enigma machine from its beginnings
in Belgium and Germany in 1931 to what
the author titles the “Last Hiccough,” in
June 1944. Most war college graduates
consider themselves informed on the
events of World War II, but few fully re-
alize how crucial breaking the codes was
to winning the war or appreciate the
blood, sweat, guts, and luck that made it
possible.
In 1931 Hans Schmidt, who has been
called the “Enigma spy,” gave some
Enigma manuals to the French. Two
years prior, the German embassy in War-
saw asked Polish customs to return a box
to Germany that had evidently been sent
to Poland by mistake. A suspicious cus-
toms officer alerted the appropriate offi-
cials, and when the box was opened, an
Enigma machine was found inside. Pol-
ish cipher authorities spent the weekend
examining it before sending it back to
Berlin, with no one German wiser. The
Poles took advantage of their find and
managed to break the code. With the be-
ginning of the war and the subsequent
fall of France, the Polish code breakers,
who had fled to France, were in a precari-
ous position. Their efforts to escape to
England were frustrated by seemingly
endless French bureaucratic roadblocks.
Finally, some succeeded in crossing the
English Channel and joined the British
code breakers at Bletchley Park.
There are really two facets to this story:
acquiring the material, and then develop-
ing the capability to use it. The credit for
the first requirement belongs to the
Royal Navy, and later to the U.S. Navy.
Credit for the second goes to the code
breakers themselves.
The film U-571 is fictitious but draws
upon the capture of U-110 by HMS Bull-
dog. At its conclusion, full credit is given
to Bulldog and other people and ships
that captured Enigma machines, includ-
ing Admiral Dan Gallery and the men of
USS Guadalcanal’s hunter-killer group
who captured U-505 in June 1944. The
author comments on Admiral Ernest
King’s severe displeasure at the salvage of
the submarine; had word filtered back to
Germany, the high command would have
been certain that the Enigma secret was
no longer safe. If there was a leak, how-
ever, evidently it was not acted upon. In
addition to U-boats, German trawlers,
weather ships, and supply ships were
boarded and their code material taken to
the Allied code breakers. Although the
popular recent movie might be thought
to be overdrawn, in fact the boarding of-
ficer and one enlisted man from HMS
Petard went down with U-559 after re-
trieving its code books.
The author points out that the German
high command discounted any indica-
tion that its code might have been com-
promised. It did not indoctrinate
submarine personnel sufficiently to en-
sure that Enigma material was safe from
enemy hands. Weighting cipher books
seems elementary. Still, none of us is
blameless. Code books from American
destroyers sunk in the Solomons washed
ashore, much to everyone’s embarrass-
ment, but fortunately they were recov-
ered by “the good guys.”
This book contains a considerable
amount of technical information about
the Enigma machine, how it was put to-
gether, and about the code books that
made it work. Fortunately, most of this is
contained in appendices, so the flow of
the narrative is not disrupted. For the
untutored, the technical data make clear
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the enormous effort and highly talented
people required to succeed in such diffi-
cult and frustrating work. Communica-
tions have come a long way since 1945,
but a detailed description of Enigma of
World War II may be useful to young se-
curity communications personnel of to-
day. After all, if you want to know where
you are going, you should know where
you have been.
Hugh Sebag-Montefiore has done a real
service to all navies by digging out this
story and unfolding it so well. Had the
code breakers not been successful, the
world might look much different. At the
least, some of us would not have sur-
vived, and our children and grandchil-
dren would not have been born.
WILLIAM B. HAYLER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
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FROM THE EDITORS/OF SPECIAL INTEREST
In Memoriam
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER’S ELLER PRIZE
The Director of Naval History has awarded honorable mention in the Rear
Admiral Ernest M. Eller Naval History Prize, for the best article published in
2000, to Dr. Donald Chisholm of the Naval War College, for his “Negotiated
Joint Command Relationships: Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950,”
which appeared in our Spring 2000 issue. The article also won our own Edward
S. Miller History Prize, and honorable mention in the Surface Navy Associa-
tion/U.S. Naval Institute Literary Prize competition.
SUBSCRIPTION VALIDATIONS
Longtime Naval War College Review subscribers are aware that the U.S. Postal
Service requires this journal and other users of the Periodicals Postage privilege
to “validate” their subscription lists every two years. Starting in 2002, the Review
will meet this requirement in a new way: a special mailer will be sent in
even-numbered years to all subscribers. Individual and institutional (e.g., li-
brary) subscribers should watch for our mailer in early 2002: tear off the return
section, fill out your address as you want it to appear, add any comments about
our journal or Website, attach postage, and mail it back to us.
Those who returned our tear-out card in the Spring 2001 issue need not return
the 2002 mailer; if in doubt, however, please send in the card.
Three current Naval War College students—participants in the Nonresident
Seminar Program of the College of Continuing Education—were killed in the
11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon:
Lieutenant Commander Dan F. Shanower, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Jonas Panik, U.S. Navy
Ms. Angela Houtz
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